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ACTIVISM 


^  Idbru 
C  K.  OGDEN 


ACTIVISM 


BY 

HENRY  LANE  ENO 

RESEARCH  ASSOCIATE  IN  PSYCHOLOGY 
PRINCKTON   UNIVERSITY 


PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

PRINCETON,  N.  J. 

LONDON :  HUMPHREY  MILFORD 

OXTORD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

1020 


Copyright  1920,  by 
Princeton  University  Press 

Published  1920 


rTT>T>AKT 

tWrVT'^c-TTY  OF  rATJVORNT\ 
P  SANTA  BAEBAUA 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

1.  Fundamental  Conceptions  i 

2.  Activity  as  an  Underlying  Hypothesis  8 

3.  Planes  of  Activity 30 

4.  Units  of  Activity 38 

5.  Unitary  Complexes    47 

6.  Interrelation      of      the      Different 

Planes   58 

7.  Consciousness     92 

8.  The  Meta-psychic  Plane    138 

9.  Activism  and  the  Historic  Problems 

of  Philosophy  144 

10.  Conclusion    175 

Appendix    185 

Index     203 


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PREFACE 

It  is  not  without  hesitation  that  the  present  essay 
is  submitted  to  the  public. 

It  would  seem,  however,  at  this  time  especially, 
when  all  of  us  are  groping  for  whatever  stray 
gleams  of  light  may  come  our  way,  that  a  possibly 
fresh  point  of  view  may  not  be  entirely  supereroga- 
tory. For  in  the  midst  of  the  cataclysmic  changes 
taking  place  on  every  side  many  of  us  find  ourselves 
forced  to  a  new  searching  of  the  spirit.  The  older 
creeds  and  philosophies  are  crumbling  or  becoming 
metamorphosed.  And  in  the  intellectual  world,  no 
less  than  in  the  sphere  of  politics  and  industry,  we 
are  everywhere  faced  with  the  necessity  of  a  revalu- 
ation of  values. 

In  philosophy  a  newer  Idealism,  Realism,  and 
Pragmatism,  as  well  as  such  iconoclastic  doctrines 
as  Behaviorism  in  psychology,  and  the  Relational 
theory  in  physics,  have  swept  many  of  the  long  re- 
ceived dogmas  into  a  historic  past ;  while  many  old 
questions  have  been  answered  with  surprising  solu- 
tions, and  many  strange  and  hitherto  unsuspected 
problems  have  been  discovered  to  confront  us. 

To  meet  some  of  these  newer  conditions — to 
envisage  some  of  these  many  problems  from  a  pos- 
sibly fresh  angle — is  the  endeavor  of  the  hypothesis 
here  briefly  outlined.  The  author  is,  nevertheless, 
acutely  conscious  of  the  tentative  and  sketchy  char- 


PREFACE 

acter  of  this  trial,  as  well  as  of  its  frequent  short- 
comings both  in  substance  and  in  style. 

It  is,  also,  a  cause  of  no  small  regret  that  it  seems 
to  have  been  necessary  to  use  not  a  few  new  terms,  in 
addition  to  several  familiar  words  employed  in  such 
a  fashion  as  to  involve  unusual  connotations.  The 
exigency  in  the  development  of  a  somewhat  novel 
thesis,  however,  involving  a  descriptive  terminology 
for  which  apparently  there  exists  at  present  no  ac- 
curate expressions,  has  forced  the  issue  to  a  point 
where  no  practical  alternative  has  been  left.  It  can 
only  be  said  in  extenuation  that  as  few  strange 
words  as  possible  have  been  used,  and  that  a  strenu- 
ous effort  has  been  made  to  explain  carefully  these 
innovations. 

Finally,  the  author's  thanks  are  due  to  Professor 
Edward  Gleason  Spaulding  for  his  helpful  sug- 
gestions and  logical  criticism;  to  Professor  Au- 
gustus Trowbridge  for  his  assistance  in  the  interpre- 
tation of  modern  physics ;  to  Professor  Howard  C. 
Warren  for  his  revision  of  the  chapter  on  Conscious- 
ness; and,  particularly,  in  remembrance,  for  the 
kindly  advice,  and  the  many  critical  notes  jotted 
down,  by  the  late  William'  James — now  some  years 
ago — upon  the  margins  of  the  original  sketch  of 
which  the  present  essay  is  the  outgrowth. 

Henry  LanE  End. 
Princeton,  New  Jersey, 
May,  1920 


CHAPTER  1. 

FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS 

The  universe  of  which  we  seem  to  be  aware  may 
be  divided  into  three  great  classes — entities,  rela- 
tions, and  processes. 

Of  these,  entities  and  relations  are  fundamental ; 
processes  appear  to  be  derivative,  involving  entities 
of  some  kind,  relations  of  usually  many  kinds,  but 
always,  and  especially,  those  relations  to  the  time 
series  which  distinguish  process  as  such. 

As  to  the  exact  status  of  these  classes,  philoso- 
phers differ.  As  to  their  actuality,  all  philosophers 
agree.  Every  mode  of  thought  possesses  an  expres- 
sion for  them.  In  physical  science  they  are  epito- 
mized in  matter,  and  in  the  relational  complexes  of 
space,  time,  and  motion.  As  organisms  we  are  con- 
scious of  them  as  existence,  environment,  and  reac- 
tion; while  in  the  poetic  symbolism  of  the  East 
they  are  known  as  being,  wisdom,  and  power.  They 
do  not  easily  submit  themselves  to  definition,  for 
without  cognizance  of  them  no  thinking  is  conceiv- 
able. Like  Emerson's  "Brahma",  they  include  the 
thinker,  his  total  environment,  and  his  thought. 

Yet,  although  the  universe  thus  seems  to  fall  into 
three  main  divisions,  not  all  philosophers  have  been 
fully  alive  to  this  obvious  fact.  On  the  contrary 
they  have,  from  the  earliest  times,  nearly  always 

(1) 


2  FUNDAMENTAI.  CONCEPTIONS 

overemphasized  some  single  aspect.  "The  World 
is  eternal  and  immutable,"  said  Father  Parmenides 
(Entity)  ;  "All  things  flow  away  and  nothing  re- 
mains" said  Heraclitus  (Process) ;  "Everything  is 
relative,  illusion — 'Maya'"  said  Sankara  (Rela- 
tion) ;  and  their  intellectual  descendants  are  alive 
this  very  day.  All  things  are  generated  from  the 
immutable  logical  principles,  says  Russell  (Realist)  ; 
the  whole  universe  is  pure  process,  becoming,  says 
Bergson  (Pragmatist) ;  everything  is  error  and  illu- 
sion, says  Bradley  (Idealist).^  While,  it  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  add,  we  possess  every  sort  of  philosophy 
exhibiting  some  more  qualified  overempha§is  as  the 
result  of  combinations  and  modifications  of  these 
extreme  views. 

But  this  universe  of  ours  is  in  some  ways  at  least 
not  only  threefold  but  also  one,  since  after  all  it  is 
a  universe,  ordered  to  some  extent,  so  far  as  we  have 
been  able  to  explore  it,  and  not  a  chaos.  As  a  uni- 
verse of  total  inclusion  it  is  undoubtedly  one,  as  well 
as  in  its  character  as  a  universe  of  discourse ;  while 
for  many  essential  considerations  science  is  forced 
to  maintain  that  it  is  a  uniformity,  subject  through- 

*  Bertrand  Russell :  The  Principles  of  Mathematics.  Cam- 
bridge University  Press,  1903. 

Henri  Bergson:  ^'Evolution  Creatrice.  Felix  Alcan, 
Paris,  1908. 

F.  H.  Bradley:  Appearance  and  Reality.  Swan,  Sonnen- 
schein  &  Co.,  London,  1908. 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS  3 

out  to  inevitable  laws.  All  monistic  philosophical 
systems  also,  on  speculative  grounds,  maintain  its 
essential  unity;  and  while  their  reasoning  and  con- 
clusions may  perhaps  be  found  faulty,  yet  from 
their  wide  acceptance  and  traditional  importance 
they  cannot  be  ignored. 

At  the  very  start,  therefore,  should  we  care  to  dis- 
cuss cosmology  at  all,  we  find  ourselves  confronted 
with  the  ancient  but  ever  youthful  problem  of  the 
one  and  the  many.  That  the  world  is  many  is  a  fact 
that  none  but  the  solipsist  can  question ;  and  even  for 
him  the  content  of  his  own  mind  is  manifold.  More- 
over one  does  not  argue  with  the  solipsist,  one  puts 
him  in  a  sanitorium. 

Well;  is  the  world  also  one?  And  if  so,  in  what 
way  and  how  much  is  it  one  ? 

We  have  seen  that  it  is,  pretty  deeply  at  any  rate, 
threefold,  since  we  find  everywhere  the  ultimate 
distinction  between  entities  and  relations,  and, 
wherever  time  holds  sway,  those  special  relations 
between  entity-complexes  and  moments  in  the  time 
series  which  superadd  the  element  of  process.  But 
can  these  great  divisions  into  which  it  falls  be 
united ;  can  the  three  great  classes  of  its  elements  be 
in  any  way  subsumed  under  one  unifying  concep- 
tion? 

Now  in  attempting  to  answer  this  question  we 
shall  probably  be  forced  to  admit  at  once  that  any 


4  FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS 

such  unifying  conception,  in  our  present  state  of 
ignorance,  can  be  at  best  but  a  working  hypothesis. 
That  such  an  hypothesis  should  possess  wide  theo- 
retic and  empirical  support,  and  that  it  should  work 
— enable  us  to  explain  with  its  aid  a  greater  number 
of  difficulties  than  we  could  explain  without  it — is 
the  most  that  reasonably  can  be  expected.  For  the 
day  of  irrefutable  philosophic  systems  is  past. 

A  working  hypothesis  of  this  kind,  furthermore, 
from  its  very  nature  as  such,  must  draw  its  chief 
support  from  empirical  experience — from  the  world 
as  we  actually  seem  to  find  it — not  as  we  might  find 
it  or  prefer  to  find  it.  Our  philosophic  point  of 
view,  therefore,  will  be  in  the  main  the  point  of 
view  characterized  as  radical  empiricism.  Since  we 
posit  too,,  for  our  purpose  at  any  rate,  a  real  uni- 
verse full  of  real  entities,  relations,  and  processes, 
it  will  also  be  a  realistic  philosophy  avoiding  as  far 
as  possible  the  ancient  controversial  problems  as  to 
whether  the  world  is  not  after  all  merely  appear- 
ance, illusion,  or  existent  only  in  the  mind  of  some 
Knower,  or  knowers.  For  whatever  the  ultimate 
character  of  the  universe  may  be,  it  seems  indisput- 
able that  at  least  it  appears  as  real,  and  so  consti- 
tutes for  us  at  any  rate  a  real  appearance.  If 
therefore  to  hold  this  view  makes  us  naive  realists, 
we  must  let  the  soft  impeachment  lie,  permitting 
ourselves  cheerfully  to  be  classed  among  the  scien- 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS  5 

tists,  the  poets,  the  religious  teachers,  and  the 
practical  men  generally,  who  do  real  illusory  things 
in  a  world  of  real  illusion. 

Taking  then  the  world  in  this  way  as  it  ap- 
pears, we  find  it  full  of  a  number  of  things — 
physical  things,  mental  things,  and  things  which 
seem  to  be  neither.  In  this  world  of  actual  ex- 
perience, moreover,  all  of  these  things  in  their  own 
various  ways  are  efficient.  They  "make  a  differ- 
ence" somewhere.  Any  one  of  these  things  also,  in 
so  far  as  it  is  conceivably  to  be  found  at  all,  may 
from  the  fact  of  its  conceivability  alone,  if  from  no 
other  reason,  be  in  essential  relation  with  some  sort 
of  process.  It  is  quite  unessential  that  such  a  thing 
should  itself  be  a  process,  a  change,  or  be  dependent 
for  its  existence  or  efficiency  upon  other  processes. 
An  ideal  entity  such  as  a  geometrical  figure,  a  rela- 
tion, or  a  relational  complex,  whether  independently 
"real"  or  merely  an  intellectual  construct,  makes 
many  differences,  and  among  them  differences  in  the 
world  of  process.  It  is  of  course  evident  that  the 
efficiency  of  such  unchangeables  may  be  a  non-causal 
efficiency,  but  that  fact  does  not  make  them  any  less 
efficient.  The  existence,  or  "subsistence",  of  geo- 
metric triangles  or  circles  not  only  is  efficient  in  their 
own  sphere  of  ideal  space,  but  is  equally  efficient  in 
determining  the  necessary  course  of  the  geometer's 
mental  operations.    Yet  here  the  specific  nature  of  a 


6  FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS 

process  depends  upon  something  which  is  not  a 
process  itself,  a  certain  kind  of  change  is  deter- 
mined by  a  certain  kind  of  unchangeable. 

Obviously  however  we  also  find  processes  depend- 
ing upon  each  other,  either  in  relations  of  non-causal 
efficiency,  or  causal  relations,  or  both ;  in  general  the 
strictly  causal  efficiencies  being  confined  to  the  world 
of  physical  processes  and  non-causal  relations  obtain- 
ing between  non-physical  processes,  as,  for  example, 
the  efficient  correlations  of  the  ideal  processes 
in  theoretical  dynamics. 

It  seems  evident  therefore  that  any  sort  of  entity, 
relation,  process,  or  any  complex  of  them,  can  be  a 
determinant  factor  in  some  sort  of  process.  It  seems 
equally  evident,  also,  that  this  determining  efficiency 
does  not  depend  upon  the  "existential"  status  of  the 
determinants, — their  status  as  existing  in  space  or 
time — nor  upon  what  their  ultimate  natures  may  be. 

They  may  be  entities  or  processes  real  or 
ideal,  relations,  universals,  values — whatever  you 
will.  The  fact  of  their  just  being,  whatever  they 
really  are  in  themselves,  constitutes  a  ground  for 
some  process  taking  a  different  course  from  the 
course  which  it  would  pursue  if  such  things  were 
not.  If  the  time-space  condition,  for  example,  with 
its  ubiquitous  relations  to  other  existences  was  not  a 
fact,  no  process  at  all  would  be  possible.  If  the 
numerical  series  were  absent  no  classification  nor 


FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS  7 

differentiation  could  obtain.  Without  "values"  no 
art  nor  morals  could  be  imagined.  All  these  things 
are  efficient.  They  are  that  by  reason  of  which 
processes — series  of  changes — occur  at  all. 

Now  this  particular  sort  of  efficiency  appears  to 
be  possessed  by  everything.  There  is  nothing — 
even  the  conception  of  nothingness  itself — from  a 
chimera  to  an  elephant,  from  an  ideal  or  value  to  a 
nerve  impulse,  from  a  passing  thought  to  an  eternal 
platonic  idea,  but  may  be  the  ground  for  some  sort 
of  change;  if  in  no  other  way,  at  least  for  the 
change  incurred  in  our  psychic  or  neural  processes 
while  thinking  of  it.  And  this  special  sort  of  effi- 
ciency we  shall  call,  for  want  of  some  more  accu- 
rate appellation,  "Activity." 

"Activity",  says  Bradley,  "is  the  scandal  of  phi- 
losophy." But  scandal  or  not,  activity  in  this  broad 
sense  is  inescapable.  For  activity  is  that  by  reason 
of  which  change  exists. 

Assuming,  then,  that  all  things  conceivable  can  be 
considered  as  activities  in  this  sense;  that  all  mem- 
bers of  the  three  fundamental  classes,  entities,  rela- 
tions,- and  processes  possess  at  least  this  one  element 
in  common, — can  be  subsumed  under  this  universal 
conception ;  what  sort  of  world  shall  we  find  inter- 
preted in  this  light  ?  Will  the  hypothesis  of  such  a 
common  denominator  make  our  universe  any  more 
intelligible  ?    In  short,  will  this  hypothesis  work  ? 


CHAPTER  2 

ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERIyYING  HYPOTHESIS 

We  have  tentatively  defined  activity  as  "that  by 
reason  of  which  change  exists",  and  we  have  ad- 
vanced the  hypothesis  that  everything  in  the  universe 
of  which  we  are  aware  is  an  activity  in  this  sense 
of  the  term.  Our  hypothesis  is,  therefore,  an  under- 
lying hypothesis  which  maintains  that  there  exists 
a  fundamental  class  of  being  to  which  all  things 
belong.  This  definition  of  activity  however  is  not 
equivalent  to  a  definition  of  mere  being.  For  it  is 
possible  that  there  might  exist  beings,  out  of  any 
relation  by  means  of  which  a  difference  could  be 
made  in  the  world  of  process,  and  of  which  we  could 
not  even  conceive,  that  would  not  be  activities.  The 
conception  is,  therefore,  empirically  but  not  logically, 
all  inclusive.  It  is  held  to  be  true,  nevertheless,  of 
every  object  discoverable  or  imaginable,  to  which- 
ever of  the  three  great  subsidiary  classes — entities, 
relations,  or  processes^ — that  object  may  either  ex- 
clusively or  jointly  belong. 

The  reason  for  so  sweeping  a  contention  is  that  it 
seems  impossible  to  discover  any  fact  which  does  not, 
in  some  way,  fall  into  this  universal  category.  It  is 
obviously  true  of  all  entities,  whether  "real"  objects, 
or  ideal  conceptions.  They  all  "make  a  difference" 
somewhere.    It  is  also  true  of  relations.    For  even  if 

(8) 


ACTIVITY  AS  A#UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS     9 

a  relation  "as  such",  for  example  "north  of",  seems 
to  exist,  or  as  Russell  has  it,  "subsist"  "nowhen  and 
nowhere",  it  is  nevertheless  obviously  a  ground  for  a 
very  specific  sort  of  change,  namely  the  physical 
motion  or  process  required  to  traverse  the  distance 
between  any  material  spot  and  that  which  it  is  "north 
of".  In  other  words,  the  entirely  definite  process  or 
change  involved  in  "going  north"  can  only  occur 
because  of  such  a  relation  as  "north  of".  In  this 
instance  then  "north  of"  is  not  only  an  activity  in 
general,  but  a  quite  specific  kind  of  activity  upon 
which  directly  depends  a  quite  specific  kind  of 
change.  While  if  it  is  urged  that  the  instance  quoted 
is  inadequate  because  the  relation  "north  of"  is  a 
relation  between  purely  physical  objects,  it  can  easily 
be  shown  that  the  contention  advanced  holds  equally 
well  of  any  other  relations.  For  even  if  we  take 
such  a  logical  proposition  as  the  Platonic  "Goodness 
and  Truth  are  one",  where  the  terms  are  ideal  enti- 
ties, eternal  and  immutable,  and  the  relations  be- 
tween them  seemingly  altogether  independent  of 
temporal  or  spacial  implications,  we  still  have  a  re- 
lational complex  by  reason  of  which  changes  occur. 
And  this  is  so  because  the  mere  fact  that  there  is 
such  a  proposition  eventually  entails  a  whole  host 
of  changes  in  any  world  in  which  goodness,  truth, 
and  change  exist — produces,  indeed,  a  quite  specific 
reaction  at  this  specific  moment  in  my  own  organism. 


10  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

The  same  is  true  of  mathematical  entities  and  re- 
lational complexes,  as  well  as  of  the  eternal  heaven 
of  transcendental  verities  generally.  Whatever  their 
philosophic  status  may  be,  in  so  far  as  they  are  at 
all  they  are  activities.  For  discoverable  relations 
and  entities  of  every  kind — not  only  physical  and 
mental,  but  ideal  as  well, — are  all  things  by  reason 
of  whose  being  some  modification  in  the  world  of 
process  is  continually  occurring,  if  in  no  other  way, 
at  least  in  the  conscious  processes  of  which  they  are 
at  any  time  the  content.  The  universe,  therefore, 
in  this  broader  sense  is  dynamic  through  and 
through.  Part  of  it,  and  possibly  no  inconsiderable 
part,  may  be  extra-temporal  and  in  that  way  static, 
other  parts  may  well  be  extra-spacial,  many  portions 
are  undoubtedly  extra-physical;  yet  all  parts  are 
efficient.  Any  of  them  by  their  inclusion  in  some 
particular  "state  of  affairs"  may  be  the  ground  for 
the  modification  of  specific  conditions.  Nothing  is 
dead.    Nothing  is  inactive. 

Although  every  conceivable  thing  is  thus  an  ac- 
tivity, it  is  obvious  however  that,  since  the  world 
is  many  as  well  as  one,  there  must  be  many  different 
sorts  or  conditions  or  manifestations  of  this  activity. 
Our  problem  is  therefore,  (i)  What  kinds  of  ac- 
tivity are  there?  (2)  How  are  these  different  kinds 
of  activities  related?  And  (3)  what  is  the  differ- 
entiating principle  (or  principles)  according  to 
which  they  can  be  distinguished  ? 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  11 

Now  since,  according  to  our  view,  things  are  fun- 
damentally efficiencies  and  the  world  thus  capable  of 
interpretation  in  the  terms  of  a  universal  behavior- 
ism, to  specify  every  kind  of  activity  would  be  sim- 
ply to  catalogue  everything  of  which  we  could  think. 
At  this  point,  nevertheless,  it  may  be  well  briefly  to 
point  out  in  a  general  way  the  particular  sorts  of 
activity  of  which  the  more  important  elements  of 
our  world  consist. 

We  have  already  indicated  broadly  how  entities 
both  "real"  and  "ideal"  as  well  as  relations,  whether 
taken  as  mere  conceptions  or  objective  realities,  and 
of  course  processes,  may  be  considered  as  activities. 
From  this  contention  it  follows  that  the  entities  and 
processes  of  the  physical  world  must  be  activities 
also,  since  it  is  evident  that,  as  direct  objects  of 
observation,  they  are  continually  the  conditions  of 
modification  in  any  situation  in  which  they  are 
involved.  And  it  is  a  familiar  fact  that  science  has 
already  to  a  large  extent  reached  the  same  conclu- 
sion. Physical  motion  is  of  course  activity,  since  it 
is  a  specific  form  of  change  and  directly  the  physical 
cause  of  other  material  motions.  Physical  entities 
likewise,  aside  from  the  obvious  fact  that,  from  their 
very  nature  as  such,  they  must  constitute  grounds 
for  change  in  other  physical  entities,  are  now  gen- 
erally considered  to  be  fundamentally  electrical  in 
character,  and  if  so,  ultimately  a  form  of  process  or 


12  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

change.  The  chemical  elements  are  no  longer  looked 
upon  as  static  but  as  in  a  continual  state  of  evolu- 
tion and  disintegration.  The  atoms  of  which  the 
elements  are  supposed  to  be  constructed  are  also  no 
longer  considered  ultimates,  but  are  in  their  turn 
held  to  be  composed  of  electrons,  or  particles  of  elec- 
tricity; while,  finally,  the  electron  itself  is  supposed 
to  be  some  sort  of  vortex,  whorl,  knot,  stress,  or 
strain  in  an  all-pervading  ether ;  or,  should  there  be 
no  ether,  an  electrical  unit,  possibly  complex,  and 
probably  subject  to  expansion,  contraction  and 
change.  So  even  matter  itself  is  supposed  to  be 
in  a  continual  process  of  evolution  and  dissolution, 
and,  ipso  facto,  all  the  specific  material  entities  of 
which  "matter"  is  the  general  designation. 

The  world  however  is  full  of  a  number  of  other 
things.  Most  closely  associated  with  the  physical 
world,  perhaps,  is  the  world  of  the  mathematician, 
since  it  is  more  and  more  by  the  principles  of  that 
world  especially  that  the  physical  scientist  is  enabled 
to  find  his  way  about  among  the  bewildering  multi- 
plicity of  phenomena.  Whatever  the  real  status  of 
the  subject  matter  with  which  the  mathematician 
deals  however,  (and  the  mathematician  himself 
certainly  considers  it  "objective"  and  intractable 
enough)  whether  its  content — number,  form,  varia- 
bles, and  the  like — be  as  "real"  as  the  pyrarnids, 
or  merely  useful  conceptual  ideals,  they  are,  never- 
theless, activities. 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  13 

That,  for  example,  there  is  such  a  thing  as  the 
numerical  series  at  all,  or  that  two  and  two  equals 
four  rather  than  five  or  seven,  constitutes  a  reason 
for  an  innumerable  host  of  specific  processes,  not 
only  purely  mathematical  but  material  and  mental 
as  well.  The  undeniable  fact,  whatever  its  nature, 
that  two  and  two  make  four  is  the  direct  reason  for 
certain  counting  processes,  (involving,  of  course, 
relational  complexes,)  besides  "making  a  difference" 
— i.  e.  constituting  a  change — in  countless  other 
processes  which  would  take  place  in  some  quite  other 
fashion  if  this  mathematical  fact  were  anything  else 
than  what  it  is.  In  an  assemblage  where  the  presence 
of  four  units  of  any  kind — ideal,  mental,  or  physical 
— is  an  essential  prerequisite  for  a  particular  condi- 
tion, the  fact  that  this  assemblage  may  be  obtained 
by  gathering  together  two  couples  of  these  units  is  a 
determining  factor  in  the  assembling  process.  And 
it  follows  that  the  same  condition  must  obtain  for 
the  more  complex  mathematical  situations,  as  well  as 
for  the  more  inclusive  propyositions  of  logic  gen- 
erally. That  "two  things  which  equal  a  third  thing 
in  all  respects  are  equal  to  each  other"  is  a  logical 
proposition  which  makes  all  sorts  of  differences  to 
all  sorts  of  processes,  inaugurates  many  kinds  of 
change;  and  this  is  so  entirely  irrespective  of 
whether  such  a  proposition  is  an  objective  fact,  in- 
dependent of  the  logician  who  formulated  it,  an 


14  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

eternal  verity  shining  forth  in  a  transcendent  heaven 
of  universals,  a  law  of  thought,  or  merely  a  con- 
venient method  created  by  the  human  animal  for 
making  his  world  more  easily  intelligible.  For  let 
such  a  proposition  masquerade  in  any  guise  it  will, 
it  nevertheless  is  an  activity.  It  is  a  fact  by  reason 
of  which  modifications  take  place  in  the  reasoning 
processes,  if  indeed  it  does  not  also  "generate"  addi- 
tional logical  propositions  by  implication. 

It  seems  sufficiently  clear  from  these  instances 
that  logical  propositions  in  general  must  fall  into  the 
same  category,  for  propositions  are  not  only  facts 
of  some  kind,  but,  as  essentially  facts  of  such  a  kind 
that  by  reason  of  them  changes  take  place,  they 
must,  in  order  to  be  at  all,  be  activities. 

Naturally,  it  is  but  a  step  from  mathematical 
entities  and  logical  propositions  to  universals  in 
general.  And  here  again  we  meet  with  the  same 
conditions.  Universals,  as  we  know,  are  general 
or  "abstract"  ideas,  such  as  goodness,  beauty,  white- 
ness, and  the  like.  Whether  such  "concepts"  may 
be  truly  considered  to  possess  some  sort  of  being 
distinct  from  the  particular  facts  whose  classes  they 
epitomize,  as  Plato  held,  is  a  question  which  need 
not  be  discussed  here.  It  may  fairly  be  said,  how- 
ever, that  the  words  which  designate  them  represent 
facts  of  some  kind.  For  a  universal  is  either  a 
symbol  for  a  certain  group  or  class  of  particulars. 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  15 

a  hypostatization  of  that  symbol  into  an  entity 
which  has  no  real  status  aside  from  that  fact  of 
hypostatization,  or,  as  the  class  itself,  a  genuine 
entity  in  its  own  right.  Yet,  under  any  of  these 
circumstances  a  universal  is  an  activity. 

As  the  name  by  which  a  group  of  particulars  is 
designated,  the  mere  fact  that  such  a  name  can  be 
given  constitutes  a  ground  for  the  naming  process, 
while  that  such  a  name  really  exists  creates  a  change 
in  the  reaction  of  all  conscious  organisms  towards 
that  group  of  which  it  is  the  designation — the  sym- 
bgl  for  the  existence  of  the  component  parts  as 
collectively  a  group  at  all.  Specifically,  for  in- 
stance, can  anyone  seriously  maintain  that  the 
possibility  of  the  generic  appelation  "protozoa"  or 
"vertebrate"  does  not  do  something — make  a  vital 
difference  to  the  science  of  biology?  On  the  con- 
trary without  classification,  which  means  naming 
the  separate  animal  groups,  these  sciences  would 
not  be  possible.  Again,  the  hypostatization  itself 
(a  process,  too,  even  if  no  more  than  just  that)  has 
been  the  raison  d'etre  of  a  whole  series  of  philo- 
sophical processes — Platonism,  New  Realism,  and 
the  Scholastic  discussions  generally.  Whereas  if 
universals  are,  on  the  other  hand,  independently 
real,  so  much  the  more  are  they  effective  and 
dynamic  entities,  since  without  them  the  world  of 
particulars  could  not  exist  at  all. 


16  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

Universals,  then  also,  are  facts  of  some  kind,  and 
as  facts,  no  matter  of  what  kind,  are,  as  such, 
activities.  The  ideal  conceptions  of  mathematics 
and  the  physical  sciences,  as  we  have  seen,  are  real 
activities,  otherwise  they  would  not  exist  even  as 
ideals,  continually  modifying,  as  they  do,  scientific 
procedure  in  so  many  ways.  In  like  manner  it  is 
not  difficult  to  show  that  the  ideals  of  ethics  or 
aesthetics,  in  so  far  as  they  possess  any  effective- 
ness, are  activities  also.  Any  conceivable  good, 
because  of  the  fact  that  it  is  so  conceived,  is  a  more 
or  less  important  factor  in  the  behavior  of  the  in- 
dividual who  conceives  it.  In  so  far  as  it  is  a  factor 
its  presence  determines  his  conduct,  alters  the  pro- 
cess of  his  reaction,  is  effective — in  other  words 
constitutes  an  activity. 

The  same  thing  is  true  of  aesthetic  ideals.  The 
painter  strives  for  an  ideal  beauty  of  color  com- 
position, the  musician  for  an  ideal  perfection  of 
melody,  harmony,  and  counterpoint.  The  specific 
aesthetic  ideal  in  either  case  is  the  dominant  factor 
which  governs  the  whole  attitude — modifies  the 
entire  reaction  of  the  artist  who  possesses  it.  In 
scholastic  phraseology  it  is  the  "final,"  or  "formal" 
cause — which  in  this  case  is  none  the  less  true 
because  it  smacks  of  Aristotle.  Called  by  any  name 
you  please,  however,  such  ideals  are  activities. 

Religious  ideals  also  are,  if  anything,  even  more 
"active"  activities,  since  they  more  deeply  modify 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  17 

the  course  of  the  average  individual's  behavior.  All 
of  which  may  throw  some  light  on  the  apparently 
paradoxical  fact  that  Apollo  or  Nicholas  Nickleby 
are  in  some  ways  more  real  characters — occupy  a 
higher  place  in  the  scale  of  activities — than  many  a 
person  whose  lumbering  footsteps  press  down  the 
solid  earth. 

Not  only  events  in  general  then — anything  that 
happens — but  anything  that  makes  a  difference  in 
the  world  of  happenings,  is,  to  that  very  extent  to 
which  it  does  make  a  difference,  an  activity.  Values 
therefore,  about  which  there  has  been  so  much 
recent  discussion,  will  be  conspicuously,  and  with 
rather  notable  clearness,  activities.  For  "values" 
are  those  conditions  in  any  situation  which  deter- 
mine the  reactions  of  living  organisms  to  that  situa- 
tion. They  are  those  elements  in  a  "state  of 
affairs"  that  control  the  conduct  of  the  man  or 
animal  which  that  "state  of  affairs"  confronts. 
The  very  essence  of  their  being  is  to  constitute  the 
worth  factor  in  anything  to  which  they  may  per- 
tain; the  value  of  anything  being  obviously  the 
criterion  of  its  effectiveness.  The  philosopher  acts 
unwisely  here  when  he  overlooks  the  pithy  truths 
of  the  common  man.  Anybody  is  worth  "what  he 
is  good  for,"  says  the  vernacular — his  value  lies 
in  what  he  is  able  to  do,  in  the  changes  for  which 
he  is  the  reason.    That  which  constitutes  the  value 


18  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

of  anything  is  its  efficiency,  its  existential  status  has 
nothing  to  do  with  it.  For  a  value  is  none  the  less 
an  activity  because  it  appears  to  be  neither  physical 
nor  mental.  On  the  contrary,  values  are  among 
the  most  sharply  defined  instances  of  pure  activity, 
since  their  entire  being  lies  in  their  effectiveness — 
their  esse  is  eHHcere. 

So  much,  then,  for  all  sorts  of  things.  Turn 
wherever  we  will,  in  so  far  as  these  are  effective 
in  any  way  at  all  as  conditioning  the  course  of 
events,  they  are  activities. 

As  yet,  however,  consciousness  has  not  been  re- 
ferred to  directly.  Perhaps,  at  this  place,  it  is 
hardly  necessary.  Yet  that  such  a  fact,  or  the 
series  of  facts  for  which  it  is  the  generic  term, 
exists  can  scarcely  be  controverted  seriously.^  For, 
evidently,  it  is  either  an  entity,  a  process,  a  relation, 
or  some  combination  of  these.  And  since,  as  we 
have  attempted  to  show,  all  entities,  processes,  and 

*  Neither  James,  the  Behaviorists,  nor  the  Mechanists  ques- 
tion the  existence  of  awareness  data  as  empirical  facts, 
whatever  views  they  may  advance  as  to  the  existence  of  con- 
sciousness as  a  valid  conception  over  and  above  these  empirical 
facts.  Wm.  James,  'Does  Consciousness  Exist'?  pp.  i-37> 
Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism;  Longfmans  Green  &  Co., 
London,  1912. 

John  B.  Watson :  Behavior.  New  York,  1914,  and  Psychol- 
ogy from  the  Standpoint  of  a  Behaviorist  Lippincott  &  Co., 
1919. 

Jacques  Loeb:  The  Mechanistic  Conception  of  Life.  Uni- 
versity of  Chicago  Press,  1912. 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  19 

relations  are  activities,  it  follows,  of  course,  that 
consciousness  must  be  an  activity  also.  That 
awareness  exists  at  all  (and  who  doubts  it),  un- 
questionably makes  some  difference  to  the  world  in 
which  it  belongs,  and  to  that  extent  at  least  it  is  an 
activity.  That  it  is  an  activity  in  a  much  wider 
sense  most  of  us  believe.  But  in  so  far  as  it  is  at  all, 
in  so  far  forth  it  is  an  activity. 

Well;  the  various  kinds  of  activities  have  been 
sketched  in  a  brief  way,  and  the  rough  outlines  of 
a  world  have  been  blocked  out  from  the  Activist's 
point  of  view.  If  all  is  activity,  however,  there 
must  be  some  principle  by  which  the  various  kinds 
or  degrees  of  activity  can  be  distinguished  or  this 
world  would  be  all  alike,  which  it  obviously  is  not. 
The  problem  here,  then,  is  in  what  does  this  differ- 
entiation consist?  How  does  this  "one"  become 
many   f 

Before  even  an  attempt  to  answer  this  problem  can 
be  hazarded  however,  a  preliminary  question  must 
be  asked — namely,  in  what  does  the  measure  of 
activity  consist?  How  can  the  differences  between 
specific  activities  be  determined;  in  what  do  such 
differences  consist ;  and  can  any  conception  be  dis- 
covered by  which  these  differences  can  be  intelligi- 
bly described? 

The  problem  is  not  easy,  but  we  are  inclined 
to  believe  that  such  a  conception  can  be  found; 


20  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

a  conception  which,  for  want  of  a  better  term, 
we  shall  call  "intensity."  The  use  of  intensity  in 
the  sense  proposed  here  is  perhaps  unfortunate, 
as  the  word  has  already  acquired  so  many  technical 
meanings;  as,  for  example,  in  electricity,  where  it 
is  applied  only  to  the  measurement  of  differences 
in  electrical  level,  or  voltage,  in  contradistinction  to 
the  "amount"  of  electricity;  in  psychology,  where 
the  word  is  usually  applicable  only  to  the  varying 
degrees  of  a  particular  sensation  or  feeling. 
Accepting  however  as  authoritative  Royce's  defini- 
tion of  intensity  as  a  method  of  determination 
wherever  differences  can  be  expressed  only  by 
means  of  "greater-less,  and  equality,"  this  use  of 
it  appears  legitimate ;  so  that  on  the  whole  it  would 
seem  better  to  employ  it  in  this  somewhat  special 
way  rather  than  to  invent  some  new,  and  possibly 
barbarous,  equivalent.  We  shall  use  the  word, 
therefore,  but  not  quite  in  its  ordinary  meaning, 
much  less  in  the  restricted  sense  in  which  it  is  em- 
ployed in  physics  and  psychology.  As  even  its 
ordinary  connotation,  however,  implies  a  degree  of 
power  from  within,  an  intrinsic  effectiveness;  and 
as  activity  is  essentially  self-active,  since  according 
to  our  definition  it  is  the  ground  for  all  process,  the 
term  seems  not  unfitting. 

But   we   propose   to   use   it   in   a   still   broader 
way,  as  well  as  with  a  more  specific  significance. 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  21 

For  our  purposes,  we  shall  consider  intensity  to 
include  certain  essential  elements  which  we  shall 
call,  respectively,  amount,  range,  and  persistence. 

"Amount"  signifies  the  intrinsic  quantity  of 
activity  involved  in  any  specie  instance.  "Range" 
means  the  extent  to  which  that  specific  activity  is 
efficient  in  regard  to  other  activities.  And  "persist- 
ence" indicates  the  duration  of  a  specific  activity  as 
such. 

To  these  a  fourth,  and  derivative,  characteristic 
may  be  added  which  we  shall  call  exclusion — the 
extent  to  which  an  activity,  by  reason  of  its  own 
intrinsic  efficiency,  remains  impervious  to  the  influ- 
ence of  other  activities ;  the  extent  to  which  any  of 
its  own  efficiencies  may  be  regarded  as  independently 
variable.^ 

To  explain  further — (i)  Amount — the  intrinsic 
quantity  of  activity — is  almost  self-evident,  and 
scarcely   needs    additional    definition   here.'      The 

"Stated  in  relational  terms  these  elements  represent:  (i) 
The  relations  of  a  being  to  itself  or  to  its  own  essential  parts — 
its  "inner"  relations ;  (2)  its  relation  to  whatever  is  not 
itself — "the  outer  world"  spacially  and  otherwise;  (3)  its 
relations  to  the  time  series ;  and  (4)  the  relations  to  it  of 
whatever  is  not  itself.  « 

*  Strictly  speaking  the  "amount"  of  any  activity  is  the 
quantity  of  units  (however  defined)  of  which  it  is  composed. 
And  "quantities",  says  Royce,  "are  objects,  either  physical  or 
ideal,  that  fall  into  series  by  virtue  of  relations  of  the  order 
of  greater  and  less". 


22  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

world  of  physical  energy  abounds  in  sufficiently  ob- 
vious examples  of  what  is  meant.  A  living  material 
organism,  for  example,  represents  a  greater  intrinsic 
quantity  of  activity  than,  let  us  say,  a  wooden  image 
of  the  same  size  and  weight.  It  possesses  much 
more  of  those  forms  of  activity  known  as  physical 
and  chemical  energy,* 

Thus,  for  example  again,  although  our  wooden 
image  is  less  intrinsically  active  than  the  living 
organism,  it  might  well,  if  pushed  off  a  high  cliff, 
annihilate  that  living  organism  on  the  ground  below. 
In  this  event  however  the  activity  which  had  brought 
about  this  unfortunate  result  would  not  have  been 
the  intrinsic  activity  of  the  wooden  image  but  the 
intrinsic  activity  of  gravitation,  plus,  of  course,  the 
relational  activities  of  its  situation  on  the  edge  of 
the  cliff,  the  push,  etc.    Its  own  activity  would  have 

His  definition  of  a  series  is  "any  row,  array,  rank,  order  of 
precedence,  numerical  or  quantitative  set  of  values."  A  series 
as  defined  by  Huntington  is  "any  class  of  distinct  elements 
such  that  if  an  element  A  >  (is  greater  than)  B,  and  B  >  C, 
then  A  >  C." 

For  a  full  discussion  of  this  subject  see  Royce's  "The 
Principles  of  Logic"  in  the  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Philosophical 
Sciences,  vol.  i,  p.  lil  ff. ;  and  E.  V.  Huntington's  "The 
Continuum",  p.  lo;  also  B.  Russell's  "Principles  of  Mathe- 
matics", vol.  I,  p.  199. 

*By  "intrinsic"  here,  is  meant  a  qualification  restricting  the 
measure  of  activity  to  that  quantity  of  activity  which,  in  any 
given  object  (physical  or  otherwise),  exists  by  virtue  of  that 
object  being  what  it  is. 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  23 

nothing  to  do  with  the  result  except  the  fact  of  its 
weight,  and  this,  ex  hypothesi,  was  no  greater  than 
that  of  the  organism. 

To  take  another  example — not  from  the  physical 
world — the  ideal  of  goodness  is  more  intrinsically 
active  than  such  an  ideal  as  gentleness.  Because  it 
is  just  what  it  is,  it  is  a  greater  factor  than  gentle- 
ness in  influencing  human  behavior.  It  is  more 
dynamic.    As  a  moral  value  it  is  larger. 

(2)  A  second  element  involved  is  range.  Range 
means  for  us  here  the  measure  of  how  many,  and 
how  much,  other  activities  can  be  affected — how 
many,  and  how  great,  are  the  changes  of  which  any 
specific  activity  can  be  the  ground.  For  example 
once  more,  the  range  of  the  living  organism  is 
clearly  much  wider  than  the  range  of  its  wooden 
replica.  For,  first  of  all,  it  can  physically  transport 
itself  about  the  earth,  and  so  come  into  contact  with 
a  larger  variety  of  material  environment.  Whereas 
the  wooden  man  must  stay  where  it  is  put  unless 
moved  by  some  extrinsic  physical  force.  The  living 
organism,  furthermore,  even  when  stationary  is  in 
^  eflfective  touch  with  many  activities,  internal  and 
external,  with  which  any  inorganic  substance  is 
necessarily  out  of  all  immediate  relation.  It  can  act 
upon,  and  react  to,  innumerable  stimuli  to  which 
anything  merely  wooden  is  essentially  quite  oblivi- 


24  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

ous.  In  fact  the  case  is  so  plain  that  mere  citation 
is  sufficient. 

In  another  sphere  the  goodness  ideal  is  an  equally 
evident  instance.  For  such  an  ideal  as  goodness  in- 
fluences a  thousand  men,  where  the  value  of  gentle- 
ness appeals  to  perhaps  a  dozen.  The  "range"  of 
its  effectiveness  as  an  activity  is  many  times  as  wide. 

Such  an  ideal  entity  as  a  cone  is  another  instance, 
for  a  cone  is  applicable  to  a  multiplicity  of  mathe- 
matical problems,  affects  innumerable  calculations, 
its  sections  are  followed  by  myriad  heavenly  bodies ; 
whereas  such  a  solid  as  the  dodecahedron  is  of 
interest  only  to  Archimedes  or  the  mineralogist. 
As  a  mathematical  conception,  a  symbol,  or  a  phys- 
ical fact,  a  cone  is  an  important  activity — constitutes 
the  ground  for  many  processes,  psychic  and  phys- 
ical, while  the  dodecahedron  is  chiefly  active  as  the 
principle  of  cleavage  for  sphalerite.  As  a  standard 
of  practical  value  whoever  saw  a  dodecahedron  out- 
side of  a  book  on  geometry,  or  perhaps  in  its  ap- 
proximate form,  the  pyritohedron,  among  the 
crystals  of  a  mineralogical  museum?  But  even  the 
planets  in  their  mighty  courses  travel  according  to 
the  sections  of  a  cone. 

(3)  The  characteristic  of  persistence,  taken  by 
itself,  needs,  of  course,  no  comment.  Used  in  this 
connection,  however,  since  it  necessarily  involves  a 
temporal  element  the  term  would  seem  to  call  for 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  25 

some  elucidation.  Yet  what  is  meant  is  really  simple 
enough.  What  is  meant  is  that,  in  taking  account 
of  the  total  value  of  any  specific  activity — the  meas- 
ure of  its  entire  effectiveness,  we  must  include  as 
a  factor  range  of  duration  as  well  as  spacial  range 
and  range  of  numerical  quantity.  "How  much", 
"in  relation  to  how  many  different  things",  "with 
how  little  interference",  and  "for  how  long^',  is  a 
certain  activity  efficient?  These  are  the  questions 
the  answers  to  which  determine  its  intensity.  For 
it  is  obvious  that  an  activity  which  persists  is,  other 
things  being  equal,  of  more  importance  than  an  ac- 
tivity which  is  transient.  It  is  efficient  at  more 
moments.  Its  temporal  range  is  greater.  A  living 
tree,  for  example,  has  more  persistence  than  a  dead 
tree.  From  the  very  fact  that  it  is  a  living  organism 
it  can  repair  injuries,  adapt  itself  to  varying  condi- 
tions in  its  environment  and  so  remain  to  stand  and 
flourish  when  the  dead  trunk  has  lost  its  withered 
limbs  and  fallen  rotting  to  the  ground. 

Or  again,  such  an  ideal  as  that  of  truth  has  greater 
persistence  than  the  conception  of  error,  since  it  is  in 
relation  to  a  greater  part  of  the  time  series  than 
error.  Broadly  speaking,  true  judgments  are  more 
frequent  than  false  judgments. 

And  this  is  so  whether  we  accept  the  pragmatic 
definition  of  truth,  the  realistic  definition,  or  agree 
with   Emerson  that   "truth  is  the  conformity  of 


26  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

thought  with  things".  For  it  is  evident  that  in 
general  thought  does  conform  with  most  things  for 
most  of  the  time.  So  that  even  if  all  ideals  should 
turn  out  to  be  "eternal" — extra-temporal — they 
nevertheless  vary  enormously  in  the  persistence  with 
which  they  act  as  grounds  for  any  specific  changes. 
The  same  is  true  of  mathematical  ideals.  For,  al- 
though a  dodecahedron  may  be  as  everlasting — as 
much  "nowhen" — as  a  cone,  its  persistence  is  much 
less  since  there  are  long  periods  when  its  activity  is 
practically  non-existent  or,  to  say  the  least,  reduced 
to  an  almost  negligible  minimum  of  efficacy,  whereas 
the  cone  is  widely  active  all  the  time. 

(4)  The  characteristic  of  exclusion  is,  in  a  sense, 
the  inversion  of  range.  By  exclusion  is  meant  that 
capacity  in  any  activity  which  from  its  intrinsic 
nature  offsets  or  overcomes  the  effectiveness  of 
other  activities.  For  example,  the  living  organism 
can  offset  by  its  motion  the  property  of  inertia  which 
characterizes  completely  the  wooden  image.  It 
overcomes  by  its  metabolism  the  processes  of  decay 
which  tend  to  disintegrate  it.  It  excludes,  by  the 
capacity  of  its  integrated  nervous  system  for  reac- 
tion to  a  wide  range  of  stimuli,  the  unhindered  and 
overwhelming  activity  of  any  single  stimulus  from 
driving  it  to  disaster.  And  it  is  obviously  this 
capacity  for  exclusion,  even  more  than  its  merely 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  27 

greater  physical  energy,  which  differentiates  it  from 
its  wooden  effigy. 

By  exclusion,  however,  it  is  not  meant  that  the 
adverse  activity  is  nullified  or  destroyed,  for  activity 
as  such  is  indestructible.'  What  is  meant  is  that  any 
such  adverse  activity  is  directed  to  its  own  advan- 
tage, or  otherwise  overcome  in  such  a  way  as  to 
interfere  as  little  as  possible  with  its  own  intrinsic 
activity. 

For  example  the  ideal  of  goodness  normally 
offsets  any  adverse  conceptions  of  evil  with  which 
it  is  by  nature  in  conflict,  unless  these  latter  concep- 
tions are  given  an  enhanced  dynamic  value  by 
extrinsic  reinforcement.  It  would,  also,  usually 
exclude  such  a  lesser  and  more  qualified  ideal  as 
gentleness  if  that  ideal,  although  somewhat  similar, 
should  find  itself  in  conflict  with  its  more  powerful 
and  comprehensive  companion.  "Fighting  for  the 
right",  for  example,  although  itself  a  "good"  might 
altogether  exclude  all  gentler  virtues. 

Or  again,  although  different  geometric  figures  are 
as  a  rule  mutually  exclusive  as  ideal  activities,  even 

'"Exclusion"  is  developed  here  as  a  distinct  characteristic 
because,  although  the  inversion  of  "range",  it  is  just  for  that 
very  reason,  something  different.  Range  is  the  number  of  B's 
to  which  A  "makes  a  difference".  Exclusion  is  the  number 
of  B's  which,  owing  to  A's  being  what  it  is,  do  not  "make  a 
difference"  to  A.  The  relations  here  are  not  reflexive.  The 
point  is  important  as  will  appear  later  in  the  discussion  of 
awareness. 


28  ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS 

in  this  case  the  analogy  to  some  extent  holds  good. 
For  empirically  it  is  evident  that  all  actual  motions 
follow  approximately  curves  of  some  sort,  circles, 
ellipses,  spirals,  and  the  like,  to  the  almost  complete 
exclusion  of  such  unusual  and  fantastic  figures  as 
dodecahedrons.  As  an  efficient  ground  for  most 
physical  processes,  therefore,  conic  sections  possess 
a  notable  power  of  exclusion,  as  against  any  forms 
that  are  strangely  or  elaborately  angular. 

We  have  now  attempted  to  explain,  seriatim,  the 
characteristics  of  intensity — namely,  quantity,  range, 
and  persistence,  as  well  as  the  characteristic  of  ex- 
clusion; and  have  tried  to  show  how  intensity,  as 
so  defined,  constitutes  the  measure  of  activity.  Yet 
it  is  plain  that  these  characteristics  need  not  be  of 
equal  importance  as  between  similar  activities  be- 
longing to  any  one  class,  since  it  is  conceivable  that 
any  two  or  more  specific  activities  might  be  either 
exactly  alike  or  might  differ  as  to  only  one,  two,  or 
three  of  these  characteristics,  or  to  any  extent  as  to 
each  of  them.  Thus  two  organisms  might  be  abso- 
lutely twin,  or  they  might  differ  only  as  to  innate 
energy  (quantity),  physical  strength,  or  capacity  for 
varied  reaction  (range),  or  vital  resistance  (per- 
sistence) ;  or  any  combination  of  these.  In  which- 
ever of  these  the  difference  between  them  principally 
lay,  nevertheless,  that  difference  would  constitute  in 
so  far  forth  a  difference  of  intensity  and  so  a  meas- 
ure of  their  relative  activity. 


ACTIVITY  AS  AN  UNDERLYING  HYPOTHESIS  29 

It  is  evident,  moreover,  that  the  differences  be- 
tween the  two  great  classes  of  entities  and  relations, 
consist  of  such  wide  generalizations  as  to  be  of  little 
specific  interest  at  this  point.  Where  the  full  sig- 
nificance of  intensity  as  a  differentiating  conception 
comes  in  especially  is  in  delimiting  the  great  intrinsic 
levels,  or  planes,  of  activity  into  which  the  world 
appears  to  be  divided. 


CHAPTER  3 

PLANES  OF   ACTIVITY 

The  universe  of  which  we  seem  to  be  aware,  it 
was  said  at  starting,  falls  into  three  great  classes — 
entities,  relations,  and  processes.  This  division 
however,  although  important  as  a  general  funda- 
mental proposition,  is  to  some  extent  formal,  for 
empirically  we  do  not  discover  entities  out  of  all 
relations  with  either  each  other  or  with  at  least  one, 
and  usually  many,  processes.  The  world  as  it  ac- 
tually appears  is  an  entity-relation-process  affair.  It 
is  also,  as  we  have  attempted  to  show,  through  and 
through  a  world  of  "activity".  It  appears  to  be, 
moreover,  quite  obviously  a  world  of  many  different 
degrees  of  activity ;  and  we  have  tried  to  i>oint  out 
in  what,  essentially,  these  differences  would  seem  to 
consist ;  while  the  measure  of  those  differences,  or 
that  by  which  they  might  best  be  determined,  we 
have  called  "intensity",  defining  that  term,  in  a 
somewhat  special  way,  according  to  its  three  prin- 
cipal characteristics  of  amount,  range,  and  persist- 
ence. 

Accepting  provisionally  these  preliminary  prin- 
ciples, and  with  the  conception  of  intensity  as  a  dif- 
ferentiating instrument,  let  us  examine  our  data  a 
little  more  closely. 

Let  us  begin  by  turning  our  attention  to  the 
material    world — the    world    of    physical    science. 

(30) 


PLANES  OF  ACTIVITY  31 

Now  one  of  the  first  things  that  strikes  us  here  is 
that  the  apparent  order  of  this  world  is  far  from 
democratic.  On  the  contrary  it  is  notably  hierarchic. 
It  is  everywhere  cut  across  into  pretty  sharply  de- 
fined planes.  The  scale  of  ascending  complexity, 
of  increasing  activity,  is  marked  by  salient  differ- 
ences. It  proceeds  by  jumps  from  electricity  to  gas, 
thence  to  mineral,  vegetable,  and  animal;  from 
electron  to  atom,  thence  to  molecule,  cell  and 
neuron ;  from  the  simple  reactions  of  the  compara- 
tively homogeneous  inorganic  elements  to  the  highly 
organized  activities  of  the  complex  living  organ- 
ism; from  the  mere  sensitivity  of  the  amoeba  to  the 
complicated  selective  reactions  of  the  higher  verte- 
brates. That  these  apparent  differences  are  also  real 
differences  imbedded  in  "the  nature  of  things"  is  in- 
dicated by  the  fact  that  Science  finds  itself  obliged 
to  employ  additional  sets  of  postulates  whenever  it 
wishes  to  pass  from  its  conception  of  the  entities  and 
relational  conditions  which  characterize  any  one 
plane  to  a  conception  of  those  which  characterize  a 
different  plane. 

In  the  transition,  for  example,  from  mathematics 
to  physics  the  additional  postulates  of  mass  and 
gravity  (or  some  other  relational  "influence"  be- 
tween physical  entities)  must  be  assumed.  In  pass- 
ing from  physics  to  psychology  the  postulate  of 
awareness  (however  defined)  must  be  superadded. 


32  PLANES  OF  ACTIVITY 

Unless,  then,  these  differences  were  essentially 
involved  in  the  data  with  which  science  is  concerned 
in  interpreting,  the  necessity  for  such  distinguishing 
postulates  would  not  have  arisen. 

In  each  new  plane,  also,  where  the  entities  are 
characterized  by  generally  greater  complexity,  a 
fresh  set  of  organizing  relations  comes  into  play. 
Cells,  for  instance,  are  not  merely  aggregates  of 
atoms,  but  the  component  atoms  involved  must  be 
organized  in  certain  definite  ways.  Nor  are  atoms 
presumed  to  be  mere  congeries  of  electrons,  but 
assemblages  of  electrons  organized  into  certain 
specific  patterns.  The  activity,  again,  of  a  living 
animal  is  different  from  the  activity  of  an  inert 
mass,  if  in  no  other  way  at  least  in  its  greater  com- 
plexity and  its  inclusion  of  a  greater  number  of 
organizing  relations.  And  there  is  always  a  more 
or  less  well  defined  break  wherever  these  new  rela- 
tions of  organization  appear. 

When  we  reach  beyond  the  domain  of  physical 
science,  moreover,  the  great  transections  seem  even 
more  marked  and  separate.  For  whenever  we  pass 
from  matter  to  electricity,  from  electricity  to  con- 
sciousness, or  from  consciousness  to  a  possible  plane 
of  neutral  entities  such  as  universals,  ideals,  and 
relations,  we  seem  to  plunge  at  once  into  totally 
different  worlds. 


PLANES  OF  ACTIVITY  33 

Yet  these  so  different  worlds  are  unquestionably 
facts  of  some  kind  no  matter  what  their  exact 
status  may  be,  and  we  cannot  be  absolved  from 
taking-  some  account  of  them  even  by  denying 
that  they  exist.  For  the  world  of  matter  is  not 
analyzed  out  of  existence  by  showing  that  its  con- 
stituent atoms  are  configurations  of  electrons,  nor 
the  mental  world  by  proving  that  its  processes 
can  be  described  as  the  selective  reactions  of  an 
integrative  nervous  system.  Matter  is  not  just 
electricity,  however  its  units  may  be  compounded. 
Fresh  organizing  relations  must  be  superadded. 
Nor  is  consciousness  solely  selective  reaction,  let 
that  reaction  be  as  discriminative  as  it  may.  Nor, 
for  Activism  at  any  rate,  are  universals  and  values 
merely  mental.  The  worlds  of  matter,  mind,  and 
values  may  be  mutually  interrelated,  but  they  are 
not  the  same.  Nor  can  we  legitimately  hold  that 
any  one  of  them  is  more  real  on  its  own  plane  than 
any  other  one.  For  while,  according  to  our  conten- 
tion, all  these  worlds  are  activity  in  one  form  or 
another ;  and  while  it  might  also  turn  out  that  they 
were  all  "material",  or  "psychic",  or  possessed  of 
some  other  characteristic  in  common;  yet  their 
differences  would  be  none  the  less  salient. 

For  example :  As  regarded  by  modern  physics  all 
matter  is  ultimately  electric  in  character.  Its  mass 
depends  upon  an  electric  charge,  its  atoms  are  com- 


34  PLANES  OF  ACTIVITY 

plexes  of  electric  corpuscles.  All  electricity,  how- 
ever, is  not  matter.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  something 
less  rigidly  conditioned  and   something  different. 

Yet  in  passing  from  the  plane  of  electricity  to  the 
plane  of  matter  we  move  into  a  world  of  activity 
possessing  greater  range.  That  specific  form  of 
electricity  known  as  matter,  because  it  is  structurally 
more  complex  and  involves  a  greater  number  of 
organizing  relations,  can  do  more  different  things,  is 
efficient  in  more  directions — ^possesses,  generally, 
greater  intensity.  The  same  thing  is  true  when  we 
pass  from  so  called  "inorganic"  matter  to  the  plane 
of  conscious  organisms  (whatever  "conscious"  may 
be  held  to  mean).  As  we  have  shown  before,  the 
conscious  organism  can  do  more,  the  range  and 
intensity  of  its  activities  is  altogether  greater  than 
that  of  any  "lifeless"  complex.  And  this  is  none  the 
less  a  fact  because,  apparently  at  any  rate,  we  find 
"conscious"  reactions  associated  only  with  certain 
specific  material  forms.  This  may  well  be  a  numer- 
ical correlation  only.  It  does  not  necessarily  imply 
that  the  conscious  organism  does  not  intrinsically 
belong  to  a  world  of  more  intense  activity. 

For,  even  if  consciousness  could  be  shown  to  be 
nothing  else  than  behavior,  i.  e.,  the  specific  reaction 
of  certain  complex  material  organisms,  it  is  evident 
that  such  behavior  takes  us  at  once  into  a  wider  and 
different  realm  than  merely  material  activity.    It  in- 


PLANES  OF  ACTIVITY  35 

volves  in  the  first  place  electric  phenomena  of  a  deli- 
cate and  complex  form  not  present  apart  from  a 
nervous  system.  It  involves  further,  at  least  in  man, 
reaction  to  such  extra-physical  things  as  values, 
moral,  aesthetic,  or  philosophic.  It  may  also  involve 
awareness  of  its  own  processes — self -consciousness, 
however  we  may  interpret  that  much  discussed  term. 
In  short,  it  involves  many  kinds  of  relational  com- 
plexes which  are  quite  beyond  the  "range"  of  mere 
mass  and  motion.  Call  awareness  what  you  will, 
behavior,  relation,  dimension,  or  epiphenomenon 
(whatever  that  self -contradictory  word  may  mean), 
it  nevertheless  makes  a  difference,  implies  an  addi- 
tional factor,  opens  up  a  wider  range  of  activity. 

Whether  we  can  get  along  comfortably  in  psy- 
chology without  the  concept  of  "consciousness"  is  a 
fair  question.  Yet,  answer  it  as  we  may,  we 
shall  still  continue  to  have  sensations,  feelings,  and 
thoughts,  however  technically  defined.  Nor  can  any 
amount  of  definition  blot  out  the  essential  difference 
between  that  which  is  aware,  the  objects  of  which 
it  is  aware,  and  the  means  by  which  it  is  aware  of 
them. 

Since,  then,  awareness  not  only  involves  proc- 
ess, but  a  process  of  such  specific  characteristics  as 
definitely  to  differentiate  its  activities  from  those  of 
other  planes,  we  shall  speak  fearlessly  of  a  plane  of 
awareness — a  psychic  plane — within  whose  limits 


36  PLANES  OF  ACTIVITY 

psychic  processes  occur,  and  leave  to  the  psycholo- 
gists, for  the  moment  at  least,  all  further  contro- 
versy as  to  its  proper  status.  We  shall  assume 
also,  with  the  realist  and  the  common  man,  that 
there  are  objective  and  "material"  actualities  which 
act  and  interact  upon  a  physical  plane  independently 
of  any  knowing  process  on  our  part,  as  well  as  extra- 
physical  and  "meta-psychic"  realities — relations, 
ideals,  values — which  constitute  in  their  turn  activi- 
ties upon  a  plane  of  their  own. 

Just  then  as  the  world  can  be  divided,  as  it  were, 
perpendicularly,  into  three  great  classes  of  being — 
entities,  relations,  and  processes,  so  it  can  be  divided, 
transversely,  into  three  main  planes — the  physical, 
the  psychic,  and  the  meta-psychic. 

Each  of  these  principal  planes  is  distinguished  by 
characteristic  organizing  relations,  the  absence  of 
which  from  the  other  planes  constitutes  a  set  of 
differentiating  conditions. 

Each  of  these  planes  also,  as  we  shall  attempt  to 
show  in  the  next  chapter,  possesses,  in  addition  to 
its  distinguishing  set  of  organizing  relations,  its  own 
fundamental  structural  units  which  differ  essentially 
from  the  characteristic  units  of  the  other  planes.* 

*  Most  of  the  eastern  philosophies  have  called  attention,  in 
one  form  or  another,  to  this  division  into  planes.  The  usual 
broad  transection  for  the  Indian  thinkers  is  into  the  physical 
world    (mahabhuta),    mind    (manas),    and   spirit    (atman) ; 


PLANES  OF  ACTIVITY  37 

soTnetimes  they  are  called  akiga  (ether),  purusha  (soul),  and 
brahman  (spirit). 

The   Upanishads.     Translated  by   Max   Miiller.     Oxford: 

The  Clarendon  Press,  1879. 
Sir  M.  M.  Williams :    Indian  Wisdom.    London :    Luzac  & 

Co.,  1893. 
Paul  Deussen :  The  System  of  the  Vedanta.    Translated  by 
Charles  Johnston.    Chicago:    Open  Court  Pub.  Co.,  1912. 
Sri  Ananda  Achar>'a:    Brahmadarsnam.     MacMillan,  N.  Y. 

1917- 
Buddhism  is  so  strictly  ethical  that  it  has  but  little  interest 
in  cosmology.     The  world   for  it,  also,  is  nothing  but  pure 
process  and  essentially  unreal.    Pragmatically,  however,  it  too 
accepts    analogous    divisions.      Conformations — the    objective 
world  (sankhara)  ;    sentient  existence  (vinnana)  ;   and  what- 
ever lies  beneath  it  all,  usually  expressed  in  a  typically  Bud- 
dhistic negative  and  illogical  fashion  as,  at  one  end,  ignorance 
(avidya),  and  at  the  other  end,  the  goal  of  real  attainment, 
"Nirvana". 
The  Jataka.    Translated  by  E.  B.  Cowell,  Cambridge  Uni- 
versity Press,  1907. 
Herman  Oldenberg :  Buddha.    Translated  by  William  Hoey. 

London  :   Williams  &  Norgate,  1882. 
Henry  Clarke  Warren :    Buddhism  in  Translations.     Har- 
vard University  Press,  1896. 
How   much    Plato   may   have  been   influenced   by    eastern 
thought  it  is  difficult  to  determine.    Yet  it  now  appears  to  be 
pretty  well  established  that  the  intercourse  between  Greece 
and  the  Orient  was  much  closer  than  was  formerly  supposed, 
so  that  it  seems  unlikely  that  Athenian  scholars  should  have 
been  totally  igfnorant  of  Indian  philosophy. 


CHAPTER  4 

UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY 

In  the  last  chapter  we  distinguished,  briefly,  the 
principal  planes  into  which  the  three  main  groups  of 
activities  which  seem  to  constitute  our  universe  ap- 
pear naturally  to  fall. 

Hereafter  we  shall  refer  to  these  planes  as  re- 
spectively "lower"  and  "higher,"  proceeding  "up- 
wards" from  the  physical,  towards  the  meta-psychic 
plane. 

This  figure  of  speech,  however,  is  not  merely  ar- 
bitrary; but  since  it  appears  to  reverse  the  conven- 
tion which  usually  designates  simpler  and  more 
fundamental  phenomena  as  "lower,"  and  more  com- 
plex derivative  phenomena  as  "higher,"  some  ex- 
planation is  perhaps  necessary  here  in  order  to  avoid 
confusion. 

Such  a  sub-plane  as  that  of  matter,  for  example, 
is  considered  "lower"  than  the  sub-plane  of  elec- 
tricity because,  although  the  fundamental  unit  en- 
tities (atoms)  of  the  material  world  are  complexes 
of  the  unit  entities  (electrons)  of  the  world  of 
electricity,  and  so  "higher"  in  the  scale  of  progres- 
sive complexity,  the  activity  of  the  electric  world  in 
general  is  far  greater  in  intensity,  as  to  amount, 
range,  and  persistence — than  the  activity  of  the 
world  of  matter. 

(38) 


UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY  39 

When  the  still  "higher"  planes  are  reached,  as 
we  shall  observe,  this  condition  is  even  more  ap- 
parent; the  activities  of  the  psychic  and  meta- 
psychic  planes,  although  more  basic  structurally,  be- 
ing of  greater  intensity  in  almost  every  way  than 
the  activities  of  the  plane  "below." 

Now  each  of  the  three  principal  planes — the  phys- 
ical, psychic,  and  meta-psychic — proceeding  in  this 
way  from  lower  to  higher — we  found  to  be  char- 
acterized by  a  distinct  order  of  data,  as  well  as  by 
a  different  set  of  organizing  relations. 

We  found,  also,  that  these  transections  were  not 
merely  schematic  but  appeared  to  represent  a  real 
distinction  between  the  phenomena  of  each  plane,  so 
that  it  was  necessary,  in  the  progressive  considera- 
tion of  the  content  of  any  two  planes,  for  science  to 
make  use  of  certain  new  postulates  without  which  it 
could  not  pass  from  one  to  the  other. 

The  same  general  conditions  likewise  seemed  true 
in  regard  to  the  minor  divisions,  or  sub-planes,  into 
which  the  main  planes  could  be  separated,  although 
here  the  limits  were  less  sharply  defined.  In  the 
physical  plane,  however,  there  appeared  to  exist 
fairly  evident  lines  of  demarcation  between  the 
classes  of  phenomena  known  as  electrical,  chemical, 
and  organic,  both  in  regard  to  their  respective 
structural  units — electrons,  atoms,  and  cells,  and  in 
regard  to  the  various  sets  of  organizing  relations 


40  UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY 

characteristic  of  each  class.  We  did,  not,  however, 
attempt  to  indicate  just  how  intensity,  as  we  have 
defined  it,  was  to  be  applied  here  as  an  adequate 
standard,  or  measure,  of  differentiation  between 
these  groups  or  planes.  This  question,  however, 
was  purposely  reserved,  because  it  involves  a  fur- 
ther consideration  of  some  importance,  namely  the 
problem  of  the  units  of  activity. 

Now  this  problem  obviously  opens  up  at  once  the 
whole  question  as  to  how  far  a  quantitative  repre- 
sentation of  the  contents  of  our  universe  will  prove 
adequate — how  deep  the  quantitative  analysis  will 
cut.  Yet  here  we  must  again  confess  ourselves  to 
be  committed  to  the  empirical  method,  and  here  once 
more  we  shall  ask  what  is  that  "state  of  affairs" 
which  we  actually  seem  to  find. 

In  the  first  place,  throughout  the  physical  world, 
some  sort  of  atomism  is  the  universal  formula. 
And,  without  doubt,  empirical  findings  have  bril- 
liantly substantiated  the  atomistic  hypothesis.  The 
living  organism  is  composed  of  cells,  the  cell  of 
molecules,  the  molecule  of  atoms,  and  the  atom  of 
electrons.  Cells  and  molecules  are  visible  through 
the  microscope  or  ultra-microscope ;  the  result  of  an 
impact  flash  from  a  single  atom — the  a  particle  in 
radium  emanations — can  be  seen  in  the  spinthari- 
scope; and  the  electrons,  although  as  yet  invisible, 
can  be  indirectly  measured  and  counted. 


UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY  41 

But  although  the  contents  of  each  plane  can  be 
ultimately  reduced  to  the  units  which  compose  it, 
any  further  reduction  of  the  units  of  any  one  plane 
can  only  be  obtained  by  resolving  them  into  the  basic 
units  of  the  plane  next  above.  A  molecule  can 
only  be  resolved  into  its  constituent  chemical  atoms, 
or  an  atom  into  its  constituent  electrons.  So  we 
jump  here,  at  a  bound,  from  the  plane  of  molecules 
and  molecular  motion  to  the  plane  of  atoms  and 
chemical  activity;  and  then,  at  another  leap,  from 
the  plane  of  matter  altogether  into  the  plane  of  elec- 
trons and  electrical  activity. 

Yet  it  is  only  under  certain  specific  and  limiting 
conditions  that  the  units  of  the  higher  plane  become 
combined  into  units  of  the  plane  below.  The  world 
is  full  of  electrons  which  are  not  grouped  into  atoms 
(as  an  electrical  charge)  ;  and  of  atoms  not  com- 
bined into  living  protoplasm;  or  probably  even  (as 
in  the  photosphere  of  the  sun)  into  molecules  of 
any  kind. 

The  significant  fact  should  be  noted  here,  how- 
ever, that  it  is  only  by  this  combination  of  higher 
plane  units  under  the  specific  limiting  conditions  of 
the  plane  below  that  the  units  of  the  higher  plane 
can  manifest  the  particular  sort  of  activities  which 
essentially  characterizes  that  lower  plane.  Thus 
electrons,  or  mere  groups  of  electrons,  do  not  mani- 
fest chemical  activity.    In  order  to  do  so  they  must 


42  UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY 

first  be  combined  in  a  certain  specific  manner  into 
atoms.  To  form  living  cells  the  atoms  must  be 
first  organized  into  that  specific  colloidal  solution 
known  as  protoplasm.  And  particularly  must  it  be 
observed  that  the  unitary  complexes  which  can  be 
formed  with  cells  are  quite  impossible  to  form  out 
of  atoms  not  already  in  cellular  formation,  or  the 
unitary  complexes  of  atoms  equally  impossible  to 
form  out  of  electrons  not  first  in  atomic  configura- 
tion. 

This  brings  us  to  a  further  point,  which  is  that 
the  several  elements  of  intensity  may  to  some  extent 
vary  independently,  and  particularly  the  element  of 
range. 

For  it  is  clear  that  any  two  specific  activities,  such 
as  physical  or  ideal  objects,  may  differ  from  each 
other  in  amount, — i.  e.,  a  greater  or  lesser  number  of 
component  units — without  differing  in  duration, 
since  they  may  both  persist  for  the  same  length  of 
time.  Or  two  such  activities  may  differ  in  range 
without  differing  in  either  amount  or  persistence. 
Thus,  for  example,  as  physical  objects  a  man  and  a 
wild  animal  might  be  equal  in  amount,  might  contain 
the  same  number  of  physical  units — atoms,  or  elec- 
trons, but  the  range  of  the  man,  as  an  activity,  would 
be  much  greater ;  there  would  be  many  more  physical 
things  to  which  he  would  "make  a  difference". 
Usually,  also,  his  persistence  would  be  greater  as 


UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY  48 

well.  For  men  generally  live  longer  than  most  wild 
animals. 

It  follows  therefore  that,  although  the  total  ac- 
tivity on  any  plane  below  is  less,  the  range  of  any 
specific  activity  on  the  lower  plane  may  be  neverthe- 
less greater.  And  it  further  results,  paradoxically 
enough  it  would  seem,  that  the  unitary  complexes 
(t.  e.,  complexes  which  act  on  their  own  plane  as 
units)  of  the  lower  plane  may,  and  often  do,  mani- 
fest a  more  intense  activity  than  is  possible  for 
most  at  any  rate  of  the  unitary  complexes  upon  the 
plane  above.  Certain  chemical  compounds,  hydro- 
gen gas  for  example,  have  a  greater  range  of  ac- 
tivity in  every  way — even  electrically — than  the 
same  number  of  electrons  grouped  in  other  ways 
upon  the  plane  of  electricity  alone.  An  organism 
composed  of  living  cells  possesses  more  intensity — 
a  far  greater  range  of  possible  reaction — than  any 
inorganic  chemical  compound.  A  Leyden  jar  has 
more  intensity  than  a  free  charge  composed  of  an 
equivalent  amount  of  electrons.  An  animal  has 
more  intensity  than  a  wooden  replica  of  it  com- 
posed of  an  equivalent  amount  of  atoms. 

On  the  physical  plane,  then,  both  the  fact  of 
atomic  structure  and  the  fact  that  the  units  of  the 
higher  planes  combine  into  units  of  the  planes  below 
are  evident.  While  it  is  also  to  be  observed  that 
the  unitary  complexes  upon  the  lower  planes  are 


44  UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY 

capable  of  a  more  complex  organization  and  possess 
greater  intensity  than  is  usually  possible  for  any 
similar  unitary  complex  upon  the  plane  above. 

When  we  come  to  the  other  planes,  however, 
similar  conditions  are  not  generally  held  to  obtain. 
Psychic  atomism  is  in  bad  repute  and  maintained 
by  few  philosophers.  We  propose,  nevertheless,  to 
try  this  hypothesis  even  in  these  unusual  regions, 
and  to  examine  seriously  how  far  it  will  work. 

Let  us  assume  then  that  just  as,  in  the  physical 
world,  objects  are  ultimately  composed  of  atoms 
which  in  their  turn  are  composed  of  electrons,  so 
electrons  in  their  turn  could  ultimately  be  analyzed 
into  complexes  of  still  more  fundamental  units.* 

*The  atom  is  now  considered  by  science  as  an  established 
fact;  and  the  objective  status  of  the  electron  is  nearly  as 
good. 

Sir  William  Ramsay:  Elements  and  Electrons.  Harpers, 
New  York,  1912. 

Sir  Oliver  Lodge :  Electrons.    George  Bell  &  Sons,  London, 

1917- 
Frederick   Soddy:    The   Interpretation  of   Radium.     Put- 
nam's, New  York,  1909. 
L.   Silberstein:    The  Theory  of  Relativity.     Macmillan  & 

Co.,  London,  1914. 
There  is  moreover  already  some  evidence  which  indicates 
that  the  electron  may  not  be  so  simple  as  at  first  supposed. 
Should  it  prove  to  be  capable  of  contraction  or  change  of 
shape;  or,  as  some  recent  theories  hold,  to  be  a  concentric 
field  of  force  diminishing  from  center  to  circumference,  it 
would  be  complex,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  these  variations. 


UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY  45 

Let  us  assume  also  that  these  hypothetical  units  of 
which  the  electron  is  made  up  are  units  of  a  higher 
plane,  whose  characteristic  activity  stands  in  a  rela- 
tion to  electricity  analogous  to  that  in  which  elec- 
tricity stands  to  matter.  And  finally,  since  we  are 
already  familiar  with  one  form  at  any  rate  of  this 
higher  activity  in  the  psychic  processes,  let  us  call 
these  units  "psychons".^ 

We  need  not  raise  the  question  at  this  point  as  to 
what  awareness  "really  is".  We  shall  merely  con- 
tent ourselves  with  baldly  stating  our  doctrine  of 
psychic  atomism.* 

Awareness,  at  any  rate  for  us,  is  an  activity — a 
"that  by  reason  of  which  change  occurs",  in  this 
case,  of  course,  change  of  awareness  at  the  least, 
and,  like  any  of  the  other  activities  which  we  have 
examined  so  far,  composed  of  units — the  psychons — 
whose  combinations  and  unitary  complexes  make  up 

*TEe  term  "psychone"  was  proposed  by  Fore!  for  the 
psychic  aspect  of  a  hypothetical  unit  of  the  nerve  process, 
but  as  far  as  I  am  aware  it  has  never  come  into  general  use. 

August  Forel:    Hypnotism.     Putnam's  New  York,  1907. 

'The  student  of  the  history  of  philosophy  will  undoubtedly 
be  reminded  here  of  Herbart's  atomistic  theories.  The  hy- 
pothesis proposed,  however,  differs  in  many  respects  from 
the  Herbartian  point  of  view. 

Herbart's  monads  (Reale)  are  essentially  different  from 
each  other.  They  are  simples,  independently  existent,  their 
only  positive  attribute  being  self-preservation  (Selbsterhal- 
tung).     They    are    also    supposed    to    be    impenetrable,  al- 


46  UNITS  OF  ACTIVITY 

the  various  characteristic  activities  of  the  psychic 
plane,  as  well  as  become  combined  into  that  special 
sort  of  unitary  complex  which  forms  the  units  of 
the  plane  next  below.  And  since  the  next  lower 
plane,  in  this  case,  is  the  plane  of  electricity  the  unit 
which  is  directly  composed  of  psychons  is  the  elec- 
tron. The  collective  activity  of  psychons,  also, 
which  we  shall  call  "psychokinesis"  differs,  with  its 
various  combinations  upon  its  own  plane,  in  inten- 
sity; these  various  combinations  of  psychons  ex- 
hibiting as  groups  respective  degrees  of  amount, 
range,  or  persistence ;  in  general,  amount  and  range 
depending  upon  the  number  of  psychons  in  a  group, 
and  persistence  upon  the  character  of  the  organizing 
relations  involved. 

though  they  exist  in  an  "intelligible"  space  in  which  any  num- 
ber of  them  may  occupy  the  same  point  at  the  same  time. 
Out  of  these  monads  Herbart  builds  up  his  world  of  experi- 
ence including  both  physical  and  psychic  phenomena.  His 
monads,  therefore,  are  strictly  neither  psychic  nor  physical ; 
although,  as  spacially  conditioned,  they  resemble  somewhat 
the  "force-points"  of  modern  physical  theories. 

Unlike  the  Herbartian  monads,  however,  which  are  inde- 
pendently different  entities,  the  psychons  are  considered  to  be 
all  alike  since  they  are  awareness  units,  nor  are  they  essen- 
tially conditioned  spacially.  They  are  awareness  units,  and 
nothing  else. 


CHAPTER  5 
Unitary  Complexes 

A  unitary  complex  is  a  complex  of  units  which 
behaves  as  itself  a  unit.  It  is  a  complex  of  such  a 
kind  that  it  behaves  as  a  whole,  in  a  way  in  which 
no  mere  congeries  of  units  could  behave.  The 
measure  of  its  activity,  therefore,  is  different  and 
larger  than  the  measure  of  the  activity  of  any  com- 
plex which  does  not  act  in  this  unitary  fashion,  i.  e., 
other  things  being  equal  its  intensity  is  always 
greater.  The  intensity  of  such  a  complex  moreover 
depends  not  only  upon  the  amount  of  unit  activities 
involved,  but  also,  and  principally,  upon  the  degree 
of  complexity  (range)  with  which  these  units  are 
organized.  It  obviously  depends  as  well  upon  the 
degree  of  closeness  (exclusion)  with  which  the 
component  parts  are  knit  together.  It  depends,  that 
is,  directly  upon  the  character  and  extent  of  the 
organizing  relations  involved.* 

It  is  obvious  that  the  intensity  of  an  organism  is 
greater  than  the  intensity  of  any  mere  numerically 

*The  further  question  naturally  suggests  itself  here — just 
what  organizing  relations  must  be  brought  into  play,  in  the 
case  of  any  particular  complex,  in  order  that  that  complex 
should  be  a  unitary  complex — t.  e.,  behave  as  an  individual? 
This  question  in  our  present  state  of  knowledge,  can  only  be 
answered  empirically.  We  have  discovered  many  of  the 
relations  involved  in  molecular  structure,  as,  for  example,  the 

(47) 


48  UNITARY  COMPLEXES 

equal  congeries  of  celli,  that  a  cell  has  more  inten- 
sity than  an  unorganized  group  of  atoms,  or  an  atom 
more  than  a  group  of  free  electrons.  Yet  it  will  be 
observed  that  there  exist  many  varieties  of  organiza- 
tion of  the  units  of  each  plane  respectively,  many 
complexes  of  less  unification  and  intensity  than  the 
special  organization  which  is  essential  in  order  to 
form  a  basic  unit  of  the  next  plane  below.  There 
are,  for  example,  unitary  complexes  of  electrons, 
such  as  those  which  form  unit  charges,  which  do 
not  form  atoms;  complexes  of  atoms,  as  the  a 
radium  emanations,  which  do  not  form  molecules; 
and,  of  course,  very  many  more  of  such  complexes 
which  are  not  grouped  into  living  cells.  These 
various  complexes  differ  widely  in  extent  of  organi- 
zation and  intensity,  and  it  is  only  certain  specific 
complexes  of  great  closeness  of  organization  and 
high  relative  intensity  upon  any  plane  that  are  car- 
ried over  as  units  of  the  next  plane  below. 

As  we  mount  from  plane  to  plane,  also,  the  units 
of  the  higher,  more  fundamental,  planes  are  found  to 
be  more  and  more  alike.  Cells  are  of  many  different 
sorts,  atoms  of  eighty  or  so  varieties  according  to 

two-to-one  relation  and  the  relation  of  propinquity  of  H  and 
O  in  a  molecule  of  water.  We  have  not  yet  discovered  the 
number  and  configuration  of  electrons  in  most  of  the  atoms. 
All  that  we  can  say,  therefore,  as  a  general  proposition,  is  that 
there  must  be  certain  definite  organizing  relations  as  essential 
elements  in  every  unitary  complex,  whether  we  have  dis- 
covered them  or  not. 


UNITARY  COMPLEXES  49 

the  number  of  chemical  elements,  but  electrons  are 
supposed  to  be  at  most  of  two  kinds,  negative  and 
positive,  and  quite  probably  of  only  one  kind — the 
negative  electron.  The  specific  character  of  any 
unitary  complex,  therefore,  as  well  as  its  existence 
as  such  a  complex,  depends  directly  upon  the  specific 
character  of  its  component  units  derived  from  the 
next  plane,  and  so  on,  ultimately,  through  all  the 
other  higher  planes  in  succession.  A  cell,  for  in- 
stance, is  a  particular  grouping  of  molecules,  those 
molecules  a  particular  combination  of  chemical 
atoms,  and  the  different  component  atoms  special 
configurations  of  certain  numbers  of  electrons. 

So  the  whole  of  the  physical  world  is  character- 
ized by  an  ascending  degree  of  organization  by 
means  of  unitary  complexes,  those  complexes  occur- 
ring progressively  in  descending  from  the  higher 
planes  to  the  planes  below. 

Paradoxically  enough,  therefore,  in  a  process 
curiously  reminiscent  of  the  ancient  doctrine  of  the 
"descent  of  the  spirit  into  matter",  it  would  seem 
that  it  is  only  by  organization  upon  the  lower 
planes — greater  specialization,  or  limitation — that 
the  activities  of  the  higher  planes  can  achieve  their 
enhanced  degree  of  range  and  intensity. 

It  follows  conversely  that  the  process  of  disinte- 
gration, whenever  it  occurs,  is  always  a  breaking 
down  of  a  unitary  complex  into  the  component  units 
of  the  plane  above.    An  organism,  when  it  ceases  to 


50  UNITARY  COMPI^XES 

be  an  organism,  becomes  a  mere  quantity  of  mole- 
cules and  atoms;  a  molecule  breaks  up  into  atoms; 
while  at  least  a  partial  disintegration  of  the  atom 
itself,  as  we  know,  is  observable  in  the  case  of 
radium,  two  of  whose  three  disintegration  products 
— ^the  ^  and  r  rays — are  considered  to  be  electric  in 
character,  the  ^  rays  presumably  streams  of  elec- 
trons themselves. 

The  fundamental  conditions,  therefore,  for  the 
formation  of  a  unitary  complex  are  found  always 
upon  the  planes  above  the  one  upon  which  the  com- 
plex itself  exists.  A  complex  of  atoms  is  what  it  is 
because  of  the  particular  natures  of  the  atoms  which 
compose  it;  and  these  particular  atomic  natures  are 
what  they  are  because  of  the  nature  of  electricity 
which  permits  its  units — the  electrons — to  be  held 
together  in  certain  stable  configurations,  these  stable 
configurations  being  dep^endent  in  their  turn  upon 
the  organizing  relations  involved.  What  electricity 
does  make  the  atoms  what  they  are.  In  other  words 
the  structure  of  a  unitary  complex  upon  any  one 
plane  depends  directly  upon  the  functioning  of  the 
units  of  the  plane  above — this  functioning,  in  its 
turn,  depending  upon  the  essential  activity  of  the 
units  of  the  next  higher  plane,  and  so  on;  the 
organization  on  all  the  planes  depending,  ultimately, 
upon  specific  activities — namely,  relations — of  the 
meta-psychic  plane;   the  activity  of  any  plane  thus 


UNITARY  COMPLEXES  51 

standing  in,  as  it  were,  a  "force"  relation  to  the 
activity  of  the  plane  below. 

Now  we  have  spoken,  thus  far,  only  of  the  unitary 
complexes  of  the  physical  world  so  called.  The 
same  general  principles,  nevertheless,  hold  good  for 
the  higher  planes.  Whatever  our  view  as  to  the 
actual  nature  of  consciousness,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  psychic  complexes  exist,  and  that  as  a  matter  of 
fact  these  complexes  are  more  or  less  unified — func- 
tion as  unitary  activities.  The  normal  psychic  pro- 
cesses of  any  living  organism  are  integrative.  The 
organism  not  only  functions  as  a  unit,  but  appears 
to  itself  so  to  function.  And  the  more  complex  the 
organic  structure,  in  this  case  at  any  rate,  the  more 
unified  is  the  function,  the  greater  the  coordination, 
the  wider  the  range  of  stimuli  to  which  the  organism 
can  respond  as  a  unit.  Moreover,  just  as  a  material 
complex  depends  directly  upon  the  nature  of  elec- 
tricity of  whose  units  it  is  ultimately  composed,  so, 
according  to  our  hypothesis,  an  electrical  complex 
depends  directly  upon  the  nature  of  psychokinesis. 
In  other  words,  it  is  uix)n  the  capacity  of  the  psy- 
chons  to  be  formed  into  certain  unitary  complexes 
that  depends  the  existence  of  unitary  complexes 
upon  the  planes  below.^ 

"A  fuller  discussion  of  the  nature  of  psychokinesis  and  its 
units  will  be  found  in  Chapters  7  and  9. 

At  this  point  it  seemed  less  confusing  to  state  merely  the 
bare  hypothesis  of  psychons  and  their  complexes. 


52  UNITARY  COMPLEXES 

A  psychic  complex  therefore,  no  matter  where 
found,  nor  how  correlated  or  identified  with  the 
characteristic  complexes  of  lower  planes,  is  none  the 
less  fundamentally  and  intrinsically  a  complex  of 
psychons  and  dependent,  ultimately,  not  only  upon 
the  organizing  relations  necessarily  involved,  but 
also  upon  the  fact  that  the  entities  so  related  are 
psychons — awareness  units — and  not  something 
else. 

Just  as,  also,  there  are  many  material  complexes 
which  are  not  organisms,  and  complexes  of  electrons 
which  are  not  atoms,  so  there  may  be  complexes  of 
psychons  which  are  not  electrons,  but  psychokinetic 
complexes  only.  For  although,  presumably,  all 
matter  is  electricity  and  all  electricity  psychokinesis, 
all  psychokinesis  is  not  necessarily  in  the  form  of 
either  electricity  or  matter.  According  to  this  point 
of  view,  therefore,  there  is  no  reason  in  the  nature 
of  things  why  awareness,  or  unitary  complexes  of 
it — psychic  centers — could  not  exist  apart  from  the 
activities  of  any  lower  plane. 

It  is  evident,  however,  that,  although  such 
psychokinetic  centers  might  exist  independently 
upon  their  own  plane,  they  could  not  exist  inde- 
pendently of  the  activities  of  the  meta-psychic 
plane  or  planes,  above.  For  even  psychokinesis  is 
only  one  form  of  activity,  of  which  ex  hypothesi 
there  exist  still  wider  and  more  inclusive  manifesta- 


UNITARY  COMPLEXES  53 

tions.  And  these  still  wider  forms  of  activity  are, 
of  course,  the  entities  and  relations  of  the  higher 
planes — ideal  entities,  relations  as  such,  and  com- 
plexes whose  logical  nature  depends  upon  neither 
physical  nor  psychic  activities. 

Here  again,  we  find  activities  without  which  the 
activities  and  complexes  of  the  lower  planes  could 
not  exist  at  all.  For  in  the  first  place  it  is  evident 
that  no  complex  of  any  kind  upon  any  plane  could 
exist  without  relations — since  what  "complex" 
means  is  an  integration  of  relations.  Nor  could  the 
various  degrees  of  integration  occur  as  we  actually 
find  them  if  the  numerical  series  were  not  intrin- 
sically just  what  they  are,  since  it  is  upon  the  number 
of  entities  and  organizing  relations  involved  that  the 
extent  of  complexity  depends;  nor  could  any  proc- 
esses at  all  occur  were  it  not  for  the  time  series. 
And  this  is  equally  true  whether  these  higher  plane 
activities  are  Bergsonian  fluidities,  independent 
realities,  or  merely  Kantian  forms  of  thinking. 
Under  any  of  these  definitions  they  are  activities, 
and,  as  such,  fundamentally  and^  logically  prerequi- 
site to  the  less  inclusive  activities  of  the  planes  below. 
Here  again,  also,  are  unitary  complexes  existing  in- 
dependently on  their  own  plane,  such  as  relational 
complexes  and  complexes  of  ideal  entities.  Mathe- 
matics, for  instance,  is  full  of  them — to  go  no 
further. 


54  UNITARY  COMPLEXES 

Every  lower  plane  complex,  then,  is  not  only  a 
complex  of  the  units  of  its  own  plane,  but  a  complex 
of  complexes  of  the  planes  above  seriatim.  For 
example,  an  organism  is  a  unitary  complex  of  mole- 
cules, a  complex  of  atomic  complexes,  of  electronic 
complexes,  and  of  psychokinetic  complexes.  But  it 
is  always  a  unitary  complex  of  higher  plane  activi- 
ties as  well  as  a  unitary  complex  of  the  immediate 
unit  activities  of  its  own  plane.  In  short  it  is  a 
unitary  complex  of  many  kinds  and  many  degrees 
of  activity.  Furthermore,  since  the  growth  of  struc- 
ture is,  as  a  process,  usually  reversible,  when  a  uni- 
tary complex  is  broken  down  it  disintegrates,  succes- 
sively, into  the  unitary  complexes  of  the  higher 
planes  in  reverse  order.  Thus  an  organism  upon 
dissolution  breaks  up  into  molecules  and  atoms. 
The  atom  upon  dissolution  into  electrons,  the  elec- 
tron (upon  our  hypothesis)  into  psychons,  and  the 
psychon  (ideally  at  any  rate)  into  the  entities — 
activity  points,  or  what  not — of  the  meta-psychic 
world. 

It  follows,  therefore,  that  a  complex  upon  any 
one  plane  does  not  upon  dissolution  necessarily  cease 
to  remain  a  complex  upon  the  plane  above.  A 
"dead"  organism  is  still,  for  a  time  at  least,  a 
unitary  complex  of  atoms.  It  may  conceivably  exist 
still  longer  as  a  complex  of  electrons,  or  a  psycho- 
kinetic  complex. 


UNITARY  COMPLEXES  55 

Such  a  unitary  complex  as  a  physical  organism, 
can  be  considered  variously  as  a  complex  of 
cells,  molecules,  and  atoms;  an  electro-magnetic 
complex;  a  psychokinetic  complex;  or  a  complex 
of  force  points  in  certain  relations — all  of  which 
views  are  equally  correct.  But  the  point  here  is — 
from  whichever  angle  of  vision  it  is  looked  at,  upon 
whichever  plane  the  observer  takes  his  stand — such 
a  complex  is  always  a  unitary  complex.  An  organ- 
ism merely  as  a  cellular  complex  constitutes  an 
interrelated  whole  capable  of  unitary  functions  dif- 
ferent and  of  wider  scope — greater  in  almost  every 
way — that  the  mere  sum  of  its  parts ;  it  can  behave 
in  a  different  way,  as  an  individual,  from  the  way 
in  which  it  could  behave  as  a  mere  collection  of  its 
component  cells,  were  there  not  other  than  additive 
relations  involved.  It  is,  also,  an  atomic  complex 
which  functions  as  a  unitary  mass  independent  in 
many  ways  of  its  character  as  a  "living"  organism ; 
as  well  as  an  electric  complex  with  characteristic 
currents  and  electro-magnetic  fields  of  its  own.  It 
is,  too,  a  psychokinetic  unitary  complex  reacting  to 
its  environment  as  a  psychic  individual.  And  it  is, 
finally,  a  meta-psychic  complex — a  complex  of  rela- 
tions without  whose  existence  as  facts  the  possi- 
bility of  complicated  organization  could  not  exist 
at  all. 


56  UNITARY  COMPLEXES 

It  is  to  be  observed,  further,  that  the  intensity  and 
unification  of  function  increases  directly  with  the 
increased  complexity  of  organization — with  com- 
plexity of  structure.  Thus  an  organism  reacts  as 
a  unit  in  more  ways  than  an  electron.  Unification 
of  function  varies  inversely  with  simplicity  of  struc- 
ture. Certain  social  conditions  illustrate  this  most 
clearly.  An  unorganized  body  of  men  is  incapable 
of  acting  together — of  unitary  function.  Organ- 
ize them  into  a  well  drilled  regiment  and  they  will 
act  "as  one  man" — function  as  a  unit.  Their 
organization  has  become  more  complex,  but  their 
collective  function  more  unified.  Other  things  being 
equal,  the  higher  the  civilization — the  more  complex 
the  organization  of  any  nation  or  social  group — the 
more  completely  can  it  act  as  a  unit,  the  greater  is 
its  effectiveness.  And  the  interesting  fact  to  be 
noted  here  is  that  the  unit  itself  in  any  such  organ- 
ized complex  achieves,  as  a  unit,  greater  intensity 
than  it  could  obtain  outside  of  the  organization. 
Whether  it  be  electron  or  man,  the  range  of  its 
activity  is  heightened.  For  although  there  are  cer- 
tain things  that  it  cannot  do,  there  are  more  things 
which  it  can  do  than  if  it  were  unconditioned  in  this 
way. 

In  everyday  phraseology,  it  gains  power  from  its 
organized  association,  as  we  see  from  the  common- 


UNITARY  COMPLEXES  67 

place  but  pithy  sayings:  "When  two  or  three  are 
gathered  together,"  or  "In  union  there  is  strength." 
Entities  on  any  one  plane,  therefore,  are  always 
unitary  complexes  of  units  of  the  plane  or  sub-plane 
next  above.  And  this  brings  us  at  once  to  the 
problem  of  the  relations  of  the  activities  of  the 
different  planes  to  each  other. 


CHAPTER  6 

INTERRELATION    OF   THE   DIFFERENT    PLANES 

We  have  said  that  the  activity  of  any  plane  stands 
in  an  efficient  relation  to  the  activity  of  the  plane 
next  below.  The  phrase  is  perhaps  ambiguous,  yet 
the  meaning  can  scarcely  be  mistaken.  For  while 
the  function  of  a  unitary  complex  on  any  plane 
depends  directly  upon  the  structure  of  that  com- 
plex— the  specific  coordination  and  nature  of  the 
units  of  its  own  plane — the  structure  of  the  com- 
ponent units  depends  directly  upon  the  efficiency  of 
the  units  of  the  plane  next  above.  The  behavior  of 
a  material  complex,  for  example,  depends  upon  its 
atomic  structure,  but  the  structure  of  the  atom 
depends  upon  the  behavior  of  the  electron.  It  is 
what  electrons  do — namely,  get  themselves,  some- 
how, grouped  into  certain  relations  as  to  quantity 
and  position — that  determines  the  specific  natures  of 
the  atoms  which  they  compose.  Just  what  the  num- 
bers and  patterns  of  the  electrons  are  in  most  cases 
we  do  not  yet  know,  although  there  are  some  inter- 
esting theories  upon  the  subject.  That,  in  the  atoms 
of  many  chemical  elements,  their  numbers  are  in 
the  thousands  and  their  configurations  very  com- 
plicated seems  probable.^ 

*See  R.  K.  Duncan,  The  New  Knowledge,  New  York,  1908, 
Part  s,  chap.  2,  for  a  clear  popular  discussion  of  this  subject, 
including  an  exposition  of  Sir  J.  J.  Thomson's  'concentric  ring 
theory.' 

(58) 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  59 

The  point  here  is  obvious,  yet  its  full  significance 
would  seem  to  have  been  more  or  less  overlooked. 
And  indeed  the  whole  question  has  been  so  befud- 
dled, that  one  is  reminded  of  the  old  riddle  of  the 
chicken  and  the  egg  where,  although  as  chicken  or 
egg,  there  is  an  infinite  regressus  of  alternating 
primacy,  the  problem  is  solved  as  soon  as  we  be- 
come aware  that  both  egg  and  chicken  have  been 
evolved  from  more  primitive  forms  whose  methods 
of  propagation  were  not  by  fertilization  and  gesta- 
tion but  by  fissure. 

Structure  then,  is  always,  to  a  great  extent, 
ultimately  process,  but  the  process  which  it  ulti- 
mately is  is  always  a  process  taking  place  within 
the  characteristic  activity  of  the  plane  next  above 
the  plane  upon  which  the  structure  itself  exists. 
Organic  structure  depends  chiefly  upon  chemical 
process;  chemical  structure  upon  electric  process. 
The  structural  achievement — the  organizing  pro- 
cess— always  takes  place  from  the  higher  plane. 
This  fact  is  important  because  it  points  the  way 
towards  an  understanding  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  activities  of  the  various  planes  are  interrelated. 

The  matter  is,  perhaps,  clear  enough  upon  the 
physical  planes  where  the  general  interrelation  of 
organic  structure  and  chemical  process,  or  of  atomic 
structure  and  electric  process,  although  many  de- 
tails are  obdurate  as  yet,  is  at  any  rate  in  prin- 


60  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

ciple  pretty  well  understood.  For  example,  many, 
if  not  all,  of  the  chemical  elements  of  protoplasm 
as  well  as  some  of  the  quantitative  relations  in- 
volved are  now  known.  The  general  principle  also, 
if  not  the  specific  facts,  of  the  numerical  relations 
between  electrons  and  some  of  the  chemical  atoms 
is  known  likewise.  The  relation,  however,  of  elec- 
tricity to  psychokinesis — the  activity  of  psychons — 
needs  to  be  examined  by  the  hypothesis  which  has 
taken  this  latter  activity  for  granted. 

Now  up  to  the  present  our  examples  have  been 
drawn  largely  from  the  world  of  matter  and  energy 
as  understood  by  physical  science.  And  we  have 
made  our  inferences  from  that  world  princi- 
pally because  it  is,  in  a  certain  sense,  the  one  with 
which  we  are  most  familiar — the  one  whose  phe- 
nomena and  laws  have  been  most  thoroughly  re- 
duced to  some  sort  of  comprehensible  order.  But 
in  dealing  with  psychokinesis  we  step  at  once  into 
a  field  of  different  and  wider  activity.  We  are 
no  longer  dealing  only  with  the  conditions  of 
merely  physical  energy — with  masses,  motions,  and 
directions.  We  are  dealing,  on  the  contrary, 
with  a  plane  whose  phenomena,  although  in  many 
relations  to  the  physical  planes,  must  be  described 
in  different  terms,  and  measured  by  other  than 
merely  physical  standards.  It  will  be  also  with  not 
a  little  difficulty  that  we  shall  be  able  to  guard 


INITERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  61 

against  the  unwarranted  application  of  physical  de- 
scription to  this  more  unfamiliar  region.  It  will 
be  hard  not  to  speak  of  psychokinesis  after  the  anal- 
ogy of  physical  energy.  Yet  psychokinesis  is  not 
energy  in  the  sense  in  which  that  term  is  employed 
by  physical  science;  since,  ex  hypothesi,  although 
energy  is  a  specific  form  of  psychokinesis,  psychoki- 
nesis is  not  energy,  but  "that  by  reason  of  which" 
energy  changes  exist,  which  is  obviously  a  different 
thing  altogether. 

As  an  activity,  of  course,  its  measure  is  intensity. 
There  may  be  more  or  less  of  it,  and  it  can  vary, 
specifically,  in  range,  exclusion,  and  persistence. 
But  the  "more  or  less"  is  not  a  physical  more  or  less, 
the  range  not  only  a  material  extension,  the  exclu- 
sion not  confined  to  physical  exclusion,  nor  the  per- 
sistence a  duration  of  physical  entities. 

For  although  the  amount,  the  "more  or  less"  of 
psychokinesis  evidently  implies  a  greater  or  less 
quantity  of  psychons ;  yet,  unless  those  psychons  are 
organized  into  the  special  groupings  known  as  elec- 
trons, their  merely  numerical  variations  need  have 
no  relation  to  physical  energy.  Nor,  indeed,  need 
their  numerical  variations  have  any  relation  to 
spacial  position,  since  they  may  well  be  quantita- 
tively compenetrative,  and  therefore  not  numeri- 
cally dependent  upon  spacial  extension  in  any  way 
whatsoever. 


62  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

The  range  of  psychokinesis  again,  in  any  special 
instance,  may  be  a  range  applicable  to  other  psy- 
chokinetic  phenomena  only,  or  even  to  meta-psychic 
beings,  such  as  ideals  or  universals.  It  is  not  by 
any  means  limited  to  physical  entities  or  processes. 
Thus  a  love  for  pure  mathematics  may  be  greater 
or  less — vary  quantitatively — or  it  may  consist  in  an 
affection  for  a  wider  or  narrower  group  of  ideal 
facts  and  processes — vary,  that  is,  in  range — where 
neither  the  quantitative  variation  nor  the  multiplicity 
of  facts  involved  depends  directly  upon  the  facts  of 
the  physical  world,  no  matter  how,  otherwise,  they 
may  be  in  relation  to  them. 

Again,  a  psychic  process  may  exclude  other  psy- 
chic processes ;  and  this,  of  course,  is  true  no  mat- 
ter what  the  correlation  between  psychic  and  nervous 
processes  may  really  be.  The  martyr  who,  oblivious 
of  his  pain,  chants  hymns  of  joy  while  burning  at 
the  stake  is  not  only  a  manifest  example,  but  the 
fact  that  his  attentive  content  is,  in  this  instance,  a 
religious  ideal  makes  the  case  even  stronger. 

And  finally,  like  all  processes,  psychokinetic  proc- 
esses vary  in  persistence.  Attention  is  perhaps  the 
most  notable  example,  for  here,  together  with  exclu- 
sion, persistence  is  the  principal  measure  of  its 
intensity. 

According  to  our  hypothesis,  then,  psychokinesis 
is  an  activity  whose  intensity  may  vary  independ- 


INnrERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  6a 

ently  of  the  activities  of  the  lower  planes.  Change 
of  awareness  does  not  necessarily  imply  change  of 
physical  energy,  although,  as  we  ordinarily  know 
them,  the  activities  of  the  different  planes  are  usu- 
ally found  closely  interrelated.  Free  electricity  is 
not  usually  found  divorced  from  matter,  nor  psychic 
processes  apart  from  physical  organisms. 

Our  general  problem  therefore  is,  in  what  rela- 
tions does  the  activity  of  the  plane  above  stand  to 
the  activity  of  the  plane  below,  and  vice  versa? 
More  specifically,  in  what  relations  does  the  higher 
plane  activity  stand  to  those  particular  complexes  of 
its  own  units  which  form,  as  unitary  complexes,  the 
basal  units  of  the  adjacent  lower  planes?  How,  for 
example,  does  electricity  "affect"  an  atom  or  an 
atomic  complex?  How  does  psychokinesis  "affect" 
an  electron  or  a  complex  of  electrons  ? 

Now,  as  this  brief  essay  does  not  pretend  to  be  an 
epitome  of  modern  physics,  it  cannot  even  ade- 
quately indicate  the  scope  of  the  interrelations  of 
matter  and  electricity.  In  general,  however,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  relations  of  electricity  to  matter  are 
interatomic.  An  atom  is  affected  by  an  electric 
charge  or  an  electromagnetic  field,  through  a  change 
in  either  the  quantity,  configuration,  or  the  rate  of 
revolution  or  vibration,  of  its  constituent  electrons. 
In  the  same  way  psychokinesis  may  be  held  to  affect 
electrons  (and,  of  course,  collectively,  electricity  in 


64  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

general)  not  as  electrons,  but  as  unitary  complexes 
of  psychons.  And  this  immediately  raises  the  ques- 
tion, how  do  psychons  affect  each  other  ? 

Now  to  ask  how  anything  "affects"  anything  else 
is  simply  to  ask  for  a  description  of  the  possible  rela- 
tions between  the  things  in  question,  involving  the 
mutual  interrelation  of  these  relations  themselves. 
What,  then,  are  the  possible  relations  between  psy- 
chons— ^between  units  of  awareness  ? 

Before  discussing  this  question,  however,  it  may 
perhaps  be  well  to  call  attention,  here  for  a  moment, 
to  the  various  types  of  relations,  to  some  of  which 
types  any  particular  relations  that  may  obtain  be- 
tween the  psychons  must  belong. 

"In  brief",  (the  quotation  is  from  Royce),  "a 
relation  is  a  character  that  an  object  possesses  as  a 
member  of  a  collection."  A  relation  may  be  dyadic 
— between  two  objects  only;  triadic — between  three 
objects;  or  polyadic — ^between  any  number  of  ob- 
jects. 

Thus  "father  of"  is  a  dyadic  relation  between  two 
objects,  father  and  son.  "Indebtedness" — where  A 
owes  B  for  a  certain  sum,  C, — is  a  triadic  relation 
involving  three  objects.  A,  B,  and  C — debtor, 
creditor,  and  debt.  If  the  debt,  in  this  case,  were  in 
consideration  for  some  further  and  more  compli- 
cated transaction  involving  a  number  of  additional 
relations,  as  for  example,  the  value  of  real  property, 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  65 

rents  and  taxes  unpaid,  and  the  like,  the  "indebted- 
ness" would  be  polyadic — it  would  relate  to  a  number 
of  different  objects  or  terms. 

Relations  further  are  either  symmetrical  or  asym- 
metrical. Symmetrical  relations  are  those  relations 
which  are  identical  with  their  own  inverse,  such  as 
equality  or  difference,  since  one  object  cannot  be 
equal  to,  or  different  from  another  object  unless  that 
other  object  is  also  equal  to,  or  different  from  it. 
Asymmetrical  relations,  on  the  other  hand,  are  rela- 
tions where  this  mutual  condition  does  not  obtain. 
A  good  example  is  the  relation 'of  precedence  in  the 
scale  of  greater  and  less  between  the  series  of 
cardinal  numbers,  where  two  is  greater  than  one, 
three  than  two,  and  so  on,  but  where  the  inverse  is 
not  true. 

Relations  also  may  be  transitive  or  intransitive. 
If  there  is  a  relation  between  A  and  B,  and  the  same 
relation  between  B  and  C,  of  such  a  kind  that,  wher- 
ever one  finds  A's,  B's,  and  C's,  this  relation  is 
always  true,  whatever  the  individual  objects  (A,  B, 
and  C)  may  be,  then  that  relation  is  known  as 
transitive.  The  greater  or  less  relation  between  the 
members  of  any  quantitative  series,  as  the  cardinal 
numbers  or  the  generations  of  men  or  animals,  are 
instances  in  point.  A  transitive  relation  may  also 
be  defined  as  such  a  relation  (R),  that  if  A  R  B 


66  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

and  B  R  C,  then  it  is  always  implied  that  A  R  C — 
1.  e.,  that  B  R  C  can  be  eliminated. 

Thus,  for  example,  the  relations  between  the 
cardinal  numbers  is  asymmetrical  because  two  is 
greater  than  one,  three  greater  than  two,  and  the 
like,  but  never  the  opposite.  It  is  also  transitive 
because  "greater  than"  holds  in  the  same  way  all 
along  the  line,  between  one  and  two,  two  and  three, 
or  between  any  two  numbers  in  the  series. 

The  relation  "ancestor  of"  is  also  an  instance. 
For  if  A  is  ancestor  of  B,  and  B  ancestor  of  C,  then 
A  is  ancestor  of  C.  • 

Where  the  relations  between  a  series  of  objects 
are  transitive,  therefore,  they  hold  good  as  between 
any  two  objects  of  the  series,  and  all  intermediate 
objects  may  be  eliminated.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the 
relation  between  A  and  B,  and  B  and  C,  is  of  such  a 
kind  that  it  holds  good  only  when  A,  B,  and  C  are 
certain  specific  objects,  that  relation  is  intransitive. 
The  relation  "father  of"  is  an  example.  It  clearly 
holds  good  only  when  A,  B,  and  C  are  male  animals 
of  successive  generations  in  the  same  family.  Nor 
can  B  here  be  eliminated;  for  if  A  is  father  of  B 
and  B  of  C,  it  is  not  true  that  A  is  father  of  C.^ 

•The  short  exposition  given  above  is  epitomized  from 
Royce's  classic  discussion  in  "The  Principles  of  Logic",  p.  96  fF. 
Royce  there  makes  a  further  distinction  between  non-symmet- 
rical and  asymmetrical  relations — asymmetrical  being  defined 
as  totally  non-symmetrical.  This  further  distinction  however 
is  not  necessarily  followed,  and  has  been  omitted  here. 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DiIFFERENT  PLANES  07 

There  is,  finally,  still  another  distinction  between 
relations  which  it  is  important  for  us  to  note  here, 
for  it  obtains  wherever  there  are  several  relations 
between  any  two  or  more  objects  (or  terms) .  Thus, 
in  a  series  of  numbers,  or  other  objects,  the  relation 
of  "separate  from"  is  logically  prior  to  a  relation  of 
"greater  or  less",  or  precedence,  between  the  mem- 
bers of  the  series.  Since  unless  objects  were  distinct 
from  each  in  some  way,  one  of  them  could  not  be 
greater  or  less  than,  or  precede,  any  other  object. 

Or,  again,  if  a  relation  of  greater  and  less  did  not 
obtain  between  certain  objects,  the  relation  of  "in- 
clusion" (whole-part)  could  evidently  not  obtain 
between  them  either,  since  in  order  that  one  object 
should  include  another  object  the  including  object 
must,  in  some  way,  be  greater  than  the  object  in- 
cluded. 

Now  as  regards  the  classification  of  relations  most 
philosophers  are  in  substantial  agreement.  As  re- 
gards their  nature,  however,  there  is  a  very  material 
difference  of  opinion.  In  general  the  theories  about 
them  are  three. 

Some  philosophers  hold  that  a  relation  always 
affects  or  modifies  the  objects  which  it  relates,  or 
that  the  fact  of  the  relation  being  there  makes  the 
terms  modify  each  other;  so  that  if  A  is  related  to 
B,  the  existence  between  them  of  that  relation  makes 
a  difference  to  both  A  and  B  in  such  a  way  that 


68  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

neither  A  nor  B  are  the  same  as  they  would  be  if 
the  relation  between  them  were  not  present.  Others 
maintain  that  there  is  an  underlying  reality  which 
contains  objects  and  relations  in  such  a  way  as  to 
condition  both  of  them;  while  still  others  hold  that 
in  some  cases  a  relation  may  modify  the  objects 
which  it  relates,  but  that  in  other  cases  these  objects 
may  be  independent.  There  is  also  a  fourth  and 
more  extreme  view  which  holds  that  objects  which 
are  related  are  always  independent ;  are  never  modi- 
fied by  any  relation  which  may  obtain  between  them. 

The  problems  involved  in  the  various  theories  of 
relations  are  difficult,  and  it  would  carry  us  too  far 
afield  to  enter  the  philosophical  arena  concerning 
them.  Yet  as  some  position  must  be  taken  in  this 
matter  for  our  purposes  here,  it  would  seem  wiser  to 
adopt,  as  on  the  whole  most  satisfactory,  the  view 
that  objects  are  neither  exclusively  dependent  nor 
independent  of  the  relations  which  obtain  between 
them,  but  that  their  dependence  or  independence  is 
determined  by  the  conditions  involved  in  any  par- 
ticular case.^ 

We  shall  hold,  therefore,  that  while  any  two  ob- 
jects might  be  related  in  many  different  ways  with- 

*The  classic  idealistic  contention  that  this  problem  logically 
requires,  for  its  solution,  the  postulate  of  an  all-containing 
"Absolute",  need  not  be  considered  here,  since  in  regard  to 
such  questions  a  realistic  position  was  assumed  at  the  outset 
(See  Chap,  i.) 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  69 

out  the  relations  obtaining  between  them  altering 
the  status  of  the  objects  themselves,  there  are,  never- 
theless, specific  instances  where  the  presence  of 
certain  relations  may  essentially  alter  the  conditions 
which  pertain  to  either  one  or  both  of  the  objects 
involved  in  the  situation. 

For  example,  various  relations  of  distance,  or 
temporal  precedence,  might  well  obtain  between  two 
physical  objects  without  these  objects  being  modi- 
fied in  any  way.  On  the  other  hand  a  particular 
relation  between  time  and  distance  might  be  directly 
responsible  for  a  collision  which  would  annihilate 
one  of  the  objects,  as  such  an  object,  altogether. 

In  the  case  of  awareness,  especially  also,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  any  object  can  be  aware  of  any 
other  object  which  essentially  involves  a  complex  of 
describable  entities  and  relations,  without  being 
aware  of  the  relations  involved  as  well  as  of  the 
entities,  nor  how  the  relations  perceived  in  this  case 
cannot  but  be  taken  to  constitute  a  determining 
factor  in  the  character  of  the  awareness  of  the  per- 
ceiving object. 

Having  now  discussed  briefly  the  nature  and 
classification  of  relations  in  general,  let  us  return  to 
the  hypothesis  which  we  have  been  developing,  and, 
taking  a  simple  case — that  of  two  psychons  A  and 
B  in  isolation — let  us  examine  the  nature  of  the 
relations  there  involved. 


70  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  between  the  psychons  a 
relation  of  separateness.  Numerically  there  are  two 
psychons  and  not  only  one.  This  separateness,  how- 
ever, need  not  imply  spacial  distinction.  It  means, 
merely,  that  the  two  psychons  stand  reciprocally 
towards  each  other  in  a  relation  of  "otherness" — 
otherness  being  a  symmetrical  relation. 

Secondly,  there  is  a  relation  of  likeness.  As 
awareness  units  the  two  psychons  are  precisely  alike. 
This  also  is  a  symmetrical  relation. 

And,  thirdly,  there  is  a  relation  (whatever  it  may 
be)  by  reason  of  which  B  is  included  as  awareness 
content  in  A.  This  third  relation,  while  it  is  ap- 
parently symmetrical  here,  since  there  are  only  two 
psychons  involved  in  the  situation,  is  really  asym- 
metrical, for,  were  there  more  than  two  psychons,  A 
might  be  aware  of  B,  B  of  C,  and  so  on,  without  B 
being  aware  of  A  or  C,  nor  C  of  B  or  A. 

But  the  situation  which  we  are  examining  con- 
tains not  only  these  three  relations  but  also  two 
entities,  namely  the  two  psychons.  Now,  by  defin- 
ition, a  psychon  is  a  minimum  awareness.  A 
psychon  is  also  by  definition  the  minimum  entity 
which  exists.  It  would  appear  to  follow,  therefore, 
that  the  only  entity  of  which  a  single  psychon  could 
be  aware  would  be  a  psychon.  For  were  a  single 
psychon's  awareness  content  any  greater  entity,  or 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  71 

number  of  entities,  the  awareness  involved  would 
no  longer  be  a  least  possible  awareness.  While,  on 
the  other  hand,  a  psychon's  content  could  be  no  less 
an  entity  than  a  psychon,  since  no  less  an  entity 
exists.'*  We  shall  assume,  therefore,  that,  in  this 
case,  the  only  content — the  only  "something"  of 
which  either  psychon  is  aware — is  a  minimum 
"something  other",  namely  the  other  psychon.^ 

Whether  or  not  that  assumption  is  well  founded 
does  not  materially  alter  subsequent  considerations. 
For  whether  the  awareness  content  of  the  psychon 
is  that  psychon  itself,  another  psychon  as  other, 
whether  the  differentiation  does  not  exist,  or 
whether  the  content  is  some  fundamental  relation  or 
relational  complex  essentially  involved  in  the  situa- 

*  The  possibility  exists,  to  be  sure,  that  the  awareness  con- 
tent of  a  single  psychon  might  be  that  psychon  itself.  If  this 
were  true,  however,  it  would  land  us  at  once  in  the  ineffectual 
world  of  the  solipsist,  the  individuals  in  which  world — namely 
the  psychons — could  never  escape  from  their  own  self -aware- 
ness. Logically  there  would  appear  to  be  no  valid  argument 
against  such  a  view.  Empirically,  however,  we  do  not  seem 
to  find  any  such  sterile  condition  in  our  experience.  More- 
over the  realistic  position  which  was  assumed  at  the  start 
(Chap,  i)  precludes,  for  us  at  any  rate,  the  necessity  of  con- 
sidering solipsism  any  further. 

•  This  assumption  involves  the  logically  prior  assumption 
that  psychon  A  may  be  aware  of  psychon  B  without  being 


72  INnrERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

tion,  does  not  alter  the  fact  that,  whatever  the 
ultimate  nature  of  the  entity,  content,  or  process, 
the  combination  of  these  elements  constitute  in  this 
case  a  least  possible  awareness.  And  that  the 
psychon  should  be  specifically  and  uniformly  an 
ultimate  minimum  awareness,  whatever  its  elements, 
is  all  that  is  essentially  requisite  for  our  hypothetic 
psychokinetic  unit. 

In  this  hypothetical  case  then,  to  have  any 
psychokinesis  at  all  there  would  have  to  be  at  least 
two  psychons — which  perhaps  is  only  another  way 
of  saying  that  the  minimum  existence  for  an  intelli- 
gible world  is  at  least  two  terms  and  the  relation 
between  them. 

In  the  only  world  which  we  actually  know, 
however,  there  are  innumerable  terms  in  all  sorts 

also  aware  of  any  of  the  three  relational  elements  included  in 
the  situation.  It  also  involves  the  assumption  that  A  can  be 
aware  of  B  without  being  also  aware  of  itself  as  one  of  the 
terms  between  which  an  "otherness"  relation  obtains.  The 
problems  avoided  by  these  assumptions  are  by  no  means  free 
from  pitfalls  for  the  unwary.  Theoretically,  however,  if  not 
empirically  as  well,  it  seems  entirely  possible  for  an  aware- 
ness content  to  consist  of  nothing  more  than  a  bare  "that"  of 
some  kind,  as,  for  example,  a  simple  sensation,  without  any 
self  awareness  or  any  awareness  of  "otherness".  Moreover, 
that  it  is  possible  to  be  aware  of  an  object  like  oneself  without 
any  awareness  of  the  "likeness",  or  to  be  aware  without  any 
awareness  of  the  "awareness  relation",  is  a  familiar  fact  of 
experience. 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  73 

of  relations.^  And  since  the  pyschon  is  a  unit — 
a  minimum  awareness — in  order  that  there  should 
be  more  than  this  minimum  in  any  particular  in- 
stance there  must  be  more  psychons.  Yet  it  is 
evident  that  a  merely  larger  number  of  psychons, 
taken  with  only  the  simple  relations  obtaining  be- 
tween any  two  of  them,  would  not  get  us  very  far 
in  the  development  of  such  a  complex  world  as  we 
actually  find  in  our  experience.  For  what  we  actu- 
ally find  is  not  a  mere  string  of  psychons  (or,  for 
that  matter,  any  other  sorts  of  units),  but,  rather, 
an  infinite  variety  of  more  or  less  highly  organized 
complexes  of  them. 

And  this  at  once  raises  the  question  as  to  how  this 
organization  comes  about.  Now  that  organization 
is  a  fact  in  the  world  as  we  seem  to  know  it  is 
indubitable.  That  any  organization,  also,  neces- 
sarily involves  the  presence  of  those  relations  with- 
out which  it  could  not  exist  seems  equally  clear.  It 
would  appear,   therefore,   that  organization   takes 

•  We  are  faced  here  with  a  phase  of  the  insidious  problem 
of  an  infinite  regressus.  The  difficulty  may  be  met  for  us, 
however,  in  several  ways.  The  actual  number  of  psychons 
may  be  considered  to  be  infinite.  The  relations  between  them 
essential  to  awareness  may  be  transitive  so  as  to  make  a  closed 
circle — A  to  B,  B  to  A,  and  so,  finally,  back  to  A.  Or  aware- 
ness may,  under  certain  conditions  at  any  rate,  be  taken  as 
reflexive  so  that  A  is  aware  of  itself.  Any,  or  possibly  all, 
of  these  conditions  might  obtain. 


74  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

place  either  by  reason  of  the  inherent  activity — the 
organizing  capacity — of  the  organized  entities  them- 
selves, or  by  reason  of  some  other  activity,  or 
activities. 

Nevertheless  as,  for  the  Activist,  relations  also 
are  activities  of  a  higher  plane,  it  seems  simplest 
to  consider  that  these  relations  themselves  are  the 
efficient  agents  by  means  of  whose  characteristic 
activities  the  organizing  processes  occur.  Granting 
it  to  be  a  fact,  then,  that  there  are  such  things  as 
"organizing  relations"  by  means  of  whose  active 
presence  the  world  of  psychons  is  not  a  mere 
congeries  of  "connexities"  but  a  world  of  pro- 
gressively elaborated  unitary  complexes,  it  is  im- 
portant here  to  examine  somewhat  more  in  detail 
the  relations  involved  between  the  psychons  forming 
these  complexes,  as  well  as  to  describe  the  interrela- 
tions of  these  complexes  as  unitary  activities. 

We  have  already  seen  what  are  the  relations  be- 
tween any  two  psychons,  considered  by  themselves, 
and  of  what  the  awareness  of  each  individual  psy- 
chon  consists — its  amount  and  range. 

Let  us  now  imagine  a  unitary  complex  of  ten 
psychons.  Within  this  complex  the  individual 
psychons  would  only  be  aware  one  of  the  other.  As 
a  complex,  however,  the  awareness  content  of  the 
ten  psychons  would  be  of  a  different  character.  For 
all  that  is  necessary  here  in  order  that  this  should 


INnTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  75 

be  so  is  that  the  component  psychons  should  be  in 
other  than  merely  additive  relations.  And  that  they 
would  be  in  a  non-additive  relation  is  clear,  since 
that  relation  by  reason  of  which  they  are  organized 
into  a  unitary  complex  and  not  a  mere  unconnected 
collection  is  essentially,  as  an  organizing  relation, 
non-additive.  Our  ten-psychon  complex  then,  as  a 
non-additive  aggregate  organized  into  a  unitary 
activity,  would  be  a  more  intense  awareness,  possess 
greater  range,  although  no  greater  amount,  than  the 
mere  sum  of  its  component  awareness  units. 

Its  awareness  content  might,  for  example,  be  ten 
other  psychons  as  individuals,  or  another  complex 
of  ten  psychons,  or  two  other  unitary  complexes  of, 
let  us  say,  seven  and  three  psychons  respectively. 
If,  moreover,  its  content  were  the  two  unitary  com- 
plexes, one  of  seven  and  the  other  of  three  psychons, 
its  awareness  of  these  two  complexes  as  two  sepa- 
rate entities  would  presumably  carry  with  it  not  only 
an  awareness  of  bare  separateness,  but  an  aware- 
ness of  diflference,  due  to  the  different  intensities 
(amount)  of  the  entities  in  question. 

The  awareness  content  here,  then,  would  include 
separateness  and  difference,  two  relations  of  which 
no  single  psychon  or  mere  unorganized  congeries  of 
psychons  could  be  aware.  Thus  as  the  number  of 
psychons  and  organizing  relations  involved  in  the 
formation  of  unitary  complexes  increases,  the  in- 


76  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

tensities  of  the  complexes  are  increased  also,  both 
in  amount  and  range.  Their  possible  content  be- 
comes larger.  The  number  of  other  entities  and 
relations  of  which  they  may  become  aware  becomes 
greater. 

Why,  precisely,  this  comes  about  is  a  further 
problem.  For  that  matter  we  do  not  know,  as 
yet,  why  electrons  are  assembled  in  certain  ways 
into  atoms,  nor  why  specific  chemical  atoms  attract 
each  other.  Yet  that  we  actually  discover  these 
complexes  and  their  organizing  relations  is  an  em- 
pirical fact,  and  is  perhaps  all  that  can  be  said  con- 
cerning the  situation. 

The  question  to  which  all  this  has  been  prelimi- 
nary however  is,  how  can  any  possible  complex  of 
psychons — of  mere  awareness — no  matter  in  how 
complicated  interrelations,  or  relations  to  other  com- 
plexes, acquire  that  specific  set  of  relations  and 
those  specific  characteristics  or  qualities  which  char- 
acterize the  physical  world?  How,  in  other  words, 
can  electricity  and  matter  be  intelligently  described 
as  a  form  of  psychokinesis  ?  Why  is  the  difference 
between  those  particular  complexes  of  psychons 
which  are  electrons  not  only  a  numerical  difference, 
but  also  a  spacial  separation  ? 

Now  it  may  be  said  that,  as  a  possible  conception, 
the  mere  statement  of  the  fact  that  electrons  are 
complexes  of  psychons  is  not  so  paradoxical  as  it 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  77 

first  appears.  In  mathematics  a  line,  which  is  exten- 
sion, is  defined  as  composed  of  an  infinite  number  of 
points  which  have  no  extension.  The  extended  is 
defined  as  composed  of  non-extended  units.  There 
exists  no  logical  objection,  therefore,  to  the  con- 
ception of  a  complex  possessing  extension  whose 
component  units  are  unextended. 

But  ho,w  can  the  relational  complex,  or  manifold, 
of  extension  come  to  supervene  between  certain  psy- 
chokinetic  complexes?  Yet,  here  again,  we  are 
faced  with  only  a  special  instance  of  the  broader 
problem — namely,  how  do  relations  of  any  kind  get 
themselves  into  existence?  Or  granted  that  they 
already  exist,  or  "subsist,"  upon  their  own  plane, 
how  do  they  "get  into  action"  so  to  speak  upon  the 
planes  below? 

It  may  be  seen  at  once  that  the  problem  is  funda- 
mental, not  only  for  Activism  but  for  all  philoso- 
phies."^  That  relations  of  many  kinds  do  so  seem 
to  "descend"  is  obvious.     It  it  were  not  so  the 

'In  general  the  realistic  position  has  been  taken  that  rela- 
tions are  "external" — exist  or  "subsist"  as  real  entities,  real 
activities,  upon  a  plane  of  their  own.  Yet  the  difficulty  here  is 
no  greater  for  Activism  than  for  other  systems,  and  its  solu- 
tion does  not  determine,  in  any  event,  the  validity  of  the 
theory  of  psychokinetic  unit  entities.  The  literature  on  the 
subject  is,  of  course,  voluminous.  Possibly  the  best  exposition 
of  the  realistic  position  is  in  Russell's  "Problems  of  Philoso- 
phy" and  E.  G.  Spaulding's  "The  New  Rationalism",  Henry 
Holt  &  Co.,  N.  Y.,  191a 


78  INiTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

activities  and  complexities  of  the  lower  planes 
would  not  exist  at  all.  And,  here  again,  we  shall 
content  ourselves  for  the  moment  in  merely  stating 
the  fact. 

Granting  the  fact,  the  particular  problem  of  psy- 
chons  and  electrons  narrows  itself  to  the  question  of 
how  that  particular  relational  manifold  known  as 
spacial  extension  comes  to  obtain  between  the  spe- 
cific complexes  of  psychons  known  as  electrons. 
And  the  answer  is  that  it  is  just  the  "irruption"  of 
that  particular  relation  of  extension  into  the  psy- 
chokinetic  world  that  gives  the  specific  character — 
the  "quality"  of  extension — to  certain  complexes  of 
psychons,  creates,  as  it  were,  electrons  out  of  psy- 
chons. 

What  special  class  of  psychokinetic  complexes, 
then,  (since  there  well  may  be  many  classes)  is  that 
class  between  whose  members  this  relational  mani- 
fold of  spacial  extension  obtains  ?  And  what  are  the 
relations  that  must  exist  between  the  psychons  which 
compose  the  members  of  such  a  class? 

In  the  first  place  the  members  of  this  class  must 
be  complexes  organized  according  to  those  relations 
which  constitute  the  spacial  manifold.®    In  the  sec- 

•A  psychokinetic  complex  is  "in"  space,  when  its  organiza- 
tion includes  those  asymmetrical  transitive  relations  which  ob- 
tain between  points,  t.  e.,  when  its  component  psychons  are 
organized  according  to  the  type  of  a  three-dimensional  con- 


INTTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  79 

ond  place  there  must  exist,  as  we  have  seen  to  be 
true  of  all  unitary  complexes,  a  non-additive  rela- 
tion— a  relation  such  that  the  specific  activity  of 
these  psychokinetic  complexes  shall  be  essentially 
something  more  than,  and  something  different  from, 
the  mere  sum  of  the  activities  of  their  constituent 
psychons.  Assuming  the  hypothesis  of  psychons 
and  their  complexes  which  we  have  attempted  to 
describe,  however,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should 
not  assume  also  the  non-additive  organizing  rela- 
tions involved  in  the  spacial  manifold  to  be  appli- 
cable to  a  certain  class  of  these  complexes. 

We  shall  define  an  electron,  therefore,  as  a 
unitary  complex  of  psychons  where  the  organizing 
relations  are  those  relations  involved  in  the  spacial 
manifold,  but  where  the  psychons  themselves  are 
unextended.  And  we  are  further  justified  in  this  as- 
sumption since,  as  an  empirical  fact,  we  actually  find 
the  relation  of  spacial  separation  to  obtain  between 
those  specific  complexes  known  as  electrons.  Why 
this  is  so,  and  what  the  exact  nature  of  the  psycho- 
kinetic  order  may  be  in  those  specific  complexes,  is 
another  question.  But  all  that  is  necessary  to  make 
these  conditions  logically  possible  is  that  the  order 

tinuous  series  (see  Huntington,  "The  Continuum"  chap.  VI.). 
Or,  less  technically,  a  psychokinetic  complex  is  spacially  condi- 
tioned when  its  organizing  relations  include  such  relations  as 
"above",  "beyond",  "at  the  side  of",  and  the  like. 


80  INTERREI.ATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

here  shall  be  an  order  characterized  by  certain  non- 
additive  relations.  And  this  leads  us  at  once  to  the 
larger  question  of  the  psychokinetic  order  in  gen- 
eral. 

The  subject  is  abstruse,  but  certain  suggestions,  at 
least,  are  pertinent.  In  the  first  place  it  should  be 
observed  that  the  units  of  any  plane  may  be  "taken" 
in  at  least  two  ways,  directly  or  in  series.  Thus,  a 
number  of  points  may  be  considered  as  merely  so 
many  points.  They  may  determine  lines,  but  do  not 
as  such  compose  lines.  But  taken  non-additively  a 
series  of  points  forms  a  continuum — a  line. 

For  the  psychokinetic  plane,  however,  due  to  the 
characteristic  nature  of  the  activities  which  compose 
it,  there  are  certain  special  points  to  be  noted.  In  the 
first  place,  while  the  relations  between  psychons 
are,  in  general,  asymmetrical  and  transitive,  in  cer- 
tain cases  they  may  be  symmetrical,  as  when  psy- 
chons A  and  B  are  reciprocally  aware  of  each  other. 
Again,  although  other  relational  manifolds,  as  those 
of  time  and  space,  may  supervene,  these  apply 
principally  to  other  planes ;  they  are  not  essentially 
involved  in  the  psychokinetic  order.  The  relations 
between  psychons,  as  we  have  seen,  are  not  funda- 
mentally the  relations  involved  in  the  spacial  mani- 
fold. According  to  the  general  proposition,  never- 
theless, that  the  activities  of  the  higher  planes  are 
always  basal  or  essentially  efficient  for  the  activi- 


mrrERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  81 

ties  of  the  planes  below,  but  that  the  converse  is  not 
true,  the  spacial  relations  may  "make  a  difference" 
to  psychons,  by  organizing  them  into  certain  com- 
plexes, but  not  conversely,  these  relations  being  ideal 
beings  of  a  higher  plane.  Also,  the  existence  of 
psychokinetic  entities,  or  the  relations  pertaining 
to  them,  may  not,  or  may,  make  a  difference  to  other 
entities.  Intrinsically  they  do  not,  but  under  cer- 
tain conditions  they  do.  Generally,  neither  the  ex- 
istence of  A  nor  its  activities  depend  upon  the  aware- 
ness of  B,  but  both  of  these  facts  may  well  depend 
upon  this  relation. 

Here  again  the  intuition  of  the  common  man  is 
reliable.  Usually  your  existence  and  behavior  is 
quite  independent  of  my  knowing  you.  But  often 
not  only  your  behavior,  but  your  very  life  itself, 
may  directly  depend  upon  this  knowledge — namely 
in  those  instances  where  my  awareness  of  you  is 
an  essential  element  in  some  more  inclusive  rela- 
tional situation  in  which  your  existence  or  behavior 
is  also  involved.  In  this  case,  then,  one  awareness 
may  be  said  to  "cause"  a  change  in  another  aware- 
ness. It  does  not  necessarily  do  so.  Awareness  is 
not  essentially  constitutive.  That  it  should  be  so 
depends  upon  other  additional  relations. 

A  psychokinetic  complex,  therefore,  may  be  the 
reason  for  change  in  another  psychokinetic  complex. 
An  electron,  for  example,  may  be  "affected"  by  some 


82  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

other  complex  not  an  electron.  To  enable  this  to 
come  about  it  is  only  necessary  that  the  requisite  re- 
lational conditions  should  obtain.  And  that  these 
conditions  do  obtain  is  empirically  evident  from  the 
facts.  The  human  organism,  for  instance,  which 
is  a  complex  of  electrons,  reacts  to — is  affected  by — 
all  sorts  of  extra-physical  things — ideals,  logical 
processes,  relations  as  such  (e.  g.  pastness,  distance, 
and  the  like)  ;  and,  if  telepathy  should  prove  demon- 
strably true,  it  might  even  react  directly  to  other 
psychic  processes  than  its  own.  Nor  are  these 
extra  physical  beings  any  the  less  efficient  because 
they  are  not  physical.  And,  of  course,  awareness  is 
one  of  them.  Hence  (for  want  of  a  better  word) 
to  emphasize  this  "making  a  difference", — this  effi- 
cient, dynamic  quality — we  have  used  the  word 
"psychokinesis." 

Yet  just  as  the  great  majority  of  complexes  upon 
any  plane  are  normally  unaware  of — are  unaffected 
by — any  but  certain  complexes  of  the  plane  above, 
so  the  great  majority  of  complexes  upon  the  phys- 
ical plane  are  unaffected  by  merely  psychokinetic 
complexes.  Material  complexes,  although  funda- 
mentally composed  of  electrons,  are  under  usual 
conditions  only  sHghtly  affected  by  electro-magnetic 
disturbances.  It  is  only  when  material  complexes 
are  delicately  organized — in  states  of  highly  un- 
stable equilibrium — that  they  are  sensitive  to  the 
"forces"  of  the  plane  above.     In  the  same  way 


INTERREIvATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  83 

electronic  complexes  are  generally  minimally  af- 
fected only  by  the  activities  of  psychokinetic  com- 
plexes. When,  however,  the  lower  complexes  are 
sufficiently  highly  organized  (as,  for  example,  the 
nervous  system  of  physical  organisms)  they  become 
at  once  susceptible  to  the  specific  activities  of  the 
plane,  or  planes,  immediately  above  them. 

In  general,  therefore,  when  the  units  of  any  plane 
are  found  organized  into  those  specific  complexes 
which  compose  the  units  of  the  plane  below,  the  in- 
terrelations of  those  lower  plane  units  are  in  the 
form  of  the  characteristic  activities  of  that  plane  to 
which  they  belong.  Molecules  "interact"  molecu- 
larly,  not  as  chemical  atoms;  atoms  chemically,  not 
as  electric  charges;  electrons  electrically,  not 
psychokinetically. 

The  complex  of  psychons  which  is  an  electron 
interacts  with  other  electrons  as  an  electric  unit, 
not  as  a  mere  congeries  of  psychons.  Its  relations 
with  psychokinetic  activities,  however,  are  as  a 
psychokinetic  complex  and  not  as  a  unit  of  elec- 
tricity. They  are  psychokinetic  and  not  electrical. 
Its  psychokinetic  relations  are  inter-electronic.  Pro- 
ceeding from  below  the  planes  are  progressively  in- 
clusive. 

But  how,  it  will  be  asked,  can  any  such  state  of 
affairs  obtain?  How  are  the  gaps  between  the 
planes  bridged  ? 


84  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

The  general  interrelation  between  the  unit  activi- 
ties of  the  psychokinetic  plane  and  the  unit  activi- 
ties of  the  physical  planes,  in  respect  to  their  natures 
as  respectively  unextended  and  extended  entities, 
has  been  described.  The  specific  problem  of  motion 
in  this  connection,  however,  has  not  yet  been  ex- 
amined. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  it  should  be  observed  that, 
in  order  that  a  psychokinetic  complex  (or  any  other 
entity)  should  be  correlated  with  motion,  it  is  only 
necessary  that  it  should  be  in  the  relation  of  "all 
terms  of  a  continuous  one-dimensional  series  T 
(Time)  to  some  terms  of  a  continuous  three- 
dimensional  series  S  (Space)."  But  psychokinetic 
entities  are  always,  empirically  at  any  rate,  in  rela- 
tion to  the  one-dimensional  series  T.  It  is,  there- 
fore, only  additionally  necessary  to  prove  that  they 
are  (or  may  be  under  certain  conditions,)  in  rela- 
tion to  a  three-dimensional  series  S. 

If  these  conditions  are  fulfilled  it  is  not  necessary 
that  the  entity  in  question  should  be  a  material 
entity  or  spacial  extended.®  The  geometrical  point, 
for  example,  is  neither.  We  have  already  seen, 
moreover,  that  there  may  be  spacial  relations  be- 
tween psychokinetic  complexes.  And  that  certain 
psychokinetic  complexes  at  any  rate  are  aware  of 
spacial  relations  we  have  immediate  empirical  ex- 
perience.    It  only  remains  to  be  shown,  therefore, 

•See  Appendix.    Relativity  and  Activism. 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  85 

how  in  any  specific  instance  the  particular  "some" 
terms  of  the  three-dimensional  series  are  correlated 
with  particular  psychokinetic  entities,  and  how  a 
difference  in  the  intensity  of  these  entities  is  corre- 
lated with  a  difference  in  the  terms  of  the  three- 
dimensional  series  with  which  it  is  related. 

Now  in  general  it  may  be  said  that  the  greater 
the  range  of  any  psychokinetic  complex,  the  more 
will  be  the  terms  to  which  it  will  be  in  relation.    So 

s 

that  if  —  =  V,  (S,  of  course,  being  taken  here  as 

that  particular  SR  which  we  call  D,  namely  a  num- 
ber of  terms  in  the  three-dimensional  series,  S,) 
and  we  find  that  as  S  (the  number  of  terms)  in- 
creases, so,  proportionately,  does  V;  we  have,  in 
this  case,  intensity  of  psychokinesis  correlated  with 
velocity.  For  since  all  the  terms,  except  its  own 
component  parts,  to  which  an  electron  as  a  unit  is 
related  are  either  spacially  or  temporally  condi- 
tioned, an  increase  in  the  number  of  these  terms 
means  a  corresponding  increase  also  in  the  terms  of 
the  spacial  series,  S,  or  the  temporal  series  T. 

This  may  be  considered  to  occur  as  follows.  Let 
us  suppose  the  number  of  psychons  in  an  electron  to 
be  increased.  The  psychokinetic  intensity  of  the 
electron,  then,  is  increased  proportionately.  Now 
one  of  the  elements  of  intensity  is  range — inclusive- 
ness — the  number  of  things  to  which  the  complex  in 


86  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

question  is  related.  But  the  "things"  to  which  an 
electron  is  primarily  related  are  all  correlated  with 
the  terms  in  the  one  and  three-dimensional  series  T 
and  S.  Therefore  the  increase  must  take  place  in  the 
number  of  terms  either  of  S  or  T.  And  such  an 
increase  is,  of  course,  either  an  increase  or  decrease 
in  velocity.^®  Such  changes  in  velocity  are  accelera- 
tion or  retardation.  But,  if,  in  this  case,  change  of 
velocity  is  correlated  with  change  of  psychokinetic 
intensity,  it  follows  that  when  either  of  the  two 
correlates  does  not  change,  the  other  correlate  will 
be  unchanged  also. 

Well ;  we  can  see,  in  a  general  way  at  least,  how 
the  activities  of  the  psychokinetic  plane  can  be  cor- 
related with  the  activities  of  the  electrical  plane 
below.  Under  exactly  what  conditions,  however, 
any  specific  correlation  may  occur  is  another  ques- 
tion. There  is,  however,  an  obvious  set  of  circum- 
stances with  which  we  are  all  familiar  where  the 
correlation  strikingly  exists.  And  that  is,  in  the 
case  of  organic  life,  particularly  in  that  of  the  higher 
organisms. 

According  to  our  hypothesis,  then,  the  universe 
with  which  we  are  in  any  way  familiar  appears  to 
be   a   stratified   affair,    transversely   divisible   into 

"  The  reference  to  the  terms  in  the  three-dimensional  series 
S  ar^  to  points  as  determinants  of  finite  distances,  not  to 
points  in  space  "as  such". 


INITERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  87 

what,  for  want  of  a  more  precise  word,  we  have 
called  planes.  The  collective  activity  of  any  plane 
being  generally  more  inclusive  and  intense  than  the 
activities  of  the  planes  next  below,  although,  in 
general,  a  more  highly  organized  complex  upon  a 
lower  plane  may  possess  greater  intensity  than  a  less 
highly  organized  complex  upon  the  plane,  or  planes, 
above. 

A  progressive  analysis,  furthermore,  of  the  char- 
acteristic activities  of  the  different  planes  beginning 
with  the  lowest  always  reaches  a  point  where,  since 
the  analysis  can  be  carried  no  further  upon  the 
particular  plane  under  investigation,  the  activities 
of  that  plane  inevitably  break  up  into  complexes 
of  the  characteristic  activity  of  the  plane  above. 
Matter  is  dissolved  into  electricity,  electricity  into 
psychokinesis,  and  psychokinesis,  presumably,  into 
the  static  activities  of  the  still  more  remote  regions. 

Each  plane,  moreover,  possesses  its  own  character- 
istic unitary  complexes,  only  certain  specific  kinds 
of  which  go  to  form  the  basic  units  of  the  plane 
next  below.  And,  generally  speaking,  the  inter- 
relations of  activities  upon  the  different  planes  exist 
only  between  the  basic  units  of  one  plane  and  their 
parent  activities  upon  the  planes  above.  The  char- 
acteristic complexes  of  the  psychokinetic  plane,  for 
example,  are  those  awareness  complexes  known  to 
us  in  "conscious"  phenomena ;  only  those  complexes 


88  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

organized  after  the  manner  which  we  have  just 
pointed  out  forming  electrons.  The  characteristic 
complexes  of  the  plane  of  electricity  are  charges, 
currents,  magnetic  fields  and  the  like,  only  certain 
specially  organized  groups  of  electrons  forming 
atoms. 

There  is,  however,  a  further  point  to  be  noted  in 
connection  with  the  interrelation  of  the  activities  of 
the  different  lower  planes.  And  that  is  that  when 
the  velocity  of  vibration  or  rotation  (when  such 
conditions  exist)  of  the  units  upon  any  plane  is 
increased  beyond  a  certain  point  it  may  give  rise  to, 
processes  upon  the  plane  next  above. 

Molecular  vibration,  when  sufficiently  intense, 
may  set  up  chemical  action;  chemical  action,  when 
sufficiently  intense,  may  iniate  electric  disturbance. 
By  analogy,  also,  it  may  be  presumed  that  electric 
disturbances  of  sufficient  intensity  may  set  up  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  psychokinetic  activity.  In  short  the 
activity  of  any  plane  may  be  in  dynamic  relation 
with  the  activities  of  the  planes  immediately  above 
and  below  it.  And  finally  this  condition  of  affairs  is 
found  to  be  possible  because  we  have  seen  that  the 
extended  can  exist  when  its  component  units  do  not, 
themselves,  possess  extension,  and  that  motion  can 
exist  when  the  moving  entities  are  not  material  or 
physical  entities. 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  80 

A  psychon,  according  to  our  hypothesis,  possesses, 
essentially,  neither  spacial  position  nor  extension. 
Inclusion  of  psychons  in  a  psychokinetic  complex, 
therefore,  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  spacial  in- 
clusion. When  the  organizing  relations  involved  in 
a  complex  of  psychons,  however,  are  the  relations 
constitutive  of  the  spacial  manifold,  the  psychons  so 
organized  are  in  relation  to  that  manifold — they 
have  spacial  position.  In  this  case,  also,  the  com- 
plex of  psychons  so  organized  has  not  only  spacial 
position  but  extension  as  well,  although  the  in- 
dividual psychons  which  compose  the  complex  do 
not  possess  any  extension.*^ 

An  electron,  then,  which  has  both  spacial  position 
and  extension,  is  held  by  the  Activist  to  be  com- 
posed of  psychons  which  essentially  possess  neither; 
although  here  they  are  necessarily  "in"  space  owing 
to  the  specific  character  of  the  relations  by  which 
the  unitary  psychokinetic  complex,  called  an  elec- 
tron, is  organized.    The  component  psychons,  how- 

"  Since  psychons  are  assumed  to  be  entities  not  essentially 
in  relation  to  the  spacial  manifold,  it  follows  that  a  psycho- 
kinetic change  does  not  necessarily  imply  change  of  position 
or  motion.  The  conception  of  motionless  change,  however,  is 
by  no  means  illogical;  for  there  exists,  even  in  the  physical 
world,  one  instance  at  least  of  a  change  which  is  not  itself 
motion.      Acceleration    is    change    of    velocity — or    rate    of 


90  INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES 

ever,  do  not  first  have  to  be  "in"  spacial  positions, 
they  "get  into"  them  through  being  organized  by 
the  relations  of  the  spacial  manifold. 

Furthermore,  since  an  electron  is  composed  of 
psychons,  an  increase  of  psychons  in  an  electron 
necessarily  increases  that  electron's  amount — its 
intensity.  And  since  the  only  change  which  can 
take  place  in  an  electron's  activity  is  a  change  in  its 
mass  or  motion,  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  an 
increase  in  the  psychokinetic  intensity  of  an  electron 
must  be  correlated  with  a  change  in  its  mass  or 
motion. 

Just,  then,  as  an  increase  of  electrons  in  an  atom 
changes  the  atom's  electric  charge  and  mass,  so 
an  increase  of  psychons  in  an  electron  changes  the 
electron's  intensity  and  its  mass  or  motion.^^ 

motion,  but  acceleration  is  not  itself  motion.  The  change  in 
the  relations  of  a  moving  body  to  the  time  series  involved  in 
acceleration  is  not  in  any  sense  a  "motion",  since  both  the 
time  series  and  the  relations  of  any  entity  to  it  are  non- 
spacial  altogether.  They  are  elements  in,  or  logically  prior 
to,  motion  and  acceleration.  For  the  Rclationist  position  in 
this  matter  see  Appendix. 

"  The  phrase  "mass  or  motion"  is  employed  here  on  account 
of  the  generally  accepted  theory  that  the  mass  of  an  electron 


INTERRELATION  OF  THE  DIFFERENT  PLANES  01 

appears  to  depend  largely  upon  its  velocity.  Very  little  is 
yet  known  aliout  the  structure  of  an  electron.  It  is  possi- 
ble that  it  may  be  best  described  as  a  series  of  concentric 
fields  of  force;  and  if  so,  it  is  possible  also  that  such  fields 
of  force  might  contract  or  expand  in  relation  to  the  center. 
In  any  event  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  possible  change 
in  an  electron  would  not  involve  change  in  its  mass,  or 
velocity,  or  both.  A  recent  discussion  of  this  subject  may 
be  found  in  "Relativity  and  the  Electron  Theory"  by  E.  Cun- 
ningham. Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1915,  p.  65  fT.  See  also 
Appendix  on  Activism  and  Relativity. 


CHAPTER  7 

CONSCIOUSNESS 

In  speaking  of  the  characteristic  activities  of  the 
psychokinetic  plane  the  term  "awareness"  has  been 
used  rather  than  the  term  "consciousness".  It  is 
more  fundamental  and  has  acquired  less  ambiguous 
meanings.  As  consciousness,  however,  whether  con- 
sidered exclusively  in  its  relation  to  a  physical  or- 
ganism or  regarded  as  an  activity  in  its  own  right, 
constitutes  that  form  of  awareness  with  which,  from 
our  own  immediate  experience,  we  are  necessarily 
most  familiar,  it  is  essential  to  examine  its  specific 
conditions  in  some  detail. 

Consciousness  is  the  name  used  to  describe  a 
form  of  awareness  highly  complex  by  reason  either 
of  its  own  nature,  or  of  its  correlation  with  an  elab- 
orate nervous  structure  whose  functions  are  both 
widely  selective  and  closely  integrative.^  From  the 
point  of  view  which  we  have  developed  it  would  be 
also  a  psychokinetic  complex,  unitary  at  least  to  the 
extent  of  its  integration.^ 

*  The  term  "consciousness"  is  by  many  writers  not  limited  to 
complex  awareness.  For  our  purpose  it  seems  better  to  re- 
strict the  word  to  its  narrower  meaning, 

*  That  consciousness  is  unitary  to  the  extent  of  its  integra- 
tion would  be  true  upon  any  theory  as  to  its  real  nature.  If 
it  is  only  an  "aspect"  of  the  nervous  system,  its  integration  is 
substantially  that  of  the  nervous  system  itself.    If  it  is  a  rela- 

(92) 


CONSCIOUSNESS  93 

For  the  Activist,  then,  the  problem  narrows  itself 
to  a  question  as  to  the  nature  of  certain  highly 
organized  psychokinetic  complexes,  and  the  specific 
sort  of  relations  existing  between  them  and  the 
physical  complexes  with  which  they  are  associated. 

It  should  be  noted  here,  moreover,  that  the  gen- 
eral problem  remains  the  same,  whether  the  con- 
stituent elements  (ultimately  psychons)  of  the  phy- 
sical and  psychokinetic  complexes  are  the  same,  or 
whether  the  two  complexes  have  only  a  certain  por- 
tion of  their  elements  in  common,  or  whether  their 
elements  form  complexes  which  are  separate  and 
distinct.  For  in  any  of  these  circumstances  the 
activities  of  the  different  planes  would  be  different, 
even  though  their  constituents  were  altogether  or 
partially  identical. 

The  problem  of  consciousness,  however,  evidently 
involves  a  quite  special  case  of  this  general  interre- 
lationship, namely  the  relation  between  one  specific 
sort  of  psychokinetic  complex  and  another  equally 
specific  sort  of  psychokinetic  complex — the  relation 
between  a  living  material  organism  and  the  par- 

tion  or  relational  complex  between  the  organism  and  its  total 
environment,  its  integration  is  the  integration  of  those  rela- 
tions. 
C.  S.  Sherrington.    The  Integrative  Action  of  the  Nervous 

System.    New  York,  1906. 
Edwin  B.  Holt.     The  Concept  of  Consciousness.     George 
Allen  &  Company.    London,  1914. 


94  CONSCIOUSNESS 

ticular  consciousness  connected  with  it.  There  ex- 
ists, nevertheless,  according  to  our  hypothesis  at 
any  rate,  no  intrinsic  difficulty  in  the  way  of  an 
adequate  description  of  such  relations  in  general. 
It  remains  to  describe  if  possible  just  how  this  gen- 
eral relationship  between  psychokinetic  and  physical 
activities  is  involved  in  the  specific  instance  with 
which  we  are  dealing.  And  this  depends  largely 
upon  the  special  structure  and  functions  of  the 
physical  organism  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  special 
nature  and  processes  of  the  psychokinetic  complex 
on  the  other. 

As  regards  the  physical  organism  it  is  unneces- 
sary for  our  purpose  to  enter  into  the  detail  of  either 
its  structure  or  function  below  the  nervous  system. 
Such  investigations  belong  strictly  to  the  biological 
sciences.  Nor  is  it  even  essential  to  examine  the 
structure  or  functions  of  the  nervous  system  as  an 
integrative  mechanism.  This  field  belongs  to  the 
physiologist.  The  only  thing  that  is  of  special  in- 
terest, at  this  place,  is  the  nature  of  the  nerve  im- 
pulse itself,  since  it  is  here  if  anywhere  that  exists 
the  point  of  immediate  contact  between  the  psycho- 
kinetic and  physical  activities. 

Now  as  to  the  exact  nature  of  the  nerve  impulse 
there  are  almost  as  many  and  diverse  opinions  as 
there  are  investigators.  There  is,  nevertheless,  one 
well-established  fact  in  connection  with  it.     And 


CONSCIOUSNESS  95 

that  is  that,  whether  or  not  as  a  whole  the  nerve  cur- 
rent is  in  its  nature  electrical,  or  whether  the  method 
of  transmission  along  the  fibres  is  primarily  chemi- 
cal, there  is  always  associated  with  this  transmis- 
sion an  "action  current",  so  called,  which  is  purely 
an  electric  phenomenon.  And,  furthermore,  even  if 
this  were  not  so,  not  only  can  the  nerve  impulse  be 
directly  stimulated  by  even  minute  electric  disturb- 
ances ;  but  in  general  all  chemical  activity  can  only 
be  regarded  in  the  end  as  fundamentally  electrical 
in  character.  Any  sufficient  electric  disturbances  at 
the  cerebral  cortex,  therefore,  or  any  variation  of 
the  electrical  conditions  already  existing  there  has 
an  effect  upon  the  activities  of  the  nervous  system. 

Let  us  suppose,  then,  a  psychokinetic  complex  to 
be  in  such  a  relation  to  the  activity  of  the  afferent 
and  efferent  nerve  impulses  at  their  main  point  of 
interaction — presumably  the  cerebral  cortex — that 
some  at  any  rate  of  the  psychons  which  compose 
that  complex  are  in  efficient  relation  with  the  psy- 
chons which  ultimately  lie  at  the  base  of  the  physical 
activity  of  the  cortex  itself.  This  relation  might 
exist  in  a  variety  of  ways.  The  cortical  psychons 
and  those  of  the  psychokinetic  complex  might  be 
actually  the  same,  "taken"  in  two  different  orders. 
Some  of  the  cortical  psychons  (those,  for  instance, 
forming  the  electrical  positive  nuclei  of  the  atoms) 
might  be  involved ;  or  those  only  in  a  cortical  electro- 


9G  "CONSCIOUSNESS 

magnetic  field,  if  such  should  exist;  or  the  psy- 
chons  in  the  electrons  of  the  nerve  impulses  them- 
selves ;  or  those  in  the  electrons  of  the  atomic  struc- 
ture of  the  synapses. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  a  change  in  the  intensity  of  the 
psychokinetic  complex,  or  the  immediately  related 
portion  of  it,  would  be  correlated  with  an  intensive 
change  in  cortical  activity.  For  just  as  the  addition 
or  subtraction  of  one  or  more  electrons  alters  an 
atom's  electric  charge,  and  causes  it  to  attract  or 
repel  other  atoms,  so  the  addition  or  subtraction  of 
a  sufficient  number  of  psychons  may  be  considered 
to  alter  an  electron's  psychokinetic  intensity,  and 
change  its  dynamic  relations  to  other  electrons. 
Awareness  between  electrons,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  would  then  vary  with  the  variation  in  their 
psychokinetic  intensity.  In  other  words,  the  in- 
crease or  decrease  of  the  psychokinetic  intensity  of 
an  electron  increases  or  decreases  its  range,  the  ex- 
tent of  its  awareness  of  other  relations.  As  an  ac- 
tivity, therefore,  its  capacity  for  reaction  is  altered 
to  exactly  the  extent  of  that  increase  or  diminution. 

But  how,  it  has  been  asked,  can  this  increase  in 
merely  psychokinetic  intensity  bring  about  an  alter- 
ation in  the  physical  relations  between  electrons? 
How  can  the  increased  awareness  of  one  electron 
be  anything  but  a  change  in  its  awareness  of  another 
electron.     Or,  conversely,  how  can  an  alteration  in 


CONSCIOUSNESS  97 

the  physical  relations  between  electrons  be  in  any 
way  correlated  with  a  change  in  their  psychokinetic 
intensities  ? 

As  can  readily  be  appreciated  the  question  is  a 
crucial  one.  A  solution  of  the  problem,  however,  is 
not  impossible,  as  was  shown  at  the  conclusion  of  the 
last  chapter. 

Should  we  accept  the  explanation  given  there,  the 
problem  no  longer  assumes  the  portentous  char- 
acter of  an  inquiry  into  fundamental  principles,  but, 
difficult  though  it  may  be,  becomes  restricted  at 
once  to  the  application  of  those  principles  to  certain 
specific  instances. 

As  we  have  observed,  a  change  in  the  psycho- 
kinetic  intensity  of  an  electron  is  directly  corre- 
lated with  a  change  in  its  mass  or  motion.  In  this 
case,  also,  the  converse  is  likewise  true,  since  (ex- 
cepting in  the  case  of  a  solitary  electron  out  of  all 
relations  with  other  electrons)  an  alteration  in  the 
motion  of  an  electron  necessarily  alters  its  relations 
to  other  electrons  and  in  consequence  its  awareness 
of  the  difference  in  their  spacial  position. 

Let  us  now  assume  a  psychokinetic  complex  in 
immediate  relation  with  a  complex  of  electrons,  so 
that  there  is  at  any  rate  a  partial  correlation  between 
the  activities  of  each.  What  exactly  will  the  inter- 
relations be  ? 


98  CONSCIOUSNESS 

« 

Up  to  a  certain  point  the  situation  in  the  physical 
complex  is  fairly  well  known.  It  seems  certain 
that  at  the  great  cerebral  centers,  and  presum- 
ably at  the  cortex  especially,  there  is  a  constant 
inflow  and  outflow  of  the  nerve  impulses  together 
with,  it  is  supposed,  chemical  and  electrical  changes 
taking  place  at  these  points  concurrently.  Such 
being  the  case,  there  will  be  at  these  same  points  a 
continuous  increase  and  decrease  in  psychokinetic 
intensity  due  to  the  alteration  of  either  the  velocity 
or  direction  of  the  moving  electrons  constituting 
the  action  current,  as  well  as  the  electrical  changes 
lying  at  the  base  of  whatever  chemical  changes 
occur.  Presumably  at  these  points,  also,  the  inter- 
relations between  the  physical  complex  and  the 
psychokinetic  complex  with  which  it  is  correlated 
will  be  most  clearly  apparent. 

Let  us  suppose,  then,  a  nerve  impulse  to  traverse 
a  certain  one  of  these  points,  say  at  the  synapse  be- 
tween the  pyramidal  cells  at  one  of  the  sensory 
centers  of  the  cortex.  Under  these  conditions  the 
psychokinetic  intensity  at  this  point  will  be  increased 
with  the  motion  of  the  electrons  there.  This  will  be 
true,  moreover,  whatever  the  exact  nature  of  the 
motion  may  be.  It  may  be  translative  as  in  the 
stream  of  electrons  which  constitute  an  electric 
current,  an  acceleration  of  a  current  already  exist- 
ing, or  the  disturbance  of  an  already  existing  elec- 


CONSCIOUSNESS  99 

trie  field,  or  a  ehange  in  the  rotary  or  vibrational 
velocities  or  directions  of  the  electrons  which  con- 
stitute the  atoms  of  the  nerve  fibrils. 

Furthermore  this  increase  of  psychokinetic  in- 
tensity will  be  immediately  felt  in  the  psychokinetic 
complex  of  which  the  psychons  at  that  point  are 
either  an  actual  part,  or  with  which  they  are  in 
correlation.  The  nature  of  this  correlation  might 
be  of  a  good  many  different  kinds.  It  might  consist 
of  whole  or  partial  numerical  identity,  of  spacial 
propinquity,  of  some  as  yet  unknown  efficient  rela- 
tion; or  it  might  be  purely  a  psychokinetic  correla- 
tion due  to  the  influx  of  psychons  from  the  electrons 
into  the  psychokinetic  complex  or  vice  versa.  That 
a  correlation  of  some  sort  actually  exists  is,  how- 
ever, directly  evident  from  the  empirical  facts. 

Conversely  also  a  change,  or  certain  kinds  of 
change  at  any  rate,  in  the  psychokinetic  complex 
will  be  reflected  in  a  change  of  motion  or  direction 
of  the  electrons  at  the  point  in  question  consequent 
upon  the  change  of  their  psychokinetic  intensities. 

Yet  although  we  must  assume  this  reciprocal 
relationship,  the  picturing  of  its  precise  nature  is 
not  altogether  easy,  since  we  find  ourselves  per- 
petually prone  to  imagine  psychokinetic  units  or 
their  complexes  wholly  after  the  manner  of  physical 
entities. 

Let  us  suppose,  nevertheless,  a  portion  at  least  of 
our   psychokinetic   complex    (although   the   suppo- 


100  CONSCIOUSNESS 

sition  is  purely  diagrammatic  and  proba-bly  quite 
incorrect)  to  be  in  the  form  of  a  spacially  extended 
group  of  psychons,  a  sort,  if  you  will,  of  psycho- 
kinetic  field.  And  let  us  suppose,  further,  the  elec- 
trons of  the  nerve  impulse,  or  those  in  the  atoms  of 
the  nerve  fibres  themselves,  to  be  moving  through,  or 
revolving  within,  this  "field."  Now  whether  the 
nerve  impulse  be  altogether  electric  in  character, 
consisting,  that  is,  of  a  current  or  moving  stream  of 
electrons ;  or  whether  it  be  chemical,  in  which  case 
the  interatomic  electronic  revolutions  or  vibrations, 
or  the  electrons  of  the  charge  which  the  atom 
carries  are  primarily  affected ;  or  both  electrical  and 
chemical — in  any  of  these  events  the  psychokinetic 
intensity  of  the  electrons  in  the  field  will  be  increased 
with  the  influx  of  that  impulse.  And  as  electrons 
are,  ex  hypothesi,  also  themselves  psychokinetic 
complexes,  an  increase  in  their  intensity  involves  a 
corresponding  increase  of  intensity  in  the  field  so 
long  as  the  electrons  are  moving  through  it,  or 
revolving  in  it,  as  the  case  may  be. 

In  general,  likewise,  the  condition  of  heightened 
intensity  would  last  just  as  long  as  the  influx  con- 
tinued. Conversely,  an  increase  of  intensity  in  the 
field  from  any  other  source  than  that  of  the  inflow- 
ing electrons  would  increase  the  intensity  of  the 
electrons  already  in  the  field,  and  therefore,  accord- 
ing   to    the    general    theory    of    interrelationship 


CONSCIOUSNESS  101 

outlined,  set  up  an  electrical  activity  among  them. 

The  only  condition  that  it  is  necessary  to  posit 
in  order  that  such  a  state  of  affairs  should  obtain  is 
that  the  hypothetical  psychokinetic  field  in  question 
should  be  coterminous  spacially  with  some  portion 
of  the  line  of  flow  of  the  nerve  impulse  (or  of  the 
nerve  fibre  itself),  so  that  the  electrons  of  the  im- 
pulse (or  the  atoms  of  the  fibre)  should  be  within 
the  field  itself  at  that  point. 

Now  this  presentation  of  a  possible  manner  of 
correlation  is  obviously  crude,  and  the  actual  con- 
ditions are  presumably  much  more  subtle  and  com- 
plex. It  gives,  nevertheless,  some  general  idea  of 
how  such  a  correlation  might  actually  exist. 

Should  the  locus  of  correlation  between  the 
psychokinetic  complex  and,  at  any  rate,  the  eflferent 
nerve  impulse  be  interatomic,  moreover,  there 
already  exists  a  well-known  experiment  in  physics 
which  points  strongly  in  the  direction  of  an  explana- 
tion as  to  how  such  a  condition  might  occur. 

This  is  the  experiment  known  as  the  Zeeman 
eflfect.^ 

*Righi's  Modern  Theory  of  Physical  Phenomena  i  (N.  Y. 
The  Macmillan  Co.  1909)  p.  14  ff.  and  Robert  W.  Wood's 
Physical  Optics,  (N.  Y.  The  Macmillan  Co.  191 1)  p.  500  ff., 
both  give  an  excellent  discussion  of  Zeeman's  classic  experi- 
ment. There  is  also  some  experimental  evidence,  as  yet  incon- 
clusive, which  appears  to  indicate  the  possibility  of  some  such 
psychokinetic  effect  upon  the  interatomic  motion  of  electrons 
as  the  one  which  has  been  suggested. 


T.TRPAPV 


102  CONSCIOUSNESS 

When  an  incandescent  gas  is  subjected  to  the 
influence  of  a  strong  magnetic  field,  and  its  spectrum 
examined  through  a  sufficiently  powerful  telescope, 
the  influence  of  the  magnetic  field,  as  the  current  is 
turned  on,  is  clearly  shown  by  the  splitting  up  of  a 
single  characteristic  spectrum  line  of  the  gas  into 
two  or  more  separate  lines.  This  singular  effect  is 
produced  by  an  alteration  in  the  rotation  or  vibra- 
tion of  the  electrons  within  the  gaseous  atoms; 
which  alteration,  in  its  turn,  changes  the  frequency 
of  the  light  waves  propagated  by  these  whirling  or 
vibrating  electrons.  The  effect  of  this  change  of 
frequency  is  then  visible  through  the  spectroscope 
as  an  alteration  in  the  lines  of  the  spectrum. 

Now  if  in  place  of  the  magnetic  force  which, 
of  course,  acts  upon  the  moving  electrons  in  the 
atoms  from  without,  we  may  imagine  a  psycho- 
kinesis "acting  upon"  the  electrons  from  within, 
through  the  heightening  of  their  psychokinetic  in- 
tensity and  consequent  increase  of  velocity,  we 
should  find  a  change  in  their  periods  of  rotation  or 
vibration  similar  to  that  which  can  be  observed  in 
the  Zeeman  effect.  And  if  that  change  were  suffi- 
ciently great,  we  should  expect  electric,  or  possibly 
even  chemical,  changes  to  follow  in  the  physical 
system  in  which  the  change  occurred. 

Furthermore,  if  this  description  of  the  correla- 
tion between  a  psychokinetic  and  physical  complex 


CONSCIOUSNESS  103 

as  essentially  interatomic  should  be  in  any  way 
correct,  it  obviously  falls  into  line  with  the  general 
law  already  laid  down  that  the  interrelation  of  the 
activities  of  the  different  planes  take  place  by  means 
of  the  fundamental  unit  activities  of  these  planes — 
by  reason,  that  is,  of  the  fact  that  the  fundamental 
units  upon  any  plane  are  always  unitary  complexes 
of  the  fundamental  units  of  the  plane  next  above. 

Well — it  has  been  pointed  out  here,  in  a  general 
way,  in  what,  for  the  Activist,  the  psycho-physical 
correlation  may  be  considered  to  consist.  It  remains 
to  be  shown  how  the  variation  of  intensity  in  the 
psychokinetic  complex  itself  may  be  held  to  consti- 
tute the  different  psychic  processes  with  which  we 
are  familiar. 

Now  upon  any  theory  the  problem  of  the  relation 
between  awareness  and  its  object  is  obscure  and 
complicated  enough,  and  perhaps  the  most  that  can 
be  hoped  is  that  the  hypothesis  under  consideration 
may  prove  a  little  less  unsatisfactory  than  the  more 
traditional  explanations.  At  any  rate  it  possesses 
the  obvious  advantage  of  being  free  from  one  of  the 
principal  difficulties  of  the  older  theories;  since, 
for  it,  objects  do  not  have  to  be  somehow  "gotten 
into"  consciousness,  for  as  fundamentally  them- 
selves awareness,  simple  or  complex,  they  are 
already  "there"  from  the  start. 


104  CONSCIOUSNESS 

The  problem,  then,  may  be  stated  as  follows: 
( I )  Under  what  conditions  is  one  awareness  (simple 
or  complex)  aware  of  another  awareness;  and  (2) 
How  far  can  the  qualitative  differences  of  aware- 
ness be  correlated  with  difference  of  "intensity"  as 
we  have  defined  that  term. 

The  problem  of  the  "transmission  of  the  quali- 
ties" of  an  object  by  a  dynamic  mechanism  whose 
activity  is  measured  altogether  quantitatively,  as 
light  and  heat  by  ether  waves,  or  sense  qualities  by 
the  nerve  impulse,  is  a  further  difficulty  which  exists 
for  all  theories  alike  and  which  need  not  be  ex- 
amined at  present.  For  the  moment,  also,  the  first 
question  ( i )  may  be  passed  over,  since  it  is  ob- 
viously the  second  (2)  that  concerns  us  most  imme- 
diately at  this  point. 

Can,  then,  the  intensive  differences  in  a  psycho- 
kinetic  complex  explain  in  any  way  the  qualitative 
differences  of  the  psychic  processes?  Thus  stated 
it  is,  we  see  at  once,  the  old  question,  although  in  a 
slightly  unfamiliar  guise,  of  the  compounding  of 
consciousness.  How  can  one  get  quality  out  of 
quantity,  color  out  of  light  vibrations,  feeling  out 
of  sensation,  and  all  the  rest  of  it?  And  yet,  if  one 
looks  about,  the  world  is  full  of  just  that  sort  of 
thing.  Organisms  are  composed  of  cells,  but  they 
behave  as  indivisible  units,  possess  "qualities"  that  no 
amount  of  cells  "as  such"  could  possess.     So  do 


CONSCIOUSNESS  105 

cells  possess  "qualities"  unpossessed  by  atoms  or 
electrons.  Everywhere  we  find  unitary  complexes 
possessing  functions  and  apparently  unanalyzable 
characteristics — qualities — which  their  component 
units,  either  singly  or  in  groups,  do  not  possess. 
So  on  all  sides  we  discover  the  "compounding"  of 
activities.  There  would  seem,  therefore,  to  be  no 
peculiar  difficulty  in  assuming  the  same  general  con- 
dition to  hold  also  for  those  special  activities  which 
we  know  as  conscious  processes.  It  is  simply  a 
question  as  to  how  in  that  particular  case  the  "com- 
pounding" may  be  considered  to  take  place.  The 
fact  that  we  are  unable  to  trace  the  conditions  accu- 
rately does  not  constitute  a  valid  reason  for  denying 
their  possibility. 

But  let  us  briefly  re-examine  just  what  is  meant 
by  the  term  "intensity",  as  we  have  used  it,  in  con- 
nection with  a  psychokinetic  complex.  As  a  stand- 
ard of  measurement  for  activity  in  general,  includ- 
ing of  course  psychokinesis  as  an  activity  in  par- 
ticular, it  involves  the  elements  of  amount,  range, 
persistence,  and  exclusion. 

Now  the  intensive  variation  of  a  psychokinetic 
complex  as  regards  persistence,  or  duration,  is  com- 
paratively simple  to  understand,  since  it  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  imagine  any  condition  in  such  a  complex  as 
lasting  for  a  shorter  or  longer  period  of  time.  Ex- 
clusion also,  empirically  at  least,  is  clearly  enough 
shown  in  the  phenomena  of  attention,  the  principal 


108  CONSCIOUSNESS 

characteristic  of  the  attentive  state  being  the  exclu- 
sion of  extrinsic  content.  Moreover  range — the 
extent  to  which  the  complex  in  question  "makes  a 
difference"  to  other  activities — need  not  concern  us 
at  this  point. 

The  remaining  element  of  intensity,  however,  has 
a  special  bearing  upon  the  immediate  problem.  For 
amount  is  essentially  connected  with  content — the 
"number  of  things"  of  which  a  psychokinetic  com- 
plex is  aware.  The  more  or  less  of  psychons,  or 
their  subsidiary  complexes,  in  any  given  complex 
implies,  ex  hypothesi,  a  more  or  less  of  awareness 
objects.  This  follows  from  the  mere  fact  of  the 
more  or  less  of  the  relations  involved.  Increase  in 
intensity  in  this  case  signifies,  the  other  elements 
being  equal,  increase  in  content,  and  variation  of 
intensity  variation  of  content.  If  there  could  be  dis- 
covered, therefore,  the  specific  increase  of  intensity 
in  a  given  psychokinetic  complex — the  specific  in- 
crease in  amount,  or  content — due  to  a  specific  rela- 
tion to  some  other  specific  activity,  the  main  part 
of  the  problem,  for  the  Activist  at  any  rate,  would 
thereby  be  solved.  For  if  we  could  discover  in  any 
given  case  the  exact  intensity  concomitant,  for  ex- 
ample, with  the  presence  of  a  specific  sensation,  the 
psychokinesis  involved  at  that  specific  intensity 
would  be  the  sense  datum  itself."* 

*  For  the  additional  element  of  periodicity  involved  here  sec 
p.  80  ff. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  107 

Now  of  course  any  theory  whatever  is  neces- 
sarily faced  with  this  problem  in  one  form  or  an- 
other. Even  purely  physiological  psychology  cannot 
escape  it.  How,  for  example,  do  specific  degrees  of 
light  vibrations  get  themselves  reproduced,  or  ex- 
emplified, as  correlated  specific  neural  processes  in 
the  optic  centers?'  And  since  they  obviously  must, 
in  some  way,  represent  these  discriminations,  it  does 
not  add  to  the  general  theoretic  difficulty  to  suppose 
them  to  be  equally  well  represented  in  the  variations 
of  psychokinetic  intensity. 

In  some  cases  at  least,  moreover,  a  consideration 
of  the  essential  nature  of  the  psychokinetic  complex 
and  its  intensive  changes  may  lead  to  a  more  ade- 
quate description  of  this  correlation. 

Let  us  take  the  simplest  example — that  of  sensa- 
tion; and  let  us  assume — although  possibly  with- 
out warrant — that  a  simple  sensation  can  exist. 

An  approximation  might  be  found  in  the  sensa- 
tion obtained  upon  suddenly  awakening  from  sleep, 
in  an  open  field  under  a  cloudless  sky.  Momentarily 
at  any  rate  then,  it  would  seem  that  celestial  blueness 
would  be  the  sole  visual  sensation. 

•For  an  excellent  discussion  of  this  problem  from  the  point 
of  view  of  psysiological  psychology,  see  "Human  Psychol- 
ogy". P-  435  ff-.  by  Howard  C.  Warren,  Houghton  Mifflin  Co. 
1919. 


108  CONSCIOUSNESS 

Now  the  particular  -blue  which  would  consti- 
tute the  sense  datum  under  these  circumstances  is 
caused,  as  we  all  know,  by  certain  definite  stimuli 
(wave  motions  of  the  ether  presumably)  imping- 
ing upon  the  retina  with  a  certain  definite  period- 
icity. And  this  periodicity  would  naturally  be 
reproduced  (whether  discretely  or  "summed  up" 
in  some  way)  in  the  periodicity  of  intensive 
changes  in  the  psychokinetic  complex.  Objectively, 
of  course  also,  vibrations  of  just  that  periodicity 
are  blue  light  of  just  that  shade.  Why  then  should 
not  just  that  periodicity  of  intensive  psychokinetic 
variation  be  also  the  same  blue  light  "subjectively" 
in  the  awareness  complex  itself? 

According  to  this  suggestion  "blue"  is  intrinsically 
a  certain  definite  periodicity  no  matter  where  it 
occurs.  As  etheric  waves  it  is  color  as  light,  as 
intensive  psychokinetic  variations  it  is  color  as  sen- 
sation. Color,  then,  will  be  both  in  the  object  and 
in  the  mind,  and  yet  be  the  same  color. 

Although  no  theory  of  color  is  free  from  diffi- 
culties, the  realistic  theory  here  put  forth  seems  on 
the  whole  to  possess  at  least  the  merit  of  a  certain 
simplicity.  It  assumes  (i)  that  the  periodicity  in- 
duced (as  psychokinetic  or  possibly  electronic 
changes)  upon  a  material  surface  by  the  impinging 
light  rays  (white  sunlight),  as  modified  by  the  struc- 
ture (psychokinetic  or  electronic)  of  that  surface,  is 


CONSCIOUSNESS  109 

the  color  of  that  surface.  It  assumes  (2)  that 
light  of  the  sam^*  periodicity — the  same  color — is, 
then,  reflected  from  the  surface,  and  (3)  trans- 
mitted, in  some  as  yet  undiscovered  way,  through 
the  nervous  system,  until,  finally,  the  same  peri- 
odicity is  reproduced  in  changes  of  psychokinetic 
intensity — i.  e.,  in  consciousness. 

Whether  the  color  "quality"  results  from  "sum- 
ming up,"  or  some  other  characteristic  associated 
with  such  a  periodicity  as  a  series  of  changes,  is  a 
further  question.  It  would  seem  however  legiti- 
mate to  assume  that,  even  were  this  the  case,  the 
"summing  up,"  or  other  characteristic  involved, 
would  be  present  in  any  psychokinetic  complex, 
whether  that  complex  were  the  surface  of  an  "in- 
animate object"  or  the  awareness  centers  of  a  living 
organism. 

The  same  thing  would  also  be  true  of  all  the 
vibratory  phenomena  and  their  correlative  sensa- 
tions— sound,  heat,  electric  stimuli,  and  the  rest 
of  them. 

What  is  called,  in  technical  psychology,  "in- 
tensity", i.  e.,  degree  of  loudness,  brightness,  etc.,  is 
purposely  left  out  of  consideration  at  this  point, 
because  it  is  so  largely  relative — due,  that  is,  to  the 
general  intensive  "level"  of  the  psychokinetic  com- 
plex, as  well  as  so  intimately  connected  with  the 
subject  of  attention.     The  problem  of  its  correla- 


110  CONSCIOUSNESS 

tions  also  is  obviously  much  simpler,  since  a  more 
or  less  of  the  same  sort  of  phenomenon  is  essentially 
quantitative  from  the  start. 

There  are  several  other  points,  however,  to  be 
noted  briefly  here. 

Color,  as  we  know,  considered  psychologically, 
may  vary  in  three  ways,  hue,  tint,  and  chroma.*^ 

Hue  is  accounted  for  by  the  periodicities  of 
psychokinetic  change  corresponding  to  light  wave 
frequencies. 

Tint  is  quantitative,  induced  principally  by  light 
wave  amplitude,  and  is  represented  by  the  amount  of 
psychokinesis  involved  as  the  result  of  any  given 
visual  stimulus. 

Chroma,  which  is  due  to  saturation,  or  the  quan- 
tity of  white  light  mixed  with  the  pure  spectral  color, 
is  somewhat  more  complicated.  Nevertheless,  when 
it  is  considered  that  almost  any  number  of  periodic 
changes  may  go  on  at  the  same  time  in  a  sufficiently 
developed  psychokinetic  complex  the  problem  seems 
less  serious.  White  light  itself  is  a  complex  of 
such  periodicities,  and  the  amount  of  saturation  is 
simply  due  to  the  extent  to  which  this  complex 
enters  into  a  further  complex  composed,  in  its  turn, 

"  Titchener's  classification  is  followed  here.  Breeze  and  some 
others  use  "tint"  as  an  equivalent  for  light  shades;  Warren 
uses  it  for  chroma.  Possibly  "color-brightness,"  or  "color- 
shade"  would  be  a  better  term.  See  Warren  "Human  Psy- 
chology," pp.  165  ff. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  111 

of  white  light  and  the  periodicity  of  a  pure  spectral 
color.  The  awareness  here,  therefore,  is  of  this 
further  complex  as  a  whole — the  awareness  con- 
tent, sensation,  being  the  unitary  complex  of  just 
these  psychokinetic  periodicities. 

Black,  again,  or  the  absence  of  color  periodici- 
ties, is  only  perceived  as  a  color  by  means  of  light. 
For  even  as  darkness,  when  opening  the  eyes  at 
night,  it  is  never  wholly  free  from  the  retinal 
luminosity,  the  contrast,  psychokinetic  change,  be- 
tween it  and  light  being  either  perceived  or  remem- 
bered. 

Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that,  empirically  at 
any  rate,  psychic  content  is  always  changing  and 
so  involves  psychokinetic  change;  and  that  a  psy- 
chokinetic decrease  in  intensity  may  be  just  as 
positive  a  sensation  as  an  increase  of  intensity. 

Space  perception  is  a  knottier  question.  For  al- 
though we  have  shown  how  a  psychon,  or  a  psycho- 
kinetic complex,  can  be  in  relation  to  the  spacial 
manifold  (Chapter  6,  p.  62  flf.),  we  have  not  shown 
definitely  how  it  can  be  aware  of  such  a  three 
dimensional  series.  It  seems  clear,  also,  that  this 
relation  can  exist  without  implying  any  awareness 
of  it. 

The  problem  is  difficult  enough  upon  any  theory. 
If  we  start,  however,  with  the  conception  of 
such  a  sensation  of  crude  extension — of  undefined 


112  CONSCIOUSNESS 

"amount"  of  color — as  our  awakened  sleeper  would 
probably  receive  from  a  cloudless  blue  sky,  the 
problem  becomes  simpler. 

For  any  psychokinetic  complex  is  characterized 
by  the  "amount"  of  its  psychokinesis — the  number 
of  psychons  which  compose  it.  The  extent,  there- 
fore, to  which  the  periodicity  of  any  activity  with 
which  a  psychokinetic  complex  is  in  relation  can  be 
reproduced  in  the  complex,  is  necessarily  limited  by 
the  "amount"  of  activity  to  which  the  periodic  con- 
dition applies. 

Now  the  periodic  change  in  psychokinetic  inten- 
sity here  must  be  a  recurrent  increase  and  decrease 
in  either  range  or  amount.  It  would  seem  never- 
theless simpler,  in  the  case  of  an  impinging  neural 
stimulus,  to  consider  it  a  periodic  change  in 
amount  due  to  a  periodic  increase  and  decrease  in 
the  electric  current  (stream  of  electrons)  asso- 
ciated    (or    identical    with)    the    nerve    impulse. 

Physiologically  this  is  correlated,  of  course,  with 
the  extent  to  which  the  end  organ  in  the  case  of  any 
given  stimulus  is  involved,  and,  presumably,  with  the 
number  of  nerve  fibres  implicated  or  the  quantity 
of  nerve  impulse  transmitted,  or  both. 

Psychokinetically  it  is  correlated  with  the  extent  to 
which  the  psychokinetic  complex  is  involved.  The 
quantity,  for  example,  of  light  waves  set  in  motion 
by  a  single  rotating  or  vibrating  electron  would 


CONSCIOUSNESS  113 

obviously  be  less  than  the  quantity  of  waves  set  in 
motion  by  a  hundred  vibrating  electrons.  The  num- 
ber of  psychons  accordingly,  whose  periodic  in- 
tensive changes  could  be  affected,  would  vary  with 
the  amount  of  the  waves  with  which  they  were 
in  relation.  There  would  be  more  or  less  of  the 
same  color  as  there  was  a  greater  or  less  amount 
of  etheric  waves.  And  this  condition  is,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  rather  neatly  exemplified  empirically;  for 
in  the  purest  cases  brightness  and  size  (extent)  seem 
to  be  substantially  the  same,  as  in  the  fixed  stars 
where  there  is  no  real  visable  extension,  but  only 
an  apparent  extension  due  to  brilliancy. 

The  simple  sensation  of  space  then — of  crude 
extension — appears  to  be  directly  correlated  with 
amount,  the  "extent"  to  which  the  psychokinetic 
complex  is  involved.  If  all  the  psychokinesis  pos- 
sible, for  example,  is  set  changing  intensively  with 
a  certain  periodicity  by  the  total  physiological 
activity  of  the  optic  nervous  mechanism,  the  sensa- 
tion involves  the  entire  field  of  visual  awareness. 
The  color  has  the  maximum  extension.  The 
colored  "surface"  fills  the  whole  field.  If  the  mini- 
mum amount  of  psychokinesis  is  involved,  the  sensa- 
tion is  of  a  mere  point  or  speck  of  the  same  color.^ 

'  This  would  still  be  true  even  if  the  "extension"  were 
wholly  relative  to  fixation  distance,  and  the  angles  of  the 
horopter. 


114  CONSCIOUSNESS 

Moreover,  since  the  psychokinetic  complex  may 
be  supposed  to  be  in  spacial  relation  with  the  differ- 
ent nerve  fibres  at  various  points  spacially  distinct, 
it  may  well  be  considered  to  be  itself  aware  of  these 
spacial  differentiae  and,  to  that  degree  at  least, 
directly  aware  of  spacial  extension — its  own  spacial 
relationships  between  spacially  distinct  portions  of 
its  own  unitary  complex. 

For  when  the  spacial  relations  in  which  a  psycho- 
kinetic  complex  stands  are  of  such  a  character  as 
directly  to  affect  its  intensive  variations,  it  is  clear 
that  an  awareness  of  those  special  relations,  in  so  far 
as  they  affect  its  intensity,  must  exist  also.  And  a 
psychokinetic  complex  in  spacial  relations  with  a 
complex  system  of  nerve  endings  (or  cortical  cen- 
ters) is  in  just  that  situation. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  to  be  by  no  means  impos- 
sible to  correlate  at  least  the  sensation  of  crude 
extension  with  psychokinetic  intensity. 

In  a  brief  essay,  however,  it  is  impossible  to  work 
out  the  problem  in  detail — form,  contrast,  and  all  the 
rest  of  it.  All  that  can  be  done,  and  all  that  is  really 
necessary  here,  it  to  show  that  the  general  principle 
of  such  a  correlation  can  be  established. 

It  would  appear  then  that,  for  the  Activist  at  any 
rate,  such  qualities  as  color  and  spacial  extension 
can  be  "gotten  over"  into  sensation,  can  be  stated 
in  terms  of  psychokinetic  intensity.     Color  can  be 


CONSCIOUSNESS  115 

"gotten  over"  because,  as  essentially  a  certain 
periodicity,  it  "is"  wherever  that  particular  period- 
icity occurs. 

Extension  can  be  "gotten  over"  because  a  psycho- 
kinetic  complex  may  not  only  be  in  relation  to  the 
spacial  three  dimensional  series,  but  also  may  be 
aware  of  its  own  intensive  condition  concomitant 
with  its  relation  to  that  manifold. 

There  remains  to  be  considered  the  diflFerences 
between  the  kinds  of  sense  data  furnished  by  the 
separate  sense  organs.  How  can  sound,  light,  touch, 
and  the  others  be  stated  differentially  in  intensive 
terms  ? 

At  first  sight  this  would  seem  impossible.  For 
the  essential  characteristic  of  these  separate  senses 
seems  to  be  an  unanalyzable  qualitative  differen- 
tiation. Nevertheless  in  this  case  also  the  distinct 
periodicities  which  characterize  the  stimuli  that 
give  rise  to  the  various  classes  of  sensation  may 
prove,  when  stated  in  terms  of  the  same  period- 
icities of  intensive  change,  entirely  adequate  to 
account  for  the  different  orders  of  sensation. 

Touch,  for  example,  may  well  be  a  change  of 
intensity  simply  quantitative,  the  "amount"  of  it 
constituting  the  "mass"  or  extent  of  pressure  felt : 
Sound,  a  change  of  intensity  characterized  by  a  rela- 
tively slow  periodicity — 40  to  40,000  per  second, 
roughly:      Light   an   enormously   rapid  psychoki- 


116  CONSCIOUSNESS 

native  periodicity — ^^some  400,000,000,000  per  sec- 
ond and  upward.  While  taste  and  smell  may  be 
certain  specific  periodicities  due  to  chemical  changes 
excited  at  the  respective  end  organs. 

How  such  enormous  variations  in  periodicity  can 
be  taken  up  and  differentiated  by  the  nervous  system 
is  a  problem  for  the  physiologist.  There  would  be 
good  reason  to  suppose,  however,  that  psychokinetic 
discrimination  would  be  more  delicate  in  every  way. 
The  great  gaps,  also,  between  the  various  series  of 
periodicities — as,  for  example,  between  light  and 
sound — might  account  for  the  awarenesses  of  these 
widely  separated  series  as  distinct  sensations. 

Our  point,  however,  is  that  these  respective  peri- 
odicities are  pressures,  colors,  sounds,  and  the  rest, 
zvherever  they  occur,  so  that  when  they  take  place 
in  the  intensive  variations  of  a  psychokinetic  com- 
plex, they  are  there,  actually,  where  they  do  take 
place.  And  since,  ex  hypothesi,  its  own  intensive 
conditions  and  changes  are  essentially  the  things  of 
which  such  a  complex  is  immediately  aware,  those 
intensive  changes  which  are  color,  sound,  touch, 
and  the  rest,  constitute  the  sense  data  themselves. 

The  localization  of  certain  sense  data — as  spaci- 
ally  "external" — of  certain  objects  as  "out  there" — 
is  of  course  a  further  question.  It  seems  not  improb- 
able however  that  this  awareness  of  spacial  "ex- 
ternality" is  a  complex  matter  requiring  inference — 


CONSCIOUSNESS  117 

the  additional  relations  involved  in  at  least  rudi- 
mentary "thought" — and  that  such  "externality"  is 
not  immediately  given. 

The  localization  of  sensation  in  various  parts  of 
the  body,  again,  may  perhaps  consist  in  that  co-ordi- 
nation of  any  specific  intensive  change  with  the 
awareness  of  spacial  relations  which  has  already 
been  discussed. 

The  whole  problem  is  complex  enough  upon  any 
hypothesis.  It  would  seem,  nevertheless,  that  we 
are  justified  in  assuming  that  a  psychokenitic  com- 
plex is  aware  of  the  different  sense  data  which  reach 
it  through  the  separate  cortical  centers  as  distinct 
sense  data.  Their  periodicity  might  be  similar  (as 
from  similar  pressures  upon  different  parts  of  the 
body),  but  these  periodic  changes  might  well  in- 
volve distinct  sub-complexes  within  the  whole 
psychokinetic  complex,  and  thus  still  carry  with  them 
the  relation  of  separateness  between  them  into  the 
general  awareness. 

Pain  is  more  difficult  to  explain  intensively,  but 
it  may  perhaps  be,  finally,  some  sort  of  disruption 
or  syncopation  of  the  normal  rhythmic  periodicities 
either  in  themselves  or  their  complex  relations. 

Feeling,  as  technically  employed  by  the  phychol- 
ogists,  is  usually  restricted  to  the  awareness  of 
pleasantness  or  unpleasantness;  and  it  is  better,  for 


118  CONSCIOUSNESS 

us  here  at  any  rate,  to  confine  ourselves  to  this  funda- 
mental conception  of  it. 

Although  in  a  certain  sense  immediately  given, 
since  its  essential  character  depends  upon  the  nature 
of  the  stimulus,  it  is  obviously  conditioned  also  by 
the  response,  since  the  same  stimulus  may,  under 
different  circumstances  at  different  times,  give  rise 
to  quite  opposite  feelings.  Like  the  sensation  of 
pain  it  is  probably  due  principally  to  the  disturbance, 
or  brusque  interruption,  of  the  normal  psychoki- 
netic  periodicities  already  dominant  in  the  psycho- 
kinetic  complex.  This  arhythmic  quality  would  ac- 
count for  the  fact  that  the  same  feelings  are  not 
always  associated  with  similar  stimuli,  for  the  dis- 
ruption is  relative;  the  state  of  the  complex  at  any 
moment,  as  well  as  the  nature  of  the  stimulus,  being 
a  controlling  factor.  This  disruptive  quality  is 
clearly  enough  shown  in  ordinary  language  by  such 
vernacular  phrases  as  "it  jars  me",  "it  upsets  me", 
and  the  like.  The  quantitative  measure  of  the  feel- 
ing, also,  can  evidently  be  measured  by  the  usual 
intensive  elements  of  amount,  range,  duration,  and 
exclusion. 

Unpleasantness,  then,  would  seem  to  be  the  ge- 
neric appellation  for  arhythmic  psychokinetic  dis- 
turbances, and  vice-versa :  the  smoothness  of  flow 
of  the  interrelated  periodicities  being  pleasantness, 
and  its  opposite  unpleasantness.     Where  the  rhyth- 


CONSCIOUSNESS  119 

mic  quality,  or  its  opposite,  is  of  insufficient  intensity 
to  be  a  conspicuous  factor  in  the  awareness  of  the 
moment,  the  feeHngs  remain  neutral  or  practically 
unaroused. 

In  passing,  also,  it  may  be  noted  here  that  rhythm, 
or  the  lack  of  it,  is  an  important  element  in  proc- 
esses of  all  kinds,  including  changes  in  psychoki- 
netic  intensity,  and  that  as  a  fact  in  itself  apart 
from  the  specific  processes  of  which  it  is  an  element, 
it  has  not  been  sufficiently  emphasized  of  late.  It  is, 
says  the  much  maligned  Spencer,  "the  characteristic 
of  all  motion' ;  and  he  might  well  have  added,  of  all 
change.  It  plays  unquestionably,  upon  any  theory, 
a  conspicuous  part  in  determining  the  specific 
"qualities"  of  many  of  the  pyschic  processes.* 

•This  whole  subject  of  rhythm,  whether  psychologically  or 
intrinsically  considered,  has  occupied,  perhaps,  too  little  of 
the  scientific  attention.  It  may  well  be  a  much  more  important 
determining  clement  everywhere  than  is  generally  recognized. 

Certain  Oriental  systems  have  recognized  its  importance,  but 
among  us  Westerners,  Herbert  Spencer  and  John  Fiskc  arc 
among  the  few  who  have  treated  it  philosophically  in  any 
detail. 

As  an  essential  factor  involved  in  emotion  it  is  by  no  means 
improbable  that  further  investigation  would  reveal  an  intimate 
connection  between  arhythmic  and  abnormal  conditions,  either 
neural,  psychic,  or  both,  especially  in  the  cases  of  the  so-called 
"affect  psychoses." 

Herbert  Spencer.  First  Principles.  Chapter  lo.  (N.  Y.,  D. 
Appleton  &  Co.,  1898.) 

John  Fiske.  Cosmic  Philosophy.  Part  2,  Chapter  2. 
(Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  Boston  and  New  York,  1892.) 


120  CONSCIOUSNESS 

So  much  for  sensation  and  feeling.  Another  im- 
mediately given  element  which  enters  into  the 
psychic  content  is  imagery. 

Now  the  difference  between  a  specific  sensation, 
say  of  color,  and  the  corresponding  image  of  it 
seems  to  be  fundamentally  quantitative,  at  any  rate 
when  measured  in  terms  of  psychokinetic  intensity 
as  we  have  defined  it — the  elements  of  intensity 
being,  as  will  be  remembered,  amount,  range,  per- 
sistence, and  exclusion.  In  regard  to  all  of  these 
elements  the  image  is  quantitatively  less  than  the 
sensation.  Its  amount  is  less — it  possesses  less 
vividness,  "intensity"  in  the  ordinary  psychological 
sense.  Its  exclusion  is  less, — its  hold  on  the  atten- 
tive field  is  less  firm.  Its  duration  is  less — images 
are  notoriously  fleeting  and  evanescent.  And  its 
range  is  less — it  possesses  less  clearness,  is  character- 
ized by  precision  in  a  more  restricted  number  of 
details.  It  will,  nevertheless,  be  an  image  of  the 
same  color  notwithstanding  its  inferior  intensity 
(in  any  or  all  the  elements  thereof)  because  its 
periodicity  is  the  same.  And  since  that  particular 
psychokinetic  periodicity  is  that  color  (as  sensa- 
tion) ;  where  the  periodicity  is  there  will  the  color 
be  also,  whatever  its  intensity  may  be. 

Perhaps  attention  should  be  again  called  to  the 
fact  that  the  "locus"  of  the  periodicities  with  which 
we  are  dealing  here  is  in  the  psychokinetic  complex. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  121 

A  color,  as  a  certain  periodicity,  is  in  the  object,  the 
awareness  complex,  and  the  connecting  media — is, 
in  fact,  all  along  the  line.  But  a  color  as  a  sense 
datii-m  is  essentially  in  the  awareness  complex  itself. 
Such  a  "locus",  however,  does  not  necessarily  im- 
ply spacial  position.  It  implies  psychokinetic  inclu- 
sion only. 

Yet,  if  this  is  all  there  is  to  it,  how  can  an  image 
be  distinguished  from  a  similar  sensation  of  suffi- 
ciently feeble  intensity,  or  a  sufficiently  intense  image 
from  a  sensation?  The  answer  is  that  it  cannot. 
If  a  sensation  is  sufficiently  feeble  in  all  of  the 
three  intensive  elements  it  cannot  be  clearly  dis- 
tinguished from  an  image.®  If  an  image  possesses 
all  three  of  them  to  a  sufficient  degree,  it  becomes 
a  hallucination. 

It  is  perhaps  needless  to  say  that  under  normal 
circumstances  in  broad  daylight  these  limiting  con- 
ditions are  scarcely  ever  reached,  and  that  in  prac- 
tice the  distinction  is  usually  both  easy  and  and 
definite. 

The  images  with  w^hich  we  are  ordinarily  familiar, 
however,  are  not  of  the  simple  kind  which,  for  the 
purposes  of  a  clearer  analysis,  we  have  been  dis- 
cussing.    On  the  contrary  they  are  nearly  always 

•The  experimental  demonstration  of  the  essential  similarity 
between  image  and  sensation  is  discussed  at  length  by  Titch- 
ener.  A  Text-book  of  Psychology.  The  Macmillan  Co.  N. 
Y.  1 910,  p.  197  flF. 


122  CONSCIOUSNESS 

memory  images,  or  at  any  rate  presentations  in 
which  some  reference  to  past  experience  is  impHcit. 
And  this  brings  up  at  once  the  problem  of  memory 
and  its  relation  to  psychokinetic  intensity. 

Now  there  are  three  fundamental  questions  in 
regard  to  memory  and  memory  images.  One  is  the 
problem  of  retention;  the  second  the  problem  of 
reference,  or  relation  to  the  past ;  and  the  third,  the 
problem  of  reference  to  the  specific  time  of  any  past 
event. 

The  first  problem  applies  to  all  images,  since 
obviously  any  image,  either  as  a  whole  or  in  its  con- 
stituent elements,  depends  upon  past  "experience"  of 
some  kind.  The  subject  is  obscure  and  has  never 
been  satisfactorily  explained,  but  the  generally 
accepted  view  seems  to  be  that  any  organic  complex 
which  has  previously  responded  in  certain  ways  to 
specific  stimuli,  may  be  impelled  to  similar  (although 
usually  less  intense)  responses  either  by  a  repetition 
of  the  original  stimulus,  or  by  an  indirect  arousal  of 
the  secondary  responses  through  some  interrelated 
processes — as  e.  g.  the  neural  processes  connected 
with  the  associational  centers  of  the  cerebral  cortex. 
According  to  this  view  there  is,  of  course,  no  "reten- 
tion", strictly  speaking,  aside  from  the  tendency  to 
similar  response — the  revived  response  being  differ- 
entiated from  an  initially  aroused  psychic  process 
by    those    qualities — lack    of    clearness,    duration, 


CONSCIOUSNESS  123 

strength,  etc.,  which  have  already  been  noted  as  dis- 
tinguishing imaginal  characteristics. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  if  this  physiological  basis 
is  sufficient  for  "retention",  its  relation  to  the  corre- 
sponding psychokinetic  intensity  (already  outlined) 
presents  no  fresh  problem.  The  modus  operandi  is 
the  same  as  for  sensation.^" 

It  should  be  observed  here,  however,  that  if  the 
neural  processes  can  be  revived  in  this  way,  it  would 
presumably  follow  that,  since  these  processes  like  all 
physical  processes  are  ultimately  a  form  of  psycho- 
kinesis, the  psychokinetic  processes  themselves  would 
possess  a  similar  capacity  of  revivification  under 
requisite  conditions.  In  other  words  that  "reten- 
tion" might  be  psychokinetic  as  well  as  neural.  The 
same,  of  course,  would  be  true  for  association.  Pos- 
sibly both  conditions  may  be  essential. 

The  problem  of  "pastness" — or  the  conscious 
reference  of  images  to  previous  experience — has 
given  a  great  deal  of  trouble.  We  have  already  as- 
sumed, however,  that  a  psychokinetic  complex  is 

"  There  are  so  many  difficulties  in  any  physiological  theory 
of  memory  that  Bergson,  in  his  well  known  "Matiere  et 
Memoire",  was  led  to  discard  such  explanations  altogether. 
The  general  view  among  psychologists,  nevertheless,  is  that  a 
satisfactory  physico-chemical  basis  for  retention  will,  one  of 
these  days,  be  discovered.  For  our  purpose,  therefore,  it 
seems  best  to  accept,  uncritically,  the  prevailing  opinion.  For 
an  excellent  discussion  of  the  possible  physiological  basis  of 
retention  see  Warren,  "Human  4*sychology,  p.  437  ff. 


124  CONSCIOUSNESS 

aware  not  only  of  entitles  (psychons  and  their  com- 
plexes), but  of  relations;  and  that  the  relations  of 
which  it  is  aware  "get  into"  its  awareness  in  connec- 
tion with  the  entities  with  which  these  relations  are 
essentially  associatecj.  Two  distinct  colors,  for 
example,  are  perceived  not  only  as  colors,  but  also 
as  distinct.  The  relation  of  dissimilarity  comes  in 
with  them.  But  different  colors  perceived  at  the 
same  time  are  usually,  as  well,  spacially  separate. 
In  this  case  the  separateness  relation  comes  in  also. 
The  two  periodicities  do  not  travel  in  isolation,  but 
carry  their  mutual  interrelations  with  them.  It  is 
further  evident,  moreover,  that  two  color  periodi- 
cities need  not  occur  at  the  same  moment  of  time, 
but  that  one  may  precede  the  other,  and  that  the 
change  in  psychokinetic  intensity  which  is  the  cessa- 
tion of  a  periodicity  would  be  an  awareness  object 
as  well  as  that  change  which  is  the  incipience  of 
periodicity.  But  an  awareness  of  change  implies  an 
awareness  of  temporal  sequence.  And  here,  at  any 
rate,  change  in  awareness  is  awareness  of  change. 

This  awareness  of  pastness  in  general,  therefore, 
is  postulated  in  our  original  hypothesis.  And  the 
postulate  would  appear  to  be  justified,  if  for  no 
other  reason,  because  empirically  it  is  a  fact  that  we 
are  immediately  aware  of  temporal  sequence. 

Specifically  nevertheless  the  question  may  be 
asked  how  any  given  image  can  be  taken  to  "refer" 


CONSCIOUSNESS  125 

to  some  definite  past  time,  and  how  this  past 
reference  can  be  expressed  in  psychokinetic  terms. 
The  truth  of  this  matter,  however,  would  seem  to 
be  that  such  specific  reference  is  not  a  question  of 
pastness  at  all,  but  of  association.  The  general  con- 
dition of  a  relation  to  the  temporal  series  attaches 
to  all  images,  either  as  a  whole,  or  to  the  imaginal 
elements  of  which  they  are  the  unitary  complex.  The 
specific  character  of  that  relation — the  specific  place 
in  the  temporal  series  which  it  implies — appears  to 
depend  altogether  upon  the  character  of  the  asso- 
ciated images  revived  with  the  principal  image  in 
any  given  case.  My  "memory"  of  the  blue  seen  last 
Sunday  is  referred  to  "last  Sunday",  because  the 
blue  image  is  associated  with  the  open  field  where  I 
was  reclining  when  I  opened  my  eyes  upon  the  cloud- 
less sky,  the  Sunday  atmosphere  of  too  much  break- 
fast, the  distant  church  bells,  and  the  rest  of  it. 
With  more  unfamiliar,  remote,  or  less  specific  im- 
ages, it  is  often  quite  impossible  to  "place"  them 
definitely.  All  that  exists  is  the  general  vague  sense 
of  pastness. 

Psychokinetically,  therefore,  all  that  is  necessary 
to  ix)sit  is  that  the  associated  images  should  occur 
together  synchronously.  As  to  the  relation  to  past- 
ness in  general,  the  relation  of  psychokinetic  condi- 
tions to  the  time  series  is,  as  we  have  seen,  funda- 
mental.    The  further  consideration  of  the  aware- 


126  CONSCIOUSNESS 

ness  of  relations  as  such  will  be  discussed  more  in 
detail  later. 

We  have  now  considered — very  briefly — from  the 
standpoint  of  Activism,  those  psychic  elements  im- 
mediately derived  from  the  world  about  us — sensa- 
tion, feeling,  and  image,  with  its  derivative,  memory. 
There  remains  to  be  considered  from  the  same  stand- 
point the  more  complex  psychic  processes — ^atten- 
tion, perception,  thought,  emotion,  and  will. 

With  the  last  four  of  these  we  are  faced  once 
more  with  the  question  of  the  compounding  of  con- 
sciousness. 

Attention,  however,  does  not  raise  this  point.  It 
is  not  a  specific  "state"  like  sensation  or  image,  but 
involves  merely  the  relative  intensity  of  differ- 
ent psychokinetic  conditions.  It  is  the  extent  to 
which  any  given  condition  occupies  the  psycho- 
kinetic  complex — "fills  the  mind"  literally.  The 
degree  of  attention  existing  in  any  such  condition 
depends  directly  upon  that  element  in  intensity 
which  we  have  called  "exclusion",  which  in  its  turn, 
is  the  relative  degree  of  amount,  range,  and  dura- 
tion. ^^  Attention,  then,  is  psychokinetic  intensity — 
measured  however,  in  the  case  of  any  specific  con- 

"The  "clearness"  which  Titchener  and  others  consider  as 
the  distinguishing  attribute  of  attention,  evidently  depends 
upon  these  three  intensive  elements  of  amount,  range,  and 
duration. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  127 

tent,  relatively  to  the  total  intensity  of  the  whole 
complex,  at  that  moment. 

It  is  altogether  an  affair  of  intensive  quantity. 

This  does  not  mean  that  several  of  such  relatively 
absorbing  intensities  may  not  exist  synchronously, 
or  that  the  difference  between  them  may  not  itself 
constitute  a  content  of  attentive  awareness.  For 
example,  the  thin  high  note  of  a  violin  E  string  may 
be  perceived  during  a  thunder  clap,  but  the  relative 
intensity  of  the  contrast  makes  it  audible.  For  rela- 
tions, as  activities,  have  their  intensities  also.  At- 
tention in  itself,  therefore,  does  not  involve  any 
"compounding". 

Perception,  however,  obviously  involves  more 
than  a  simple  element.  That  which  is  perceived 
must,  in  the  first  place,  possess  sufficient  relative 
intensity  to  arouse  attention.  The  amount  of  psy- 
chokinesis involved,  as  well  as  its  duration  and 
range — the  extent  to  which  associated  processes  are 
aroused — must  be  great  enough  to  exclude  other 
processes.  ^^ 

In  the  case  of  sense  perception,  for  example,  the 
sensation  must  also  be  connected  with  the  appi^o- 
priate  image  in  such  a  way  that  the  image  is  part 
of  the  content.    It  is  possible  that  the  image  might 

"  It  is  upon  the  intensive  element  of  exclusion  as  a  deriva- 
tive of  amount,  range  and  duration,  that  depends  what  Wundt 
seems  to  mean  by  apperception — the  "bringing  of  content  into 
clear  comprehension". 


128 '  CONSCIOUSNESS 

be  a  "generic"  image,  rather  than  a  pure  memory 
image.  It  seems  wiser  here,  however,  not  to  enter 
the  recent  discussion  concerning  imageless  thought. 
In  any  event  perception  involves  more  elements  than 
mere  sensation.  It  involves  at  the  very  least,  aware- 
ness of  sensation,  image,  and  the  relation  of  like- 
ness between  them.  It  is,  therefore,  a  complex 
awareness,  a  combination  of  different  psychic  ele- 
ments, so  that  we  have  here,  at  any  rate,  a  content 
which  is  "compound". ^^ 

For  the  activist,  however,  there  is  no  reason  what- 
ever that  such  a  combination  of  periodicities  and  the 
relations  of  similarity  between  them  should  not 
exist,  nor  that  the  complex  which  they  form  should 
not  be  essentially  a  unitary  complex.  In  fact  it  is 
just  this  sort  of  thing  that  unitary  complexes  are; 
and  the  world  is  full  of  them  both  on  and  off  the 
psychokinetic  plane.  That  their  constituent  ele- 
ments can  be  quantitively  determined  and  stated  in 
terms  of  psychokinetic  intensity  in  no  way  impairs 
their  unitary  character. 

"  Many  Psychologists  as  Warren  (p.  234  flF.,  "Human  Psy- 
chology", and  Titchener,  p.  364  ff.,  Textbook  of  Psychology), 
speak  of  "simple  perception"— as  the  perception  of  a  mass 
of  colored  points  in  a  single  field.  This  would  seem  to  the 
author  to  be,  rather,  a  "compound",  or  "summated"  sensation, 
perception  proper  carrying  with  it  always  a  relation  of  "differ- 
ence from"  or  "likeness  to"  some  other  sensation,  or  (usually) 
some  other  image. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  129 

We  have,  so  far,  briefly  analyzed  only  the  simplest 
kind  of  sense  perception,  but  the  general  application 
of  the  principle  of  the  unitary  complex  holds  good 
for  more  elaborate  complexes  as  well.  It  is  funda- 
mentally a  question  of  the  quantity  of  the  associated 
imagery — psychological  meaning. 

In  regard  to  the  more  complex  psychic  processes, 
such  as  thought,  it  is  exceedingly  difficult  to  enter 
into  any  discussion  of  them  without  immediately 
becoming  involved  in  psychological  controversy. 
Yet  without  some  definition  a  statement  of  these 
processes  in  psychokinetic  terms  is  impossible. 
What  for  example,  is  the  precise  difference,  psy- 
chologically, between  a  percept  and  concept?  One 
has  only  to  ask  the  question,  and  the  immeasureable 
abysses  of  metaphysics  at  once  fly  open.  Is  a  con- 
cept, psychologically,  merely  an  image — a  percept 
where  the  image  perceived  is  that  of  a  word,  or  a 
concrete  thing,  differing  from  other  percepts  only  in 
its  associative  content — its  meaning,  or  reference? 
Or  is  it  something  intrinsically  different  sub  specie 
qwditatis?  Is  meaning,  after  all,  something  more, 
psychologically,  than  content  ?  And  a  host  of  sim- 
ilar difficulties  and  questions. 

Now  whether  the  immediate  object  of  awareness 
in  conception  is  an  image  or  not,  it  is  obvious  that 
the  total  psychological  content  is  characterized  by 


130  CONSCIOUSNESS 

conditions  which  differentiate  it  from  the  content  in 
perception. 

In  the  first  place,  the  content  in  conception  lacks 
the  sense  datum.  There  are  in  it,  as  essential  ele- 
ments, neither  sensation,  nor  sense  perception.  It 
consists  almost  wholly  of  a  more  or  less  complex 
series  of  relations  plus,  usually,  an  image  or  series 
of  images,  the  relational  complex  however  being  the 
important  factor.^* 

The  question  for  us  here,  therefore,  is  can  these 
relational  complexes  which  constitute  the  chief 
element  in  the  content  of  a  concept  be  described  and 
differentiated  quantitatively  in  terms  of  intensity? 

Now  the  differences  between  specific  relations 
would  seem  at  first  sight  finally  qualitative.  There 
is,  nevertheless,  between  them  a  difference  in  range. 
For  the  things,  for  example,  which  such  a  relation 
as  "above"  can  characterize,  are  evidently  more  than 
the  things  to  which  such  a  relation  as  "tangent  to" 
can  refer.  And  in  the  end,  too,  this  difference  in 
range  is  intensively  quantitative,  since  "above"  can 
characterize  more  things — the  entities  of  a  three 
dimensional  series,  while  "tangent  to"  can  char- 
acterize the  entities  of  the  class  "lines"  only.  For  in 
general,  relations  differ  in  range,  quantitatively,  in 

"  For  a  concise  discussion  of  "Imageless  Thought"  from  the 
point  of  view  of  Physiological  Psychology  see  Warren, 
"Human  Psychology,"  p.  322  ff. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  131 

respect  to  the  number  of  classes  of  entities  to  which 
they  can  apply.  The  social  relations  show  this 
clearly — e,  g.  the  relation  of  parenthood  has  a  much 
greater  range  than  the  relation  of  teacher  to  pupil, 
and  that  of  teacher  to  pupil  has  a  much  greater 
range  than  that  of  officer  to  soldier. 

Universals,  as  well,  differ  in  range  within  them- 
selves. Goodness  has  a  greater  range  than  gentle- 
ness, or  love  than  jealousy;  since  many  are  good 
who  are  not  gentle,  and  many  more  love  than  are 
jealous. 

Furthermore,  since,  as  a  rule  if  not  always, 
the  awareness  content  in  the  case  of  universals  and 
abstract  particulars  includes  a  symbolic  image, 
sensory  or  otherwise,  the  total  content  will  vary  in- 
tensively with  the  different  images  appropriate  to 
the  universals,  or  abstract  particulars,  with  which 
they  are  associated. 

Thought,  however,  involves  more  than  mere  con- 
tent It  involves  process  also.  Nevertheless,  this 
fact  presents  no  special  difficulty,  since  ex  hypo- 
thesi  a  psychokinetic  complex  is  aware  of  its  own 
intensive  changes ;  and,  since  the  thought  psychosis 
can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  psychokinetic  intensity, 
it  follows  that  the  changes  of  that  psychosis  can  be 
expressed  intensively  also.  As  process  the  thought 
process  consists,  like  other  psychokinetic  processes, 
in  a  series  of  intensive  changes. 


132  CONSCIOUSNESS 

As  a  process,  however,  it  differs  from  other  pro- 
cesses in  being  obviously  much  more  complex.  It 
involves,  essentially,  a  number  of  subsidiary  pro- 
cesses. It  involves  the  awareness  of  concepts,  fre- 
quently, at  any  rate,  of  images,  and  of  different  and 
usually  progressive  series  of  relational  complexes. 
It  involves  also,  as  a  rule,  feeling — the  awareness  of 
gratification  or  the  opposite  during  the  process.  It 
possesses,  therefore,  both  greater  amount  and 
greater  range.  Between  thought  processes  them- 
selves, however,  their  intensive  differentiae  are  prin- 
cipally those  of  range,  due  to  the  specific  nature  of 
the  various  contents  which  the  process  relates  or 
generates.  And,  finally,  of  course,  thought  always 
involves  meaning,  and  meaning  is  content  logically 
determined.  ^'^ 

There  is,  strictly  speaking,  no  specifically  constant 
content  in  emotion.  Like  feeling  it  is  altogether 
process.  It  differs  from  feeling,  however,  in  being 
characterized  intensively  by  both  greater  amount 
and  greater  range.  It  involves  thought  and  image 
as  well  as  perception  and  organic  sensation.  All 
these  elements,  nevertheless,  may  exist  in  a  complex 
without  emotion.    It  is  only  when  the  total  aware- 

"That  universals — whatever  they  may  really  be — are  em- 
pirically essential  to  the  thought  process,  as  part  of  the 
psychological  content,  seems  incontrovertible.  For  we  can- 
not, after  all,  think  without  thinking — t.  e.,  conceiving — be  the 
nature  of  the  process  what  it  may. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  183 

ness  process  related  to  such  a  complex  content  is 
strongly  rhythmic  or  arhythmic  in  character  that  an 
emotion  may  be  said  to  occur.  To  be  afraid  means 
to  perceive  an  object,  to  think  of  its  dangerous 
nature,  to  have  unpleasant  bodily  sensations,  and, 
therefore,  to  be  aware  of  a  series  of  intensive 
changes  out  of  harmony  with  the  totality  of  normal 
processes  in  the  psychokinetic  complex  as  a  whole — 
to  be  aware  of  a  general  arhythmic  condition  in  the 
total  awareness.  Emotion  is  therefore  psycho- 
kinetically  more  intense,  although  at  the  same  time 
vaguer  and  less  specifically  precise  than  feeling. 
But  like  feeling,  such  a  rhythmic  condition  may  char- 
acterize any  process.  It  needs  only  to  be  sufficiently 
pronounced  to  become  a  distinct  element  of  aware- 
ness. So,  for  any  "psychic  state"  we  may  have 
not  only  a  "feeling  tone,"  but  also  an  "emotional 
coloring". 

The  diflFerences  between  emotions  may  be  ex- 
pressed in  intensive  terms  in  the  same  way  as  the 
differences  between  feelings,  with  certain  modifica- 
tions due  to  their  greater  complexity.  Thus,  fear 
and  anger  may  be  equally  unpleasant — equally 
arhythmic.  But  in  fear  the  lack  of  rhythm  qualifies 
one  set  of  psychic  processes,  in  anger  another.  The 
content  of  the  elements  whose  psychokinetic  changes 
are  involved  differs  in  the  two  cases.  The  thought 
processes  are  not  alike,  nor  the  associated  bodily 


134  CONSCIOUSNESS 

sensations;  so  that  the  two  psychoses  differ  inten- 
sively, as  complexes,  with  the  intensive  difference  of 
these  associated  elements. 

The  same  general  considerations  also  hold  good  of 
the  emotions  characterized  by  an  increased  ryhthmic 
glow — greater  harmony  in  the  total  activity  of  the 
psychokinetic  complex.  Love  and  joy,  for  example, 
may  -be  equally  in  ryhthmic  harmony  with  the  psy- 
chokinetic processes  as  a  whole,  'but  neither  the 
thought  processes  nor  the  associated  bodily  sensa- 
tions are  the  same  in  both  instances,  They  differ  in 
range,  amount,  or,  under  certain  conditions,  in  both 
of  these. 

The  ancient  problem  of  will  and  activity — 
whether,  that  is,  the  will  is  dynamically  efficient,  or 
merely  an  inefficient  psychic  correlate  of  physico- 
chemical  processes — does  not  exist  for  the  activist, 
since,  as  for  him  all  processes,  psychic  or  otherwise, 
are  activities,  will  is  an  activity  also.  It  is  not, 
however,  in  any  sense  a  "faculty"  in  the  antique 
psychological  terminology. 

Will  is  a  process  which  characterizes  the  psycho- 
kinetic  complex  as  a  whole,  a  certain  content  (sub- 
complex),  and  the  whole-part  relation  between  them. 
The  essential  characteristics  of  will,  therefore,  are 
due  to  this  relation  of  the  specific  content  to  the  con- 
tent included  in  the  total  process. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  135 

This  specific  content  is  usually  called  purpose. 
Its  principal  element  is  a  complex  image  which  is 
anticipatory — that  is,  an  image  which  is  in  relation 
to  the  forward  stretching  part  of  the  time  series; 
and  which  is  characterized  by  a  desirable  feeling 
tone — "desirable"  meaning,  here,  desirable  as  a 
whole  and  in  the  long  run.  In  other  words,  the 
image  in  this  case  possesses  a  complex  of  periodici- 
ties and  a  range  in  harmony  with  the  range  and 
periodicities  of  the  psychokinetic  complex  as  a 
whole.  The  image  also  must  endure,  or  be  capable 
of  revival  in  all  essential  elements  under  varying 
psychokinetic  conditions,  until  it  is  merged  in  the 
actual  experience — must  possess,  in  a  high  degree, 
duration. 

The  will  process,  then,  is  characterized  intensively 
by  a  maximum  amount  and  exclusion — it  occupies 
the  whole  complex,  the  whole  "field  of  attention" ; 
while  its  imaginal  content  is  characterized  by  a  high 
degree  of  range  and  duration.  It  is  differentiated 
intensively,  moreover,  from  other  psychoses  by  the 
nature  of  the  image  which  is  the  essential  element 
of  its  content ;  the  "purpose"  image,  alone,  possess- 
ing both  the  relation  to  the  forward  stretching  part 
of  time  series,  and  the  specific  feeling  tone  which 
have  been  noted. 

For  example,  a  situation  which  is  merely  desired 
but  not  willed,  involves  also  an  anticipatory  image 


136  CONSCIOUSNESS 

and  a  pleasant  feeling  tone.  But  in  that  case  the  feel- 
ing is  either  only  pleasant  in  itself,  or  harmoniously 
related  to  a  part  only  of  the  total  psychokinetic 
complex;  its  range  does  not  include  the  greater 
part  of  the  complex  as  does  the  feeling  tone  of  the 
will  content.  Or  again,  the  feeling  tone  attached 
to  the  anticipatory  image  may  be  unpleasant  in  itself, 
but  taken  in  its  wider  relations  to  the  total  complex 
it  may  be,  nevertheless,  desirable.  I  may  not  wish  to 
go  to  a  dentist,  but  I  may  will  to  go  there.  Psycho- 
kinetically  the  difference  is  clear  and  can  be  meas- 
ured intensively. 

Well!  We  have  considered  briefly,  the  chief 
conscious  processes,  and  found  that  they  can  all  be 
stated  in  psychokinetic  terms  and  "measured"  in- 
tensively.*® 

From  the  standpoint  of  Attivism,  at  any  rate,  their 
"qualities"  and  differences  do  not  seem  to  be  irre- 
ducible elements,  except  in  so  far  as  they  involve 
differential  combinations  of  the  elements  of  intensity 

"This,  of  course,  does  not  imply  that  "content"  can  be 
wholly  stated  in  psychokinetic  terms,  since  the  relations  in- 
volved are  not  psychokinetic,  but  beings  of  a  different  plane. 
The  conditions  involved  in  the  awareness  of  relations,  how- 
ever,— the  conditions  of  their  inclusion  in  the  psychokinetic 
complex  which  is  aware  of  them — can  be  stated  in  terms  of 
psychokinetic  intensity.  A  relation  is  not  a  complex  of 
psychons.  But  the  awareness  of  a  relation  is  a  complex  of 
psychons,  at  the  particular  intensity  which  that  relation  deter- 
mines. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  137 

itself.  And  this  we  have  found  to  be  true  even  in  the 
awareness  of  such  things  as  ideals,  relations,  and 
values,  since  they  also  can  be  distinguished  inten- 
sively. 

"Consciousness",  then,  is  simply  the  generic  term 
for  the  total  activities  of  a  unitary  psychokinetic 
complex  of  a  certain  kind — of  a  certain  interrelated 
complexity  and  intensity, — just  as  "electricity"  is  a 
generic  term  for  the  total  activities  of  unitary  psy- 
chokinetic complexes  of  certain  other  kinds — of 
certain  other  interrelated  complexities  and  inten- 
sities. 


CHAPTER  8 

THE   META-PSYCHIC   PLANE. 

This  is  the  plane  of  ideal  entities — numerical 
series,  logical  propositions,  universals,  ethical  values, 
and  the  like — ^beloved  of  Neo-realists  and  mathe- 
maticians ;  the  plane,  especially  too,  of  relations  "as 
such". 

We  have  already  referred  to  these  beings  not  in- 
frequently and  concluded  that,  whatever  else  they 
might  or  might  not  be,  they  were  at  any  rate  effi- 
ciencies— Activities  in  our  sense  of  that  term.  They 
all  are  things  which  "make  a  difference"  somewhere, 
as  well  as  things  by  "reason  of  which  change  exists". 

All  of  them,  also,  can  be  measured  intensively  by 
applying  the  three  dimensional  rule  of  amount, 
range,  and  persistence.  The  relation  "above",  for 
example,  may  be  "nowhen  and  nowhere",  but  never- 
theless its  intensity  can  be  determined.  It  can  be 
intensively  differentiated  from  such  a  relation  as 
"separate  from",  for  its  range  is  less,  being  re- 
stricted to  spacial  position,  whereas  "separate  from" 
applies,  as  well,  to  the  time  series,  and  even  to 
things  outside  of  time  and  space  altogether.  Or 
again,  the  relation  "brother  of"  has  much  less  in- 
tensity— is  much  more  restricted  in  range — than 
such  a  relation  as  "ancestor  of".  For  evidently 
"brother  of"  can  make  a  difference  to  but  a  limited 

(138) 


THE  META-PSYCHIC  PLANE  139 

number  of  persons  or  situations,  while  "ancestor 
of"  is  an  organizing  relation  for  the  whole  human 
race  as  well  as  for  the  animal  world  generally. 

Certain  of  these  ideal  entities,  also,  would  seem 
to  be  universals  and  relations  some  or  all  of  the 
terms  essential  for  whose  activity  exist  only  upon 
the  planes  below.  Electricity — the  universal — for 
instance,  would  be  inefikient  without  its  units,  the 
electrons,  which  are  entities  of  the  physical  plane. 
Nor  could  the  relation  "above",  in  its  usual  conno- 
tation, possess  any  intensive  range  without  a  ma- 
terial mass,  distance  from  whose  center  of  gravity 
constitutes  "aboveness". 

The  universals  and  particular  entities  of  mathe- 
matics on  the  other  hand — series,  for  example,  as  a 
universal;  or  the  numbers  of  which  any  particular 
series  is  composed — seem  to  exist  independently  of 
the  lower  plane  activities. 

Again,  such  a  relation  as  "distance",  not  from  a 
material  mass  as  in  "aboveness"  but  in  general,  is 
a  purely  spacial  relation  between  points,  and  neither 
space  nor  points  depend  upon  anything  beneath  the 
meta-psychic  plane. ^ 

Some  "subsistents",  therefore, — certain  ideal  en- 
tities, relations,  and  relational  complexes — would 
appear  to  exist  independently  of  the  lower  planes, 

*If  there  is,  also,  a  "logical  distance"  (Russell — Principles 
of  Mathematics),  the  elements  of  such  a  "distance"  would, 
clearly,  be  all  meta-psychic. 


140  THE  META-PSYCHIC  PLANE 

and  to  possess  on  the  whole  greater  range  and  in- 
tensity. For  the  efficiency  of  others  the  lower  plane 
activities  seem  to  be  essential  conditions. 

Now  this  whole  problem,  although  so  recently 
brought  to  the  fore  in  philosophic  discussion,  has 
existed,  as  we  all  know,  since  Plato.  For  Activism, 
however,  these  difficulties  appear,  to  some  extent  at 
any  rate,  in  a  modified  and  more  simple  form. 

In  the  first  place,  since  for  it  all  the  entities  of  the 
lower  plane,  organic  or  artificial,  are  ultimately 
complexes  of  one  sort  of  entity — of  psychons — the 
concrete  particulars  of  any  universal  are  necessarily 
always  such  psychokinetic  complexes ;  the  distinctive 
difference  between  them  depending  altogether  upon 
the  nature  of  the  relations  involved.  And,  since  all 
relations  and  relational  complexes  exist,  or  "subsist" 
upon  the  meta-psychic  plane,  the  relations  not  only 
between  ideal  entities  but  the  relations  which  char- 
acterize the  lower  plane  entities — namely,  psychons 
and  their  complexes — are  to  be  found  there  also.  In 
other  words,  "psychon",  the  universal,  not  other- 
wise than  all  other  universals,  has  its  home  on  this 
plane. 

The  psychon  however  is  peculiar  in  that,  as  an 
awareness  unit,  it  is  not  necessarily  conditioned  by 
space  or  time,  for  an  awareness  may  be  altogether 
of  meta-psychic  activities — universals,  relations,  or 
ideal  entities.     The  range  of  its  intensity  may  be 


THE  META-PSYCHIC  PLANE  141 

exclusively  a  meta-psychic  range.  Ideals  or  rela- 
tions, as  well  as  past  or  future  events  and  distant 
objects,  may  compose  at  any  moment  almost  its 
entire  content.  It  may  justly  be  considered,  there- 
fore, to  be  at  home  on  the  meta-psychic  plane  no 
less  than  on  its  own.  The  difference  being  that 
upon  its  own,  or  any  of  the  lower  planes,  all  com- 
plexes are  fundamentally  psychokinetic,  while  upon 
the  meta-psychic  plane  there  are  many  entities 
which  are  presumably  not  psychokinetic. 

These  other  meta-psychic  activities,  however,  so 
long  as  they  remain  upon  their  own  plane,  are  ineffi- 
cient in  respect  to  the  existential  world.  They  are 
out  of  relation  to  concrete  particulars.  To  achieve 
this  efficiency  upon  the  lower  planes,  to  enter  into 
relations  with  concrete  particulars,  they  must  depend 
upon  psychokinesis.  For  psychokinesis  is  the  only 
activity  among  them  which  can  "descend"  into  the 
planes  below.  Without  it,  therefore,  there  would 
not  be  any  existential  world  as  we  actually  find  it  at 
all.  Such  a  spacial  relation  as  "distance,"  for  ex- 
ample, might  well  exist  if  there  were  nothing  but 
empty  space,  but  it  would  possess  no  effectiveness 
upon  the  lower  planes.  Its  intensity  would  be  slight, 
its  range  restricted,  without  some  sort  of  existential 
world  in  which  its  activity  could  be  manifested,  and 
in  which,  through  psychokinesis,  it  could  become 
involved. 


142  THE  META-PSYCHIC  PLANE 

Because  we  are  immediately  a\Yare  of  such  meta- 
psychic  activities  through  psychokinetic  "inclusion", 
however,  has  led  to  the  common  error  that  they  are 
themselves  "mental"  in  nature.  Yet  we  are  immedi- 
ately aware  of  the  activities  of  the  existential  world 
in  no  other  way,  and  no  one  but  the  subjective 
idealist  doubts  their  objective  validity.  For  Activ- 
ism, therefore,  there  is  no  question  about  the  "ob- 
jectivity" of  relations.  As  awareness  content  they 
are  psychokinetically  included,  but  as  facts  on  their 
own  plane  they  are  not  only  objective,  but  ap- 
parently extra-mental  altogether.  In  this  sense,  at 
any  rate,  Activism  is  realistic. 

There  remain  of  course  many  problems  as  to  the 
classification  of  meta-psychic  activities,  but  in  so 
brief  an  essay  these  problems  could  not  be  even 
adequately  summarized.  That  there  is  a  differential 
stratification  among  these  entities  also,  is  to  be 
presumed  from  our  discussion  of  the  classification 
of  relations.  There  are,  obviously,  wide  intensive 
distinctions  between  them,  as  we  have  also  noted. 

In  regard  to  the  possibility  of  there  being  some 
ultimate  unit  activity  upon  the  meta-psychic  plane, 
it  would  appear  that  so  far-reaching  a  discrimina- 
tion must  lie  outside  of  our  present  power,  if, 
indeed,  such  an  analysis  is  by  any  means  possible 
at  all.  It  would  seem  for  the  present  that  we  must 
take  numbers,  points,  moments,  and  psychons  to  be 


THE  META-PSYCHIC  PI^NE  148 

ultimate  entities;  while  the  relations  of  likeness, 
difference,  direction  (temporal  as  well  as  spacial), 
and  precedence  would  seem  to  be  fundamental. 

Whether  or  not  there  is,  in  addition,  such  an 
ultimate  as  logical  change  is  a  still  further  question. 
For  the  purpose  of  this  essay,  however,  it  is  hardly 
essential  to  pursue  a  rigorous  analysis  so  far. 

There  remains  the  further  inquiry  whether  or  not 
they  may  be  some  still  more  fundamental  plane  of 
activity  of  which  even  the  meta-psychic  activities 
are,  in  a  sense,  derivatives;  and  whether,  if  such  be 
the  case,  some  form  of  psychokinesis  may  not  pene- 
trate even  beyond  so  remote  a  boundary  also.  The 
Eastern  thought,  as  we  know,  has,  for  ages,  main- 
tained the  actuality  of  such  transcendental  regions, 
and  that  their  activities  may  be  truly  apprehended 
in  "sammadhi",  or  the  supernormal  mystic  experi- 
ence. 

These  lofty  mountain  peaks,  nevertheless,  lie  quite 
beyond  our  ordinary  vision,  although  it  were  an 
unwise  man  who  should  presume  to  assert  dog- 
matically that  the  glimmer  of  their  eternal  snows 
may  not,  from  time  to  time,  light  up  for  some  brief 
moment  our  normally  circumscribed  horizon.  How- 
ever all  this  may  be,  for  the  activist  at  any  rate 
meta-psychic  beings,  whatever  their  exact  status,  in 
so  far  as  they  can  be  at  all,  are  activities,  and  as 
such  capable  of  intensive  differentiation. 


CHAPTER  9 

ACTIVISM  AND  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF 
PHILOSOPHY 

It  is  evident  that,  for  the  activist,  many  of  the 
historic  philosophic  problems  will  take  on  a  dif- 
ferent complexion  from  their  long  accustomed  hue. 

Some  of  them,  from  his  point  of  view,  will  be 
lengthened  or  foreshortened,  and  some  of  them  will 
cease  to  exist  altogether. 

In  so  brief  an  essay,  however,  intended  in  great 
measure  to  be  suggestive  merely,  there  can  be  no 
pretense  of  even  an  adequate  survey,  much  less  an 
exhaustive  analysis,  of  the  many  questions  which 
have  monopolized  the  attention  of  philosophy  at 
different  times  during  its  long  history.  To  indicate 
certain  aspects  upon  which  the  activistic  attitude 
may  have  some  special  bearing  is  all  that  can  be 
attempted  here. 

Among  the  traditional  problems  the  first,  and  per- 
haps the  most  ancient,  bequeathed  to  us  moderns 
already  worn  and  dusty — yet  with  something  of  the 
glamour  still  about  it  of  the  sunlit  temples  of  Egypt, 
and  India,  and  Greece, — is  that  of  the  "One  and  the 
Many." 

The  problem  has  taken  many  different  forms. 
With  Plato  and  Aristotle,  it  was  the  problem  of 
universals  and  particulars.     With  Spinoza,  it  was 

(144) 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  145 

the  problem  of  substance  and  attributes.  With 
Hegel,  it  was  the  problem  of  system — of  how  a  rela- 
tion relates. 

It  is  difficult,  however,  to  fasten  fairly  either  of 
the  catchwords  "monist"  or  "pluralist"  upon  the 
activist.  Since  for  him  every  conceivable  thing  is 
an  activitity  of  some  sort — since  activity  is  the 
universal  in  which  all  entities  participate — he  may 
be  labeled  "monist",  especially  as  the  attempt  is 
seriously  made  to  discriminate  between  activities  in 
quantitative  terms  of  activity  itself.  On  the  other 
hand  there  would  seem  to  be  for  him  certain  irre- 
ducible differentiae  between  activities  due,  para- 
doxically enough,  to  the  fact  of  their  being  activi- 
ties at  all. 

For  there  seems  to  a  good  deal  of  inherent  vague- 
ness in  our  ideas  of  unity.  Anything  can  be  "one" 
in  so  many  different  ways.  A  unitary  complex,  for 
example,  is  "one"  in  its  relations  to  other  similar 
entities  on  its  own  plane.  Yet  it  is  "many"  in  its 
relation  to  the  entities  of  the  plane  above.  Rela- 
tions, again,  and  their  complexes  seem  funda- 
mentally disparate — as  difference,  identity,  or  the 
temporal  and  spatial  relations.  Even  quantitative 
differences  are  different,  although,  it  may  be,  involv- 
ing units  of  the  same  kind.  One  and  one  are  two, 
and  one  and  one  and  one  are  three;  but  two  and 
three  are  forever  and  essentially  separate. 


14G  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

The  world,  as  we  can  ever  apprehend  it,  then, 
seems  to  be  always  many,  although  it  would  appear 
to  be  likewise  one — one,  as  activity,  the  universal; 
many,  as  particular  activities  intensively  distinct. 

Whether  the  universe  as  a  whole  is,  in  some  trans- 
cendental fashion,  a  unitary  complex  also,  seems  in 
the  end  to  be  largely  a  matter  of  philosophic  taste. 
If  it  gives  any  deep  satisfaction  to  believe  so,  there 
exists  no  conclusive  evidence  to  the  contrary.  Ac- 
tivism, as  such,  has  nothing  to  exact  about  this 
matter.  For  Activism  the  world  is  "one"  as  activity, 
only  as  for  Physical  Science  it  is  "one"  as  a  mani- 
festation of  energy. 

In  regard  to  the  more  concrete  problem  of  Cos- 
mology, Activism,  as  we  have  seen,  has  something 
quite  definite  to  say.  A  cosmos,  whether  essentially 
a  universe  or  a  "pluriverse",  whether  fundamentally 
one  or  many  (and  isn't  it  from  the  very  nature  of 
the  case  necessarily  both?)  presents  at  any  rate  a 
number  of  different  questions.  As  full  of  many 
problems  it  is  pluralistic,  however  monistic  the  solu- 
tion of  them  may  be.  For  Monism,  of  course,  does 
not  deny  the  "many",  but  only  the  character  of  the 
many  as  ultimately  discrete.  It  insists  that  all 
things  must  be  essentially  of  the  same  kind  (as,  for 
example,  "spirits"),  and  finally  comprised,  in  some 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  147 

way,  in  an  embracing  unity  (as  an  absolute  Spirit 
or  Self). 

Now  evidently  Activism  is  not  monistic  in  this 
sense.  The  cosmological  problem,  for  Activism, 
is  not  "in  what  way  are  all  activities  one";  but 
rather,  "in  what  way  are  activities  many — how 
can  they  be  differentiated  as  activities  in  terms  of 
intensity  and  its  elements"?  Its  principal  aim  is 
empirical  distinction.  Things  for  it  are  all  of  a  kind 
because  they  can  all  be  distinguished  according  to  one 
formula.  Their  oneness  grows  out  of  their  many- 
ness.  For  although  it  considers  everything  to  be  ac- 
tivity, activities  are  intensively  discriminate — "That 
by  reason  of  which  change  exists"  may  be  mysti- 
cally,— and  perhaps  really — one,  but  the  changes 
which  exist  thereby  are  evidently  many. 

Of  course,  however,  it  is  not  intended  here  to 
indicate  any  contrast  between  "appearance"  and 
"reality."  Activities  are  entirely  real  on  whatever 
plane  they  may  occur.  Like  the  stars  they  differ 
from  one  another  in  glory,  but  not  in  being.  The  ac- 
tivist is  therefore  a  realist  rather  than  an  idealist, 
yet,  in  a  way,  an  idealist  also,  in  that  he  holds  that 
awareness — psychokinesis — is  the  stuff  of  which 
the  existential  part  of  the  world  is  made.  He  has 
moreover,  as  we  have  seen,  a  pretty  definite  hy- 
pothesis as  to  what  this  psychokinesis  is,  and  how 
it  is  organized  to  form  the  basic  units  of  the  dif- 


148  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ferent  existential  planes.  Yet,  since  the  whole  essay, 
so  far,  has  been  concerned  with  just  these  questions 
as  to  the  essential  structure  of  the  universe,  it  is 
unnecessary  to  discuss  them  further  here.  How  far 
Activism  may  have  solved  them,  at  least  to  its  own 
satisfaction,  is  for  him  who  runs  to  read. 

Specifically,  however,  there  are  many  questions 
into  which  the  Activist  hypothesis  cuts  deeply — as 
for  example  the  Mind-Body  problem.  Granting 
the  activist  hypothesis,  this  problem  does  not  pre- 
sent the  difficulties  with  which  it  bristles  upon 
other  theories.  It  is  almost  entirely  a  problem  of 
non-additive,  and  possibly  non-causal,  relations — 
the  relations  between  the  unitary  complexes  of  the 
different  planes.  For  if  psychons  are  the  basic  units 
of  the  physical  world,  legitimate  questions  can  be 
concerned  only  with  differences  between  aware- 
nesses, not  with  a  difference  between  awareness  and 
some  other  existential  entity. 

The  mind-body  problem,  therefore,  reduces  itself 
to  the  question — what  are  the  relations  between  the 
specific  psychokinetic  unitary  complex  called  body 
and  the  specific  psychokinetic  complex  called  mind? 
Are  they  essentially  different  from  the  relations 
found  between  other  sorts  of  psychokinetic  com- 
plexes, or  are  they  merely  a  special  instance  of  the 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  149 

interrelationship  of  psychokinetic  complexes  in  gen- 
eral? 

Obviously  for  the  activist  the  last  description  is 
the  correct  one.  Whatever  is  p>eculiar  to  the  mind- 
body  relation  is  due  merely  to  the  special  character 
of  the  complexes  involved. 

For  Activism,  then,  the  mind-body  problem  is  the 
specific  problem  concerning  the  nature  of  the  rela- 
tions between  the  two  psychokinetic  complexes 
which  constitute,  respectively,  the  body  and  the 
mind.  What  some  of  these  relations  might  be  has 
been  indicated  in  the  chapter  on  Consciousness. 

There  remain,  however,  the  questions — are  the 
body  and  the  mind  quantitatively  (in  amount)  iden- 
tical; are  they  entirely  separate  psychokinetic  com- 
plexes merely  interrelated;  or  does  the  body,  in 
some  way,  and  if  so  in  what  way,  include  the  mind 
as  a  subcomplex,  or  vice  versa? 

Now  as  far  as  the  characteristic  doctrines  of  Ac- 
tivism are  concerned  any  one  of  these  various  con- 
ditions might  be  true.  As  a  complex  of  psychons 
the  body  might  be  characterized  by  a  double  order, 
the  order  of  atoms,  molecules,  cells,  and  the  rest  of 
the  physical  organic  structure;  as  well  as  a  purely 
psychokinetic  order  not  imbedded  in  the  physical 
order. 


150  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Or  possibly  this  double  order  might  characterize 
only  a  part  of  the  physical  organism,  the  nervous 
system,  brain,  or  cerebral  cortex. 

On  the  other  hand  that  complex  of  psychons 
which  we  call  mind  might  be  altogether  disparate 
from  the  physical  organism  with  which  it  is  re- 
lated; the  relations  between  the  two  being  possibly 
causal,  or  merely  correlations — relations  of  non- 
causal  efficiency.  There  is,  also,  a  further  possi- 
bility— namely  that  the  mind  is  neither  quantitatively 
identical  with  the  whole  physical  body  or  any  part 
of  it,  nor  yet  altogether  separate  from  it,  but  that, 
on  the  contrary,  the  physical  body,  either  as  a  whole 
or  in  part,  is  a  sub-complex  included  in  the  larger 
complex  of  an  individual  mind. 

No  one  of  these  possible  relationships,  however, 
would  seem  to  follow  as  a  necessary  deduction  from 
the  postulates  of  Activism.  On  the  contrary,  any 
one  of  them  might  prove  to  be  the  actual  mind-body 
relation.  We  do  not  know  whether  it  will  ever  be 
possible  to  solve  this  problem  by  experimental  evi- 
dence or  the  discovery  of  new  facts;  but,  whether 
practically  capable  of  solution  or  not,  the  problem  is, 
for  Activism  at  any  rate,  an  empirical  problem. 
The  Activist  hypothesis  does  not  in  any  way  depend 
upon  its  solution.  It  has  a  place  for  the  facts  what- 
ever they  may  be. 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  151 

This  much  however  can  be  said.  The  essential 
relations  between  body  and  mind  must  be,  in  any 
event,  organizing  relations.  And  this  would  be 
equally  true  whether  the  mind  is  organized  by,  or 
through,  the  body;  the  body  by,  or  through,  the 
mind ;  or  whether  each  is  partially,  but  not  wholly, 
organized  by  the  other. 

Concretely  this  is  evident  in  such  a  case  as  that 
of  pain.  If  pain  is  always  superinduced  by  a 
physical  lesion,  the  body  would  be  always  the 
medium  through  which  the  psychic  pain  situation 
were  organized.  If,  on  the  contrary,  pain  could 
be  superinduced  without  physical  lesion,  if  the 
thalamic  pain  centers  in  the  body  could  function  as 
the  result  of  a  purely  mental  stimulus  (as  for  ex- 
ample a  "telepathic"  suggestion),  the  mind  would 
be  the  medium.  In  either  case,  however,  the  rela- 
tions involved  would  be  organizing  relations.  But 
beyond  this  it  would  seem  impossible  in  our  present 
state  of  knowledge  to  proceed. 

The  mind-body  situation,  irrespective  of  the  solu- 
tion of  the  problems  involved  in  it,  has  nevertheless 
an  immediate  bearing  upon  the  question  as  to  why  a 
psychokinetic  complex.  A,  is  aware  of  another  com- 
plex C,  or  of  a  certain  relation,  X,  rather  than  of 
complexes  D,  E,  and  F,  or  of  relations  W,  Y,  and  Z. 

But  to  this  problem,  also,  the  answer  is  an  em- 
pirical answer.    For,  as  a  familiar  fact  of  experi- 


152  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ence,  we  find  minds,  whatever  their  real  nature,  re- 
lated to  bodies,  whatever  the  relations  between  them 
may  be,  in  such  a  way  that  sense  data  evidently,  and 
all  other  awareness  data  presumably,  "get  into"  the 
mind  through  the  medium  of  bodily  stimuli. 

Clearly,  therefore,  what  the  psychokinetic  complex 
"mind"  is  aware  of  is  conditioned  by  the  stimuli  that 
the  body  to  which  it  is  related  receives.  Similarly 
the  psychokinetic  complex  which  is  electron  A  is 
aware  of  electron  B,  and  not  electrons  C,  D,  or  E, 
when  changes  in  A's  motion  are  caused  by  B.  The 
respective  modus  operandi  in  the  two  cases  has  been 
examined  at  some  length  in  Chapter  7  and  Chapter 
6.  In  either  case  the  situation  which  conditions 
the  physical  unitary  complex  is  the  selective  agent. 

The  Epistomological  problem,  in  some  form,  has 
been  at  the  fore  in  philosophical  discussion  for  the 
past  century  and  a  half. 

It  has  taken  on  this  character  of  a  fundamentally 
important  problem  because  no  philosopher  can  pre- 
tend to  consider  the  ultimate  nature  of  objects  in 
general  without,  either  explicitly  or  tacitly,  assuming 
some  position  in  regard  to  the  character  of  the  rela- 
tionship between  himself  and  the  objects  which  he 
has  under  consideration — e.  g.  the  relation  between 
the  knower  and  the  object  known. 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  153 

It  is  evident,  moreover,  that  the  conditions  in- 
volved in  this  relation  between  knower  and  object 
known  is  a  special  case  of  the  essential  conditions 
involved  in  the  relationship  of  any  objects  or  terms. 
What,  then,  is  implied  in  the  relational  situation? 
Is  the  character  or  existence  of  terms  dependent, 
ipso  facto,  upon  the  character  or  existence  of  the 
relations  which  obtain  between  them?  Or  are 
neither  the  character  nor  existence  of  terms  in  rela- 
tion necessarily  dependent  upon  the  fact  of  their 
relationship?    This  is  the  question  in  a  nut-shell. 

Briefly,  there  are  three  types  of  solution  to  this 
problem.  The  eighteenth  century  thinkers — Locke, 
Berkeley,  Hume,  Kant — who  were  inclined  to  con- 
sider all  relations  as  essentially  causal  in  character — 
held  that  related  objects  were  necessarily  con- 
ditioned by  the  relations  which  obtained  between 
them.  Particularly  was  it  urged  that  all  objects 
which  could  be  perceived  by  the  senses,  since  their 
entire  existence  as  sense  objects  depended  upon  the 
relation  between  object  and  perceiver,  were  from 
the  very  nature  of  the  situation  altogether  depend- 
ent upon  the  awareness  relation — that  their  esse  was 
pcrcipi.  For  the  earlier  Subjective  Idealism,  there- 
fore, consciousness  was  constitutive. 

The  second  type  of  solution  is  that  offered  by 
Objective  Idealism  exemplified  in  such  philosophers 
as  Fichte,  Hegel,  Caird,  Bradley,  Royce.    This  later 


154  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Idealism  still  holds  that  terms  in  relation  are,  in  con- 
sequence of  that  fact,  different  from  what  they 
would  be  were  the  relation  not  there.  It  still  holds, 
also,  that  the  awareness  relation  is  essentially  con- 
stitutive. To  get  away  from  the  obvious  difficul- 
ties and  limitations  of  a  purely  Subjective  Idealism, 
however,  it  posits  a  universal  or  absolute  conscious- 
ness, in  which  are  contained  ("as  appearances",  or 
at  any  rate,  subordinate  realities)  both  terms  and 
relations.  For  it,  therefore,  consciousness  is  still 
constitutive,  but  the  world  is  "objective"  to  the 
merely  private  perceiver  because  the  constituting  is 
done  by  an  Absolute  Being  to  whose  universal 
awareness  is  due  the  existence  of  all  objects  and 
finite  perceivers.^ 

The  third  type  of  solution  is  advanced  by  the 
Realists,  and  in  its  latest,  most  logical  form  by  the 
New  Realists.  Needless  to  say,  also,  this  is  the  view 
generally  held  by  the  scientists  and  the  unphilosoph- 
ical  portion  of  humanity.  This  view  was  definitely, 
although  briefly,  stated  to  be  the  view  held  by  Activ- 
ism, as  an  essentially  realistic  system  (Chapter  I). 
In  order  to  justify  the  faith  that  is  in  us,  however,  it 
is  well  to  state  the  matter  here  somewhat  more  in 
detail. 

*  See  Royce  "The  World  and  the  Individual".    Vol.  I.    Lec- 
ture III  ff. 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  155 

If  we  call  two  objects,  or  terms,  A  and  B,  and  the 
1  elation  between  them  R;  Activism  holds  (i)  that  R 
does  not  necessarily  make  any  difference  to  A  or  B, 
except  the  mere  fact  of  relationship;  (2)  that  R, 
however,  does  make  a  difference  to  the  complex 
A-R-B,  since,  although  not  constitutive  of  A  or  B, 
it  is  constitutive  of  the  complex;  and  (3.)  that  al- 
though R,  as  such,  does  not  necessarily  make  any 
difference  to  A  or  B,  it  may  make  a  difference,  if  in 
any  situation  it  is  logically  prior  to  other  relational 
conditions  in  the  situation  by  which  the  situation,  as 
a  whole,  makes  a  difference  to  the  objects  included 
in  it. 

Thus  (i)  if  A  and  B  are  friends,  that  fact  does 
not  make  a  difference  to  A  and  B  as  objects.  They 
are  just  as  much  animals,  or  men,  or  citizens, 
whether  they  are  friends  or  not.  The  relation  here 
is  constitutive  of  friendship  only.  Otherwise  the 
objects  which  it  relates  are  quite  independent.  (2) 
The  relation  of  friendship,  however,  does  make  a 
difference  to  A  and  B  as  a  complex  of  two  friends 
acting,  in  any  way,  in  common.  (3)  But  the  friend- 
ship relation  may  make  a  vital  difference  to  A  or  B, 
or  both,  since  A  and  B  might  be  in  some  situation 
where  the  safety,  or  even  the  existence,  of  one  or 
both,  might  depend  upon  the  fact  of  their  friend- 
ship. 


156  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Again,  (i)  time  and  space,  as  manifolds  of 
moments  and  points,  are  mutually  independent, 
whether  or  not  the  relational  complex  of  physical 
motion  obtains  between  them  or  not.^  On  the  other 
hand,  (2)  motion  is  altogether  dependent  upon  its 
relations  to  points  and  moments,  or  a  complex  de- 
pendent upon  its  organizing  relations;  or  such 
a  term  as  a  child  dependent  upon  the  relations — 
"ancestor  of"  and  organic  "similarity".  (3)  Cases 
of  partial  independence  are  acceleration  and  motion, 
the  existence  of  acceleration  depending  upon  the 
relational  complex  of  motion  but  not  vice  versa;  or 
brotherhood,  when  not  only  the  existence  of  A  and 
B  as  brothers,  but  also  their  existence  as  physical 
organisms  at  all  are  dependent  upon  their  relation- 
ship to  a  common  ancestor.^ 

There  is,  thus,  a  logical  hierarchy  of  relations;  in 
general  the  logically  prior  relations  being  constitu- 
tive, and  the  logically  subsequent  relations  not  con- 
stitutive. 

Now  the  "awareness  relation"  is  for  the  Activist, 
ex  hypothesi,  a  relation  of  psychokinetic  inclusion. 

'According  to  the  new  Relational  Physics  this  would  be  true 
in  a  limited  mechanical  sense  only,  the  three  dimensions  of 
space,  and  time,  being  considered  as  a  single  four-dimensional 
manifold.    See  appendix. 

*  For  a  discussion  of  independence,  and  the  independence 
test  see  Huntington's  "Continuum,"  or  Young's  "Concept  of 
Algebra  and  Geometry." 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  157 

It  may,  therefore,  be  present  or  not  in  any  given 
case.  Ipso  facto,  it  is  constitutive  only  of  the  fact 
of  inchision,  although  it  may  make  a  difference  to 
the  terms  which  it  relates  in  certain  situations,  just 
as  may  any  other  relation.  Since  however  relations 
are  activities,  any  relation  always  makes  a  difference 
someii'hcre,  although  it  does  not  make  a  difference 
ez'eryzvhcre.  Where  it  makes  a  difference,  and  the 
sort  of  difference  it  makes  depends  upon  its  in- 
tensity, especially  the  intensive  element  of  range. 

But  the  relation  of  psychokinetic  inclusion  is  not 
a  relation  of  fixed  intensity.  Its  intensity  depends 
primarily  upon  the  including  psychokinetic  complex. 
For  an  awareness,  from  the  activist's  point  of  view, 
is  not  a  relation  but  an  entity.  Awareness,  then,  is 
ubiquitous,  not  because  the  "awareness  relation" 
is  characteristic  of  all  experience,  but  because  all 
existential  entities  are  psychons,  or  psychokinetic 
complexes.  The  existence  of  the  psychon  as  an  in- 
dependent entity  does  not  depend  upon  the  "aware- 
ness relation"  between  some  other  entity  and  it — 
its  inclusion  by  some  other  psychokinetic  complex. 
Its  existence  depends,  rather,  upon  the  fact  that  it  is 
an  awareness  unit  itself. 

It  is  not  "constituted"  by  an  "awareness  relation" 
any  more  than  an  electron  is  "constituted"  by  an 
"electrical  relation".  Nor  are  psychokinetic  com- 
plexes   necessarily   constituted    by    being   included 


158  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

in  other  psychokinetic  complexes — by  becoming 
awareness  objects. 

Activism  maintains,  therefore,  that  neither 
entities,  nor  relations  "out  there",  are  in  any  way 
determined  as  to  their  existence  by  being  thus 
included  in  the  awareness  complex  which  perceives 
them;  since  they,  also,  are  independent  activities 
in  their  own  right.  For  psychokinetic  inclusion  is 
constitutive  of  the  perceiving  only,  not  of  the  per- 
ceiver,  nor  of  the  object  perceived. 

Activism  maintains,  also,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
objects  do  not,  somehow,  have  to  be  "gotten  over" 
into  consciousness.  As  fundamentally  awareness 
complexes  they  are  already  there. 

But  this  does  not  answer  the  obvious  question 
how  does  awareness  complex  A  "get  into"  aware- 
ness complex  B  as  part  of  awareness  B's  content? 
Yet,  here  again,  an  attempt  at  a  solution  has  been 
made.  The  specific  periodicity  which  is  "blue"  is 
both  in  the  "object"  out  there,  and  in  my  "mind" 
which  is  here.  The  "aboveness"  in  a  complex  of 
objects,  out  there,  is  also  present,  "internally",  as 
a  relation,  in  the  perceiving  psychokinetic  complex. 
Literally,  therefore,  in  perception,  things  are  both 
out  there,  and  in  my  mind  also,  as  content.  All  this 
has  been  discussed,  at  some  length,  in  the  chapter 
on  Consciousness. 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  159 

In  the  chapter  on  Consciousness,  also,  it  was 
pointed  out  how  relations,  relational  complexes,  and 
ideals,  once  "inside",  are  known;  and  how  content 
can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  psychokinetic  intensity. 
In  the  case  of  sense  perception,  moreover,  it  was 
indicated  specifically  how  the  spatial  relations  "got 
in". 

Here,  then,  it  may  be  said  that  relations  in 
general  get  in  no  otherwise.  They  come  in  with 
the  entities  which  are  their  terms.  Where,  for 
example,  blue  and  red  come  in  together,  the  same 
relation  between  their  respective  periodicities  is 
then  inside  as  well  as  outside.  And  that  relation  of 
difference,  since  it  also  has  a  certain  intensity  of  its 
own,  can  exist,  qtfa  intensity,  as  an  awareness  datum 
— be  tagged  with  a  verbal  image,  and  considered 
separately  as  a  content  object.  Being  of  the  same 
intensity  as  the  difference  outside,  that  difference  is 
always  just  that  difference  whether  inside  or  out. 
It  can  thus  be  hitched  up  with  any  appropriate 
terms,  or  be  an  object  of  awareness  in  itself,  with- 
out any  specific  terms  at  all.  Relations,  then,  "come 
in"  with  their  terms,  and  once  in,  can  become  sepa- 
rate awareness  objects. 

The  same  is  true  of  ideal  entities.  They  get  in 
with  concrete  particulars — sense  data,  A  geometric 
triangle  gets  in,  in  the  first  place,  as  a  concrete  tri- 
angle drawn  on  paper — certain  intensities  of  color. 


mo  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

size,  and  form.  Once  in,  the  spacial-relation  com- 
plex alone,  without  the  color  and  size,  can  remain 
as  a  separate  awareness  datum  by  reason  of  its 
own  specific  intensity  just  as  any  other  relation  or 
relational  complex  can.  The  fact  that  such  an  ideal 
entity  is  not  "out  there"  in  the  material  world,  but 
is  "out  there"  on  the  ideal  plane  makes  no  differ- 
ence. As  an  activity  with  a  certain  characteristic 
intensity  it  is  just  the  same.  But  to  "get  it  in"  you 
have,  literally,  first  to  get  it  into  your  head,  then  in 
your  mind — which  shows  again  the  accuracy  and 
felicity  of  common  sense  description. 

"Subsi stents"  in  general,  then,  can  be  gotten  into 
the  psychokinetic  complex  without  any  great  diffi- 
culty. They  are  obliged,  however,  to  ride  in  upon 
the  backs  of  concrete  particulars — to  be  smuggled 
in  with  the  sense  objects  with  which,  at  the  moment, 
they  may  be  associated. 

In  regard  to  the  problem  of  a  priori  knowledge, 
Activism,  as  such,  may  be  considered  to  throw  no 
especial  illumination,  excepting,  in  so  far  as  funda- 
mentally realistic,  it  holds  that  whatever  "gets  into" 
the  awareness  complex  is  necessarily  just  what  it  is. 
The  awareness  object  that  is  appreliended  is  the 
same  whether  inside  or  out.  And,  of  course,  this  is 
just  as  true  of  the  awareness  of  meta-psychic  enti- 
ties or  relations  as  of  the  immediate  objects  of  sense 
perception.    Meta-psychic  entities  are  perceived  "as 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  Ifil 

such''.  The  "apriorincss"  lies  in  the  nature  of  the 
awareness  object,  not  in  the  awareness  of  it.  It  is 
logical,  or  cosmological,  not  psychical.  If  that  ob- 
ject is,  for  example,  a  simple  relation  (as  differ- 
ence) ;  or  a  simple  sensation  (as  blue)  ;  it  seems 
evident  that,  if  it  is  perceived  at  all,  it  must  be  per- 
ceived as  just  what  it  is  and  nothing'  else. 

Possibly  for  the  activist,  the  terms  "immediate" 
and  "derivative"  would  fit  the  facts  better  than  "a 
priori"  and  "experimental".  For,  in  a  way,  the 
only  kind  of  knowledge  that  is  possible  at  all,  for 
him,  is  a  p-riori — the  ambiguity  lies  wholly  in  the 
object.  For  example,  suppose  x  to  be  above  y. 
Now,  either,  x  and  y  are  of  such  a  sort  that  x  always 
is  above  y,  in  which  case  they  can  "get  into"  aware- 
ness in  no  other  way;  or  x  may,  or  may  not,  be 
above  y,  according  to  circumstances,  in  which  case 
they  must  "get  in"  with  the  circumstances  attached. 
In  either  event  x  and  y  and  the  relation  "above",  or 
its  absence,  must  get  in  as  they  really  are,  and  in 
neither  event  is  there  any  awareness  of  them  until 
they  "get  in". 

In  both  events  the  "knowledge"  is  a  priori  and 
experiential — a  priori  in  the  sense  that  the  entities 
and  relations  in  question  are  just  what  they  are 
perceived  to  be,  experiential  as  to  whether  they 
are  always,  or  otherwise,  the  same  as  they  are 
"known"  in  any  particular  presentation. 


162  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

When  anything,  whether  simple  or  complex,  in  or 
out  of  awareness,  is  of  such  a  kind  as  to  be  always 
and  everywhere  the  same,  as  c.  g.,  the  relation 
"above",  the  knowledge  of  it  may  be  said  to  be  im- 
mediate or  a  priori,  if  not,  derivative  or  experi- 
ential. There  can  be  no  question,  therefore,  for 
the  activist  as  to  the  validity  of  presentative  knowl- 
edge, since  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case  the 
same  "things"  are  both  inside  and  outside.  If 
psychon  A  is  aware  of  psychon  B,  it  is,  literally,  B 
which  is  psychokinetically  included  in  A.  If  com- 
plex X  is  aware  of  periodicity  (relational  complex) 
Z  it  is,  literally,  Z  that  is  included.^ 

But  if  this  is  so,  what  shall  the  activist  say  about 
the  question  of  Error? 

*  Due  to  the  peculiar  doctrine  of  Activism  that  knowledge  is 
essentially  psychokinetic  inclusion,  this  whole  question  assumes 
a  somewhat  unfamiliar  form. 

Certain  fundamental  relations — as  likeness,  difference,  and 
the  like — are  necessarily  involved  in  any  highly  organized 
psychokinetic  complex. 

Such  fundamental  relations,  therefore,  are  prerequisite  to 
any  activity — such  e.  g.  as  discriminative  perception — on  the 
part  of  that  complex. 

They  do  not,  however,  need  to  be  "transcendentally  deduced" 
like  the  Kantian  Categories ;  for,  as  organizing  relations,  they 
are  imbedded  in  the  very  inception  of  the  complex  itself. 

In  this  sense,  but  in  this  sense  only,  are  such  "forms  of 
thought"  a  priori. 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  1G3 

The  problem  is  so  intricate  and  full  of  difficulties 
that  only  the  briefest  survey  can  be  attempted.  It 
may  be  said,  nevertheless,  that  in  the  main  the  posi- 
tion of  Activism  would  be  here  also,  a  realistic 
position. 

There  are,  however,  two  separate  problems  con-* 
tained  in  this  general  question  which  philosophers, 
not  infrequently,  have  failed  to  distinguish  with 
sufficient  clearness.  One  is  the  problem  of  truth 
and  falsehood,  the  other  the  problem,  strictly  speak- 
ing, of  error. 

Now  since  Activism  not  only  holds,  with  Realism, 
that  all  facts  involve  or  imply  propositions,  but  also 
holds,  in  addition,  that  propositions  themselves  are 
efficient  activities ;  it  follows  that  not  only  facts,  but 
the  propositions  which  are  implicated  in  those  facts, 
are  "objective"  beings,  which  may  subsist  without 
being  "thought  of" — without  inclusion  in  an  aware- 
ness complex. 

But  it  is  evident  that  there  are  false  as  well  as  true 
propositions--^a  false  proposition  being  a  proposi- 
tion in  which  the  relation  between  its  terms  is  a 
relation  which  is  contradictory  to  the  relation  by 
which  those  terms  are  constituted  members  of  the 
class  to  which  they  belong. 

Thus  2  <  (is  less  than)  5  is  a  true  proposition, 
as  well  as  an  actual  fact.  But  2  >  (is  greater  than) 
5  is  a  false  proposition,  because  it  contradicts  the 


104  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

relation  by  which  the  series  of  cardinal  numbers  is 
constituted — namely  the  fact  that  in  such  a  serial 
order  the  preceding  number  (2)  is  always  less  than 
any  succeeding  numbers  (as  5).  It  is  false  for  that 
system  upon  which  its  specific  organization  depends. 
For  although  there  might  be  conceivably  a  system 
in  which  2  >  5  was  true,  that  system  would  not  be 
the  system  of  numbers  as  we  know  it. 

Yet  here  both  the  terms  and  the  relation  are  "true" 
enough,  the  falsehood  lies  in  the  total  relational 
situation.  The  Activist  maintains,  however,  that 
such  false  propositions  not  only  are,  but  are  activi- 
ties which  may  be  of  great  and  pernicious  intensity. 
Certainly  common  experience  is  full  enough  of  ex- 
amples of  the  efficiency  of  falsehoods.  The  fact 
that  a  falsehood  is  "unreal",  possesses  no  status  in 
the  existential  world,  is  beside  the  point ;  for  meta- 
psychic  beings  generally  are  not  existential,  yet  are 
none  the  less  efficient  activities.  For  Activism, 
therefore,  as  for  Realism,  "false"  and  "true"  are 
objective  characteristics. 

In  contradistinction  to  "false",  however,  error 
involves  the  element  of  awareness.  A  false  propo- 
sition, as  well  as  a  true  fact,  might  be,  without  hav- 
ing been  discovered.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  a 
mistake  can  occur  without  implying  a  mistaker.  The 
"error"  arises  when  a  false  proposition  as  an  inde- 
pendent awareness  object  is  included  in  a  psycho- 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  105 

kinetic  complex.^  False  and  true  apply  to  facts 
irrespective  of  an  awareness  of  them.  Error  is 
always  error  of  judgment.  It  depends  upon  the 
way  in  which  facts  are  "taken". 

We  have  spoken  of  "things"  being,  at  once,  both 
outside  and  inside  the  psychokinetic  complex — as 
"objective"  data  and  conscious  content.  It  is  evi- 
dent, however,  that  any  specific  thing — some- 
thing, for  example,  undiscovered  by  any  other 
awareness — might  be  altogether  outside  of  any  other 
psychokinetic  complex. 

It  is  also  true  that  any  specific  thing  may  be 
inside  a  given  complex  as  a  sub-complex,  as  the 
specific  intensity  which  that  particular  thing  is, 
without  being  at  the  moment  anywhere  else.  Images 
are  familiar  cases  in  point,  notably  dream  images. 
The  difference,  however,  is  between  the  relative  in- 
tensities of  that  which  is  inside  only,  and  that  which 
is  outside  as  well. 

A  man  whom  we  see  in  a  dream  is  a  man,  but  he  is 
only  a  man  as  we  see  him.  The  "real"  man  has  a 
whole  host  of  activities  inside  hhn  which  we  do  not 
see,  but  only  infer;  whereas  the  dream  man,  pre- 
sumably, does  not  possess  any  of  these  invisible 

•  Of  course  a  false  proposition  may  be  included  as  a  part  of 
a  true  proposition — be  recognized  as  false,  as  in  the  proposi- 
tion "2  >  5  is  false".  This  false  proposition,  however,  would 
not  be  an  independent  object  but  merely  an  element  in  the 
containing  proposition. 


166  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

activities  at  all.  We  see  all  that  there  is  of  him. 
He  is  a  mere  shell  of  a  man,  but  a  man  for  all  that. 
He  can  walk,  and  act,  and  even  talk,  but  the  stuff  in 
him  is  not  his  own.  It  does  not  inhere  in  his  own 
psychokinetic  complex.  It  is  pumped  into  him  from 
the  stores  of  the  dreamer's  complex.  If  the  dream 
is  vivid  enough,  however,  he  is  just  the  same  sort 
of  man  that  we  see  walking  along  the  street  in 
broad  daylight — the  same  sort  of  intensive  complex 
of  periodicities  and  space  relations  exists  in  the 
perceiver  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  Yet  in 
the  one  case  that  which  has  given  rise  to  his  exist- 
ence is  an  internal  stimulus,  in  the  other  case  an 
external  stimulus.^  The  illusion  consists  altogether 
in  the  further  inferences — the  allied  associational 
content — which  we  make  in  regard  to  this  partic- 
ular man.  Because  we  can  see  him  we  judge,  from 
long  habit,  that  he  can  think,  push  us,  argue  with 
us,  and  what  not — that  he  possesses  his  own  inde- 
pendent inside,  when  as  a  fact  he  does  not  possess 
any  inside  at  all.  He  is  all  outside.  His  esse  is  all 
percipi.'^ 
And,  of  course,  we  become  aware  of  this  at  once  as 

•How  the  dream  image  arises  is  largely  a  matter  for  the 
physiological  psychologist  to  explain — if  he  can.  Its  genesis 
is  irrelevant  for  us  here. 

^This,  of  course,  would  not  be  true  of  objects  perceived  in 
"veridical"  dreams,  if  such  dreams  should  prove  to  be  facts. 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  167 

soon  as  he  turns  into  an  elephant,  or  does  some  other 
impossible  thing  which  fails  to  fit  in  with  the 
familiar  associative  content. 

Error,  therefore,  is  always  a  question  of  mean- 
ing— of  psychological  content.  It  is  a  relational 
affair  altogether.  If  the  same  relations  exist  be- 
tween the  entities  in  the  total  content  as  exist  be- 
between  the  same  entities  outside  of  the  content  the 
content  is  "true".     If  they  do  not,  there  is  error. 

//  a  dream  mun  could  possess  all  the  relations  to 
his  environment  ivhich  a  man  outside  possesses — all 
the  actiz'ities,  including,,  of  course,  permanence — then 
that  dream  man  would  be  just  as  reed  a  man  in  every 
conceivable  sense.  That  he  does  not  possess  these 
multifarious  qualities  is  just  what  constitutes  him 
a  dream  man  only.  The  snake  which  the  alcoholic 
patient  sees  is  a  snake.  It  is  not  "real"  because  it 
can  neither  bite  nor  lay  eggs,  does  not  possess  a  real 
snake's  manifold  capacities;  not  merely  because  no 
one  else  can  see  it.  If  a  certain  kind  of  clairvoy- 
ance were  true,  another  person  possessed  of  this 
power  could  see  it  also.  Here  again  it  is  all  a  matter 
of  associated  content.  The  poor  sufferer  sees  a 
snake  and  therefore  concludes  that  it  is  "real" — 
exists  outside  as  well  as  inside  of  his  own  psycho- 
kinetic  complex.  Here,  at  any  rate,  as  Emerson  said 
"Truth  is  the  conformity  of  thought  with  things". 
The  "thing"  that  is  seen  in  hallucination  is  exactly 


I«i8  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

similar  to  the   "thing"   seen   normally.     What   is 
thought  about  it  makes  all  the  difference. 

Error,  then,  is  always  in  some  way  error  of  judg- 
ment, and  it  occurs  when  the  relational  complex  as- 
sociated in  content  with  any  awareness  object  is  not 
the  same  as  the  relational  complex  associated  with 
that  object  without,  as  well  as  within,  that  particular 
awareness  center. 

Yet  none  of  this,  it  may  be  well  urged,  meets  the 
philosophic  question — what  after  all  is  Awareness? 

For  Activism,  of  course,  it  is  an  activity,  and  we 
have  attempted  to  show  how  to  it,  also,  the  general 
determinations  of  intensity  may  be  applied.  We 
have  furthermore  defined  its  fundamental  units,  the 
psychons,  as  entities,  and  therefore  any  specific 
awarenesses  which  take  place  in  actual  experience  as 
an  entity-relation  complex. 

But  what  sort  of  an  activity  is  a  psychon,  and  how 
does  it,  or  its  complexes,  differ  from  other  activ- 
ities? Briefly,  Activism  would  answer  the  question 
in  this  way.  Awareness  is  an  activity  to  which 
nothing  except  that  which  is  included  within  itself 
can  make  any  difference.  And  not  only  is  this  true, 
but  it  is  true  of  awareness  only.  It  marks  it  off 
definitely  from  activities  of  any  other  kind. 

It  is  obviously  not  true  of  any  plane  below  the 
psychokinetic  plane,  for  although  here  too  any  uni- 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  169 

tary  complex,  such  as  a  physical  organism  or 
material  object,  may  have  a  difference  made  to  it  by 
the  presence  or  absence  of  activities  within  it,  a 
difference  can  be  also  made  by  many  sorts  of  activity 
altogether  outside  of  its  periphery. 

It  is  equally  not  true  of  the  meta-psychic  plane, 
for  such  things  as  relations,  universals,  ideals,  or 
mathematical  series  are,  presumably,  just  what  they 
are  once  for  all.  There,  one  may  have  different 
relations,  ideal  entity  complexes,  and  the  rest  of  it, 
but  they  cannot  be  changed  by  including  in  them 
additional  factors.  They  are  supposed  to  exist 
above  the  world  of  change  altogether.  They  are 
activities  because  by  reason  of  them  changes  take 
place,  but  they  themselves  are  changeless. 

Awareness,  then,  is  siii  generis  in  this  respect. 
Nothing  can  change  it  except  that  which  it  includes. 
There  may  be  many  sorts  of  activity  which  can 
determine  the  conditions  of  inclusion,  but  the  aware- 
ness itself  is  unaffected  until  that  inclusion  occurs. 
Or,  again,  the  relations  of  an  awareness  complex  to 
the  rest  of  the  world  outside  may  be  various  and 
many,  but  the  one  essential  relation  to  any  external 
activity  by  which  that  activity  becomes  an  awareness 
object  is  inclusion  within  the  complex  itself.  How 
this  may  be  so  has  already  been  pointed  out  in  tlie 
chapter  on  Consciousness. 


170  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  even  supposing  any  of  these 
external  activities  to  be  thus  gotten  inside  of  the 
awareness  complex,  are  they  not  then,  also,  still 
objects  of  awareness  as  psychic  content,  and  does 
not  the  subject-object  relation  still  obtain  as  a  special 
kind  of  relation  different  from  all  others? 

The  answer  to  this  objection  is  that  what  we 
usually  designate  as  the  subject-object  relation  is 
really,  in  the  case  of  awareness,  nothing  but  the 
whole-part  relation.  Bx  hypothesi,  for  the  activist, 
an  awareness  complex  is  aware  of  its  own  intensive 
condition  and  changes;  but,  in  this  case,  awareness 
of  condition  or  change  is  itself  change  or  condition 
of  awareness.  There  is  no  special  change-object  re- 
lation between  change,  an  sich,  and  the  object  in 
which  change  occurs.  The  relation  here  is  between 
the  object  and  the  time  series.  And,  of  course,  in 
awareness  changes,  too,  there  is  the  relation  between 
awareness  content  and  the  time  series;  so  that  the 
content  contains  this  relation  as  an  essential  element. 
The  awareness,  then,  is  of  this  relation  also.  But 
awareness  of  a  relation  of  any  sort  is  merely  the 
inclusion  of  this  relation  in  the  awareness  complex 
itself.  How  a  relation  may  "get  in"  has  already 
been  pointed  out. 

Here  again  the  literal  accuracy  of  the  vulgar  ex- 
pression shows  itself.  We  say  "a  change  takes  place 
in  a  thing."    Well ;  in  this  case  a  change  takes  place 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  171 

in  an  awareness.  There  is  no  "change-object"  rela- 
tion between  the  change  and  the  thing.  There  are, 
to  be  sure,  all  sorts  of  relations  between  the  thing 
and  what  it  does,  between  structure  and  function, 
but  those  are  obviously  not  change-object  relations. 
They  are  describable  in  their  own  various  terms. 

It  is  of  the  essence  of  psychokinetic  complexes,  as 
Activism  apprehends  them,  to  be  aware  of  their  own 
intensive  changes,  of  their  own  content,  because,  as 
we  have  pointed  out,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case  awareness  of  change  is  always  change  of  aware- 
ness. The  immediate  object  of  consciousness  here 
is  simply  a  part  of  the  consciousness  itself.  The 
relation  is  a  whole-part  relation.  Consciousness 
cannot,  therefore,  be  defined  as,  or  even  involve,  a 
relation  between  subject  and  object.  For  there  is 
no  specific  "subject-object"  relation. 

Recent  philosophical  discussion  has  been  much 
concerned  over  the  question  of  Values.  In  general 
the  contrast  has  been  drawn  between  a  world  of 
causal  mechanism  and  "a  realm  of  ends" — pur- 
poses, ideals — in  some  sort  a  spiritual  world,  over 
and  above,  or  set  off  against,  the  world  of  concrete 
realities.  A  good  deal  of  all  this,  although,  in 
the  main,  a  healthy  reaction  against  certain 
over-emphasized  tendencies,  appears  nevertheless 
vaguely  unsatisfying  and  over  literary.    The  whole 


172  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

subject,  however,  has  been  so  much  in  the  philo- 
sophic mind  of  late  that  at  least  a  -brief  word  should 
be  said  about  it  here. 

We  have  already  indicated  how  values  and 
"ends",  since  they  are  activities,  are  efficient  realities. 
They  need  not  be,  however,  "spiritual"  activities, 
for  a  telelogical  order  might  well  characterize  even  a 
purely  "naturalistic"  universe.^  For  the  activist, 
moreover,  they  would  be  taken  rather  in  the  Platonic 
fashion,  as  independent  meta-psychic  beings  logically 
prior  to  the  activities  of  the  lower  planes. 

Thus  an  aesthetic  ideal — the  ideal  of  beauty,  for 
example — would  not  depend  upon,  or  be  created  by, 
thought  or  awareness.  As  Emerson  says,  "The 
world  is  not  painted  or  adorned,  but  Beauty  is  the 
creator  of  the  universe."  Beauty,  like  truth  (as 
we  have  just  seen)  is  characteristic  of  the  "external 
order".  The  relations  involved  in  it  are  not  essen- 
tially dependent  upon  the  relations  obtaining  upon 
the  psychokinetic  plane.  The  ethical  ideal,  especially, 
is  an  activity  of  high  intensity — of  great  range.  And 
it,  also,  like  truth  and  beauty,  although  its  signifi- 
cance in  the  existential  world  may  hinge  upon  the 
presence  there  of  a  society  of  moral  individuals,  is 
not  dependent  upon  any  lower  order  for  its  own 
being. 

*  See  "The  Order  of  Nature".  Lawrence  J.  Henderson. 
1917.    Harvard  University  Press, 


THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  173 

Values,  then,  for  Activism,  are  independent  ac- 
tivities, as  efficient  and  "objective"  in  their  own 
way  and  according  to  their  respective  intensities  as 
any  other  facts. 

Closely  connected  with  the  problem  of  values, 
especially  at  this  time  of  wide-spread  suffering 
and  personal  sacrifice,  is  the  specific  question  of 
Personal  Survival. 

Disguise  our  interest  as  we  may,  pragmatically 
this  question  is  a  vital  one,  and  cuts  deep  in 
many  directions.  No  philosophy,  however  scorn- 
ful, can  afford  to  ignore  it  altogether.  Yet  the 
question  is  after  all  an  empirical  question,  and  a 
single  undeniable  fact  would  upset  at  once  all  our 
fine-spun  theories. 

Perhaps,  therefore,  the  most  which  can  be  ex- 
pected from  any  philosophy  is  a  statement  as  to 
whether  or  not  it  has  a  reasonable  place  for  such  a 
fact  in  its  system,  were  such  a  fact  proved  to  exist; 
and  possibly,  also,  whether  or  not  on  the  whole  the 
trend  of  its  cosmology  tends  towards  the  general 
assumption  of  such  a  fact's  existence. 

Now,  indubitably,  Activism  has  a  place  for  per- 
sonal survival.  For  a  psychokinetic  unitary  com- 
plex could  perfectly  well  exist  in  possession  of  its 
various  activities  whether  or  not  it  also  formed,  or 


174  THE  HISTORIC  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

were  in  correlation  with,  an  electronic  or  atomic 
complex  upon  the  planes  below. 

Such  an  awareness  complex  would,  of  course, 
presumably  be  cut  off  (although  even  this  does 
not  necessarily  follow)  from  the  characteristic 
activities  of  the  lower  planes;  but  it  would  not  be 
cut  off  from  relations  to  the  activities  of  its  own 
plane  or  the  planes  above.  Its  total  activity —  its 
life — might  conceivably  be  as  full,  or  fuller  than 
in  that  form  in  which  we  usually  know  it  here.  As 
an  awareness  complex  it  could  conceivably  still  \ye 
in  relation  to  other  awareness  complexes — dis- 
carnate,  or  possibly  under  peculiar  conditions,  incar- 
nate— as  well  as  be  entirely  aware  of  its  own  inten- 
sive changes. 

But  whether  or  not  such  conscious  entities  as  a 
matter  of  fact  exist,  detached  from  the  physical 
entities  with  which  they  are  normally  known  to  us 
as  associated,  is  a  question  the  decision  of  which 
rests  upon  empirical  evidence  independent  of  philo- 
sophic inquiry. 


CHAPTER  10 

CONCI^USION 

At  the  end,  here,  of  this  shght  and  tentative  essay 
it  is  perhaps  well  to  gather  up  the  threads,  and  to 
take  a  final  brief  survey  of  the  philosophic  garment 
which  we  have  tried  to  weave. 

According  to  the  hypothesis  which  has  been  de- 
veloped everything  is  considered  as  an  activity — a 
"that"  by  reason  of  which  difference  is  made,  this 
difference  being,  in  the  world  of  process,  nearly 
always  some  kind  of  a  change. 

According  to  our  hypothesis  also,  activity,  al- 
though a  unifying  conception  universally  applicable, 
is  known  to  us  principally,  not  in  its  universal  form, 
but  in  specific  instances,  the  specificity  of  which  can 
be  expressed  by  means  of  a  principle  of  determina- 
tion which  we  have  called  intensity.  And  we  have 
defined  intensity,  in  a  somewhat  technical  way,  as  a 
complex  of  elements  again  themselves  specified  as 
amount,  range,  persistence  and  their  derivative — 
exclusion ;  amount  being  quantitative,  the  greater  or 
less  activity  involved  in  any  given  instance;  range 
the  number  of  other  activities  in  respect  to  which 
any  given  activity  is  efficient — for  which  it  is  "that 
by  reason  of  which"  changes  in  them  exist;  exclu- 
sion the  extent  to  which  the  given  activity  is  inde- 
pendent, is  not  "influenced"  by  other  activities ;  and 

(175) 


176  CONCLUSION 

persistence  the  duration  of  a  given  activity,  usually 
as  a  specific  unitary  complex. 

Fundamentally  these  elements  of  intensity  are  re- 
lational, and  might  be  further  defined  as  the  quanti- 
tative relations  of  a  given  activity  to  its  own  parts 
(amount),  to  other  activities  (range),  the  relations 
of  other  activities  to  it  (exclusion),  and  to  the  time 
series  (persistence). 

All  this  of  course  rest  upon  the  assumption  of  a 
real  world  of  real  activities,  and  Activism  is  there- 
fore to  this  extent  essentially  realistic.  It  assumes 
the  "objective"  validity  and  "real"  being  of  entities 
and  relations,  as  well  as  the  fundamental  relational 
complexes  of  space,  time,  number,  and  change. 

It  assumes,  moreover,  a  minimum  entity  in  the 
existential  world  called  a  psychon  —  the  unit  of 
awareness.  And  it  posits  for  this  psychon,  as  an 
activity — a  ground  for  change — an  efficiency  not 
confined  to  the  merely  passive  capacity  for  receiving 
the  minimum  of  psychic  impression,  but  also  an 
efficiency  capable  of  being  "that  by  reason  of  which 
change  exists"  in  other  psychons.  To  express, 
therefore,  this  "dynamic"  element  of  awareness  we 
have  called  the  characteristic  activity  of  the  psychon 
psychokinesis. 

This  hypothesis,  however,  does  not  make  knowl- 
edge essentially  constitutive  in  the  epistemological 
sense,  for  the  existence  of  a  psychon  (or  its  com- 


CONCLUSION  177 

plexes)  is  independent  of  its  relations  to  other 
psychons  (or  their  complexes) ;  since  these  other 
psychons  according  to  specific  conditions  may,  or 
may  not,  be  included  in  its  awareness,  and  vice  versa. 
For  although  the  conditions  may  be  largely  or  ex- 
clusively psychokinetic  in  any  particular  instance, 
in  other  instances  they  may  be  altogether  relational ; 
and  as  a  matter  of  fact  are  generally,  as  we  know 
them  in  concrete  experience,  principally  dependent 
upon  the  ubiquitous  relations  of  time  and  space; 
while  even  the  awareness  relation  itself  turns  out, 
upon  fuller  analysis,  to  be  merely  a  peculiar  sort 
of  non-spacially  inclusive,  or  whole-part  relation. 

The  existential  world  of  energy,  "matter",  and 
mind,  then,  is  built  up  for  the  activist  altogether  out 
of  its  fundamental  entities,  the  psychons,  their 
complexes,  and  the  relations  involved  in  these  com- 
plexes. All  of  these,  nevertheless,  are  subsumed 
under  the  still  more  general  conception  of  activity, 
and  may  therefore  be  differentiated  and  quantita- 
tively determined  according  to  their  various  in- 
tensities— namely,  their  amount,  range,  exclusion, 
and  persistence,  or  any  predominant  one  of  these 
elements  which  may  characterize  them  individually. 

This  world  of  entities,  relations,  and  their  result- 
ant processes,  however,  does  not  show  itself  as  a  flat 
projection,  but  appears  cut  transversely  into  certain 
variously  well  defined  levels,  or  planes,  each  of  which 


178  CONCLUSION 

possesses,  as  its  own  architectonic  unit,  a  basic  com- 
plex of  the  units  of  the  next  more  inclusive  plane 
above.  And,  like  Caesar's  Gaul,  these  planes  may  be 
broadly  divided  into  three — the  meta-psychic,  psycho- 
kinetic,  and  physical  planes — each  one  of  which  is 
logically  prior,  as  well  as  cosmologically  funda- 
rnental,  to  the  plane  or  planes  below.  The  sharpest 
break,  however,  is  found  between  the  meta-psychic 
plane  and  the  planes  beneath  it,  since  the  psycho- 
kinetic  and  physical  planes  together  constitute  the 
entire  existential  world  as  it  is  known  to  us. 

Each  of  these  planes,  also,  possesses  its  own 
characteristic  activities  and  units;  but  the  ultimate 
units  of  each  are,  in  their  turn,  unitary  complexes 
of  the  units  of  the  next  plane  above.  In  the  world 
of  physical  science  this  is  obvious — the  living 
organism,  for  example,  being  a  unitary  complex  of 
cells,  cells  of  molecules,  molecules  of  atoms,  and 
atoms  of  electrons.  Activism  merely  pushes  this 
conception  a  step  further  and  defines  the  electron, 
in  its  turn,  as  a  unitary  complex  of  psychons — a  still 
more  fundamental  sort  of  activity. 

These  unitary  complexes,  moreover,  are  found  to 
possess  characteristic  intensities — efficiencies — over 
and  above  the  mere  sum  of  the  efficiencies  of  their 
component  units.  On  their  own  respective  planes 
they  are  efficient  as  units — as  simple  wholes ;  and  the 
characteristic  activities  of  their  planes  are  deter- 


CONCLUSION  179 

minqd  accordingly.  Upon  the  psychokinetic  plane 
proper,  also,  a  consideration  of  its  activities  has  led 
us  to  the  attempted  formulation  of  a  somewhat 
detailed  hypothesis  of  their  nature  and  the  relations 
between  them. 

Conscious  entities,  according  to  ^is  hypothesis, 
are  found  to  be  unitary  pyschokinetic  complexes  of 
such  a  sort  that  their  awareness  content  is  wholly 
determined  by  the  specific  intensity  of  the  complex 
itself;  this  intensity,  in  turn,  depending  entirely 
upon  an  actual  psychokinetic  inclusion  of  whatever 
other  activities  form  the  content  data.  This  in- 
clusion, furthermore,  may  be  either  a  manifesta- 
tion of  the  activity  of  the  complex  in  question 
itself,  or,  as  is  much  more  frequently  the  case, 
the  result  of  its  relations  to  external  activities.  It 
is,  however,  hardly  necessary  to  add  that  the  inclu- 
sion is  not  necessarily  a  spacial  inclusion,  although 
in  sense  perception  spacial  inclusion  is  involved. 

So,  finally,  we  find  that  the  "awareness  rela- 
tion", about  which  there  has  been  so  much  philo- 
sophic discussion,  falls  quite  naturally  into  line  with 
the  theories  of  Activism,  as  merely  a  peculiar  kind 
of  whole-part  relation — namely,  psychokinetic  in- 
clusion. 

In  the  chapter  on  Consciousness,  also,  the  serious 
attempt    was    made    to    differentiate    the    various 


180  CONCLUSION 

psychic  processes  and  data  quantitatively,  according 
to  their  various  intensities. 

In  its  treatment  of  philosophic  problems,  Activ- 
ism, while  in  the  main  realistic,  differs  radically 
from  other  realistic  systems  in  its  cosmology.  It  is 
realistic,  and  not  idealistic,  since  it  holds  that,  in 
general,  objects  are  essentially  independent  of  the 
relations  between  them,  and  that  consciousness  is 
not  constitutive.  It  differs  from  most  realistic  sys- 
tems, and  all  materialistic  ones,  because,  for  it,  the 
existential  world  is  built  up  of  awareness  units.  It 
agrees,  however,  with  Realism  in  holding  that  not 
all  activities  are  psychokinetic,  since  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  the  ideal  entities  and  rela- 
tions of  the  meta-psychic  plane  are  psychic  in  char- 
acter. 

On  the  other  hand  Activism  may  fairly  be  con- 
sidered largely  pan-psychic — at  least  in  so  far  as 
psychokinesis  is  given  the  dominant  role  among 
activities,  and  the  psychon  is  taken  as  the  basic 
entity  of  the  existential  world.  Its  pan-psychism, 
however,  is  limited  since  it  assumes  a  plane  of 
independent  meta-psychic  activities.  It  clearly 
stands,  also,  with  Idealism  in  that  it  maintains 
the  essential  free  efficiency  of  conscious  entities, 
since  the  unitary  psychokinetic  complex  is,  by  its 
very  definition  as  an  activity,  itself  a  "that  by 
reason  of  which  change  occurs" ;  the  extent  to  which 


CONCLUSION  181 

it  is  freely  efficient  depending  on  its  intensity,  and 
especially  upon  the  intensive  element  of  range. 

It  stands,  in  addition,  as  against  the  pragmatic 
philosophies,  with  both  Realism  and  Idealism  in 
upholding  the  existence,  or  "subsistence",  of  values 
and  ideals  as  independent  activities  in  their  own 
sphere,  capable  also,  as  such,  of  intensive  determi- 
nation. 

In  regard  to  epistemology,  it  is  realistic  in  so  far 
as  it  holds  that  terms  are  independent  of  the  rela- 
tions between  them;  that  knowledge  is  not  essen- 
tially constitutive  of  the  existence  of  objects  known; 
and  that  there  is,  over  and  above  the  existential 
world,  a  world  of  independent  meta-psychic  entities. 

From  the  very  nature  of  its  fundamental  hy- 
pothesis, however,  neither  the  epistemological  prob- 
lem nor  the  mind-body  problem  present  their  diffi- 
culties in  quite  the  same  way  as  for  other  philo- 
sophic systems ;  and  for  both  of  these  problems,  so 
far  as  they  are  immediately  involved  in  its  theory, 
it  has  its  own  peculiar  solution. 

Well ;  at  last,  what  bearing  has  all  this  on  prac- 
tical life?  The  question  is  but  too  justly  asked  of 
any  philosophic  creed,  as  well  as  of  philosophy  in 
general,  and,  unfortunately  for  philosophy,  too 
often  asked  in  vain. 

The  activist  hypothesis,  however,  would  seem 
to   have   a   quite   distinct   bearing   upon   practical 


182  CONCLUSION 

life.  In  the  first  place,  for  the  activist,  the  world 
is  a  real  world,  full  of  real  entities  and  relations 
of  which  we  are  actually  aware  as  they  really  are, 
in  spite  of  the  many  errors  which  we  make  in 
our  interpretations  of  them.  All  these  things, 
moreover,  whether  or  not  we  are  aware  of  them, 
are  things  which  make  their  essential  differences 
according  to  their  degree  and  kind,  so  that  the 
world  is  through  and  through  an  efficient  and 
living  world.  These  activities,  furthermore,  from 
the  very  nature  of  our  definition  of  them,  comprise 
the  real  unitary  activities  which  we  ourselves  are, 
as  well  as  the  conditions  which  determine  our  en- 
vironment, and  the  purposes  and  ideals  which  govern 
our  conduct. 

Not  only,  therefore,  is  the  realm  of  physical 
energy  efficient,  but  no  less,  in  their  own  way,  the 
realm  of  consciousness  and  the  realm  of  ideals. 

We  live,  then,  in  the  world  of  activities  independ- 
ent in  their  various  degrees,  of  which  we  ourselves 
are  also  specific  examples,  the  springs  of  whose  ex- 
istence are  not  wound  or  unwound  by  some  external 
force  alone,  but  which  wind  themselves  by  reason  of 
their  own  essential  resilience. 

No  differently  than  all  other  activities,  therefore, 
are  we,  just  to  that  extent  to  which  we  make  our- 
selves so,  fundamentally  free  and  self-determined. 
For  activity  is  that  which  is  self-determined,  and  we. 


CONCLUSION  183 

also,  are  "that".  The  only  ultimate  necessity  is  the 
necessity  of  being  free,  A  sufficiently  intense  ac- 
tivity binds  all  other  activities  to  its  own  purpose, 
every  change  to  its  own  vital  needs,  since  it  is  by 
reason  of  activity  that  change  itself  exists.  Free- 
dom, then,  is  not  only  a  pragmatic,  but  an  essential 
realty.  It  is  fundamentally  involved  in  the  activities 
of  every  plane,  so  that  the  real  efficiency  of  values 
and  ideals,  the  validity  and  efficiency  of  conscious- 
ness, and  the  actual  existence  of  conscious  entities 
as  living  activities — all  of  these  follow  inevitably 
from  the  postulates  of  Activism. 

That  such  a  view  of  life  must  possess, — as  even 
itself  also,  an  efficient  activity — a  determining  in- 
fluence, can  hardly  be  disputed.  And  if,  as  the  ac- 
tivist holds,  this  philosophy  of  life  is  not  only  effi- 
cient but  also  true,  there  is  scarcely  a  limit  to  the 
extent  to  which  it  might  not  affect  our  daily  exist- 
ence by  the  range  of  its  intensity. 

It  gives  us  a  world  not  only  of  what  James  pic- 
turesquely called  "thickness",  but  of  genuine  sig- 
nificance, full  undoubtedly  of  genuine  struggle,  evil, 
and  suffering,  but  alive,  self-sustaining,  and  fraught 
with  "meaning" — awareness  content — throughout. 
It  gives  us,  also,  a  world  in  which  real  personal 
activities  play  their  own  essential  parts,  personal 
activities  the  extent  of  whose  reality  and  the  im- 
portance of  whose  roles  depends  primarily  upon 


184  CONCLUSION 

their  own  psychokinetic  intensities — a  world,  in 
short,  in  which  despite  many  difficulties  and  dangers, 
any  man  can  with  justice  feel  secure  in  his  own  in- 
trinsic capacities,  and  which  he  may  well  face  with 
a  brave  heart. 


APPENDIX 

ACTIVISM    AS    A    PRACTICAL    WORKING    HYPOTHESIS. 

At  the  beginning  of  this  essay  Activism  was 
described  as  a  working  hypothesis  valuable  in  so  far 
as  it  might  be  able  to  offer  certain  fresh,  and  possi- 
bly more  adequate,  solutions  for  some  of  the  more 
obvious  problems  of  philosophy.  The  immediate 
interest  throughout  the  essay,  therefore,  has  been 
chiefly  theoretic.  Activism,  nevertheless,  may  not 
be  also  without  its  advantages  in  suggesting  a 
method  of  approach  to  some,  at  any  rate,  of  the 
more  practical  questions  of  psychology  and  psy- 
chiatry. 

In  the  chapter  on  Consciousness  there  were 
indicated  certain  formulae  of  "intensive"  measure- 
ment, particularly  in  regard  to  the  quantitative  dis- 
crimination between  sensations,  not  perhaps  with- 
out usefulness.  For  if,  in  accordance  with  our 
theory,  certain  periodicities  are  actually  certain 
colors  or  sounds,  either  as  sensations  or  sense  data, 
wherever  they  may  occur,  objective  experiments 
upon  the  interrelations  and  combinations  of  these 
periodicities  will  furnish  reliable  knowledge  in  re- 
gard to  their  interrelations  and  summations  as  "sub- 
jectively" perceived — as  psychokinetic  processes. 
And  if  the  objective  data  in  any  specific  case  should 
fail  to  correspond  with  the  introspective  report  of 

(185) 


186  APPENDIX 

the  subject,  we  should  look  for  some  abnormality 
such  as  color-blindness,  tone-deafness,  or  possibly 
some  more  subtle  psychokinetic  disturbance ;  further 
experimental  research  into  this  lack  of  correlation 
not  improbably  disclosing  the  more  exact  nature  of 
the  derangement.  For  the  advantage  of  the  activist 
point  of  view  lies  in  its  method,  which  is  essentially 
quantitative  not  only  in  its  application  to  conscious 
phenomena  regarded  as  behavior,  but  to  their  in- 
trospective aspect  as  well. 

Again,  as  we  have  pointed  out,  the  respective 
periodicities  which  characterize  the  different  sensa- 
tions, taken  in  conjunction  with  their  relative 
rhythmic  or  arhythmic  conditions,  may  prove  to  be 
important  factors  in  determining  the  emotional 
coloring  which  so  often  appears  inseparable  from 
them.  The  unpleasant  or  exciting  quahties  of  seem- 
ingly innocuous  stimuli  to  certain  subjects,  music  to 
the  unmusical,  the  red  rag  to  the  bull,  the  smell  of 
blood  to  some  homicidal  maniac — all  these  may 
possibly  be  described  in  "objective"  quantitative 
terms. 

Such  "objective"  description,  moreover,  might 
even  become  of  practical  moment  in  the  diagnosis 
and  treatment  of  some,  at  any  rate,  of  the  functional 
nervous  disorders — as,  for  example,  the  so-called 
"affect"  psychoses  (manic-depressive),  where  nearly 


APPENDIX  187 

all  the  reactions  of  the  patient  are  notably  char- 
acterized by  a  painful  (arhythmic)  feeling  tone. 

In  these  cases  a  careful  selection  of  the  stimuli 
which  still  possess  for  the  patient  the  power  of 
arousing  rhythmic  responses,  and  the  accurate  dis- 
crimination between  these  stimuli  and  the  remaining 
stimuli  which  appear  abnormally  as  arhythmic, 
might  not  only  aid  in  the  individual  diagnosis,  but 
possibly  even  suggest  treatment — such  as  placing 
the  patient  in  continued  subjection  to  the  beneficial 
stimuli,  thus  tending  to  reestablish  a  more  normal 
rhythmic  neural  (or  psychokinetic)  condition,  and 
building  up,  by  habit,  a  new  system  which  the  older 
arhythmic  habits  would  find  it  more  and  more 
difficult  to  disarrange. 

It  is,  furthermore,  not  impossible  that  experi- 
mental investigation  along  these  general  lines — i.  c, 
a  differential  analysis  of  the  normal  and  pathological 
responses  to  rhythmic  stimuli — might  assist  in  deter- 
mining at  least  some  of  the  now  obscure  causes 
which  produce  the  milder  forms  of  psychoneurosis. 

For  it  seems  clear  that  a  normally  rhythmic 
stimulus  must  become  transformed  in  some  way  in 
order  to  acquire  an  arhythmic  quality.  This  trans- 
formation might  conceivably  take  place  in  the  effer- 
ent nerve  tracts  due  to  pathological  conditions  there 
— lack  of  tonus  or  actual  poisoning  of  the  fibres; 
to  abnormal   functional  conditions  at  the  cortical 


188  APPENDIX 

centers;  or,  possibly,  to  a  purely  psychological 
(psychokinetic)  situation. 

Should  we,  therefore,  be  able  to  discover  certain 
stimuli,  normally  rhythmic  (of  pleasant  emotional 
tone),  which  would  appear  arhythmic  under  con- 
ditions of  artificially  produced  nerve  poisoning,  or 
lack  of  cortical  blood  circulation,  or  psychological 
disturbance  hypnotically  induced  in  a  normal  sub- 
ject, we  might  be  able  to  discover  by  a  process  of 
elimination  the  more  immediate  causes  of  the  trans- 
formation. 

Concerning  the  modus  operandi  of  hypnotism  and 
suggestion,  also,  about  which  so  little  is  known  at 
present,  the  activist  hypothesis  might  have  some 
contribution  to  make. 

To  take  a  concrete  example.  A  subject  under 
hypnosis  is  shown  a  plain  white  card,  and  the  sug- 
gestion made  to  him  by  the  hypnotist  that  he  should 
see  it  as  blue,  whereupon  he  sees  not  a  white  card, 
but  a  blue  one.  Now  what  happens  here  would  seem 
to  be  as  follows :  The  word  "blue"  suggested  by  the 
hypnotist  at  once  gives  rise,  for  the  subject,  by  a 
perfectly  normal  process  of  association,  to  an  image 
of  blue.  This  image,  as  we  have  contended,  consists 
of  a  certain  definite  periodicity — i.  e,,  that  periodi- 
city which  is  blue  wherever  it  may  be,  in  this  case  in 
the  subject's  psychokinetic  complex. 


APPENDIX  189 

Due,  however,  to  the  low  general  intensity  of  the 
subject's  psycliokinetic  activity — the  dream-like  con- 
dition— superinduced  by  the  hypnotic  trance,  the 
specific  intensity  of  the  suggested  image  so  fills  for 
the  moment  the  attentive  field,  is  relatively  so  great, 
as  to  cause  the  image  to  take  on  the  clearness  and 
permanence  of  an  actual  hallucination.  That  this 
hallucinatory  blueness  is  seen  uix)n  the  surface  of 
the  card  is  quite  natural,  as  for  the  moment  in  ques- 
tion the  card,  the  image  of  blue,  and  the  suggested 
association  between  the  two,  occupy  almost  exclu- 
sively the  subject's  attention. 

An  image  of  blue  suggested  to  a  normal  subject 
remains  merely  an  image  by  reason  of  its  low  rela- 
tive intensity.  The  relatively  high  intensity  and 
hallucinatory  character  of  the  hypnotic  subject's 
blue  is  due  entirely  to  the  low  general  intensive  con- 
ditions of  the  hypnotic  trance. 

But  how  is  the  hypnotic  trance  itself  induced? 
We  know  of  course  the  empirical  methods  employed 
in  producing  it — gazing  fixedly  at  some  bright  ob- 
ject, internal  strabismus,  sudden  words  of  command, 
and  the  like.  What  actually  takes  place,  however, 
neurally  or  otherwise,  is  a  mystery.  "Suggestion" 
is  merely  a  catchword  to  cover  our  ignorance. 

Yet  here  again  Activism  may  oflfer  at  least  a  hint. 
The  normal  condition  of  the  human  mind  (whatever 
its  relation  to  the  nervous  system  may  be — inde- 


lyo  APPENDIX 

pendence,  identity,  or  some  unknown  form  of  cor- 
relation) is  a  condition  of  great,  although  highly 
unstable,  intensity,  bombarded  on  every  side  by  a 
multitude  of  impinging  stimuli,  and  busily  occupied 
in  the  essential  processes  of  integration  and  selec- 
tion. In  moments  of  relaxation,  however,  in  day 
dreaming,  sleep  (as  a  rule),  and  such  conditions  as 
the  hypnotic  trance,  the  general  intensity  is  con- 
siderably lowered.  The  "amount"  of  psychokinesis 
is  obviously  less — the  mind  is  closed  to  many  ex- 
ternal stimuli.  The  "range"  is  less — the  organism 
"acts  upon"  fewer  objects  not  itself.  The  "persist- 
ence" is  less — conscious  data  linger  but  briefly  in 
the  attentive  field.  The  "exclusion"  is  also  less — the- 
mind  has  less  power,  owing  to  its  decreased  in- 
tensity, actively  to  exclude  stimuli,  although  its 
general  condition  has  cut  off  many  of  the  sensory 
channels  that  are  open  when  it  is  fully  "awake." 

Now  in  normal  sleep  these  sensory  channels  are 
deliberately  blocked.  The  eyes  are  closed,  the  body 
placed  at  rest,  the  attention  allowed  to  wander, 
"hypnagogic"  images  are  allowed  free  play.  For 
inducing  the  hypnotic  condition,  however,  a  differ- 
ent method  is  employed.  The  intensive  lowering 
here  is  brought  about,  not  by  a  general  shutting  out 
of  impinging  stimuli,  but,  rather,  by  the  focussing 
of  the  attention  upon  a  single  stimulus,  or  a  single 
complex  of  stimuli,  so  increasing  the  intensity  of 


APPENDIX  191 

that  part  of  the  subject's  psychokinetic  complex 
involved  that  the  remainder  of  the  complex  sinks  to 
a  relatively  lower  intensive  level. 

A  crude  physical  analogy  would  be  the  application 
to  a  patient  of  an  electric  current  strong  enough  to 
drive  all  other  sensory  stimuli  into  the  background — 
reduce  them  relatively  to  a  lower  level  of  intensity. 

This  condition  of  a  partial  specific  intensive  in- 
crease, with  the  concomitant  general  intensive  de- 
crease, can  be  obtained  by  various  methods  for 
different  subjects  (crystal  gazing  is  an  example), 
but  all  these  procedures  are  fundamentally  similar. 

It  may  also  be  mentioned  here  that  this  descrip- 
tion, if  correct,  furnishes  an  explanation  why  it  is  so 
difficult  to  hypnotize  the  insane  or  the  feeble-minded. 
It  is,  of  course,  because  the  artificial  creation  in 
these  pathological  subjects  of  a  psychokinetic  sub- 
complex  of  the  necessary  high  degree  of  intensity  is 
almost  impossible  to  accomplish,  since  either  the 
whole  complex  is  at  such  a  fixed  low  level  (as  in 
the  feeble-minded)  or  already  so  dominated  by  a 
sub-complex  of  high  intensity  (illusion,  or  "fixed 
idea",  as  in  the  insane),  that  there  is  no  opportunity 
for  a  fresh  sub-complex  to  overcome  these  unfavor- 
able intensive  CDnditions. 

This  brief  sketch  of  the  theory  of  Activism  as  a 
working  hypothesis,  possibly  applicable  to  some  of 
the  practical  problems  which  confront  the  experi- 


192  APPENDIX 

mental    psychologist    and    the   psychiatrist,    is,    of 
course,  a  merely  tentative  suggestion. 

Should  the  hypothesis  prove  practically  valuable, 
however,  there  are  many  other  questions,  besides 
those  so  cursorily  touched  upon,  for  the  solution  of 
which  Activism,  with  its  quantitative  formulae, 
might  prove  of  material  assistance. 


APPENDIX  1"3 

ACTIVISM  AND  RELATIVITY 


Most  of  the  philosophic  implications  of  the  Prin- 
ciple of  Relativity  have  not  as  yet  been  developed. 
It  is  likely  to  require,  moreover,  a  mental  equipment 
of  no  mean  order  for  the  task  of  abstracting  purely 
verbal  deductions  from  the  highly  technical  mathe- 
matical formulae  in  which  the  principle  is  now  set 
forth. 

Since  the  present  essay  was  written,  however,  the 
Principle  of  Relativity  has  attracted  wide-spread 
scientific  attention,  due  largely  to  its  recent  brilliant 
empirical  confirmation  by  the  astronomers.  It  may 
not  be  altogether  superfluous,  therefore,  to  point  out 
some  of  its  possible  bearings  upon  certain  specific 
solutions  offered  by  the  hypothesis  of  Activism. 

Arising  originally  out  of  mathematical  considera- 
tions suggested  by  such  experiments  in  physics  as 
those  of  Lorentz,  and  Michelson  and  Morley,  Rela- 
tivity acquired  later  a  much  wider  significance  in  the 
formulae  developed  by  Minkowski  and  Einstein. 

Very  briefly  these  formulae,  which  are  usually 
stated  in  terms  of  vector  analysis,^  are  based  upon 

'  They  may  also  be  expressed  in  quarternious  or  analytic 
algebra.  See  "Relativity  and  the  Electron  Theory."  E.  Cun- 
ningham.   Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  London,  1915. 


194  APPENDIX 

the  assumption  that  space  and  time  are  not  inde- 
pendently different,  in  the  sense  in  which  we  have 
been  hitherto  accustomed  to  consider  them ;  but  for 
the  purposes  of  physics  and  its  measurements  at  any 
rate,  can  be  much  more  accurately  defined  as  a  single 
four-dimensional  complex,  mathematically  analo- 
gous to  a  space  of  four  dimensions.  As  Minkowski 
put  it,  "From  henceforth,  space  by  itself,  and  time 
by  itself,  are  mere  shadows,  and  only  a  blend  of  the 
two  exists  in  its  own  right". ^ 

Relativity  holds  also  (hence  its  name)  that  since 
time  is  only  a  dimension,  element,  or  "coordinate" 
in  this  space-time  complex,  there  can  be  no  "abso- 
lute" standard  of  time  or  motion  in  the  Newtonian 
sense,  and  that  consequently  any  specific  velocity  is 
relative  only — dependent  upon  the  standpoint  of  the 
observor,  or  the  "frame  of  reference"  to  which  it  is 
referred. 

The  immediate  bearing  of  all  this  upon  the  theory 
of  physics  in  general,  and  astronomy  in  particular, 
is  too  complex  and  difficult  to  discuss  here,  even  if 
the  writer  were  technically  equipped.  Nevertheless 
certain  tentative  deductions  may  be  drawn  which 
are  not  without  interest  to  the  general  philosophic 
reader. 

*  Raum  und  Zeit  1908.    Reprinted  in  "Das  Relativitats  prin- 
2ip"  Leipzig  1913. 


APPENDIX  lOS 

The  most  obvious  of  these  is  the  confirmation  of 
the  vakie  of  a  fundamentally  relational,  as  opposed 
to  a  substance-quality,  point  of  view,  in  the  solu- 
tion of  actual  scientific  problems,  and  the  consequent 
suggestion  that  this  point  of  view — so  vitally  a  part 
of  Activism — may  prove  equally  valuable  in  its  ap- 
plication to  the  wider  problems  of  cosmology.  For 
if,  as  Activism  holds,  relations  are  not  only  genuine 
activities,  but  essentally  constitutive  of  the  various 
unitary  complexes  which  make  up  the  existential 
world,  then  the  relativistic  method  must  necessarily 
be  involved  in  the  investigation  of  these  problems. 

So,  for  example,  since  according  to  the  relational 
attitude  Science  no  longer  considers  the  ether  (if 
indeed  it  considers  it  at  all)  as  the  "subject  of  the 
verb  to  undulate",  Philosophy  also  need  no  longer 
consider  that  periodicities — rhythmic  changes — are 
dependent  for  their  occurrence  upon  some  material, 
or  other  "substance"  in  which  they  must  take  place. 

For  it  should  be  mentioned  that  Relativity,  as 
well  as  Activism,  holds  that  a  motion  to  be  real 
need  not  be  the  motion  of  a  physical  particle.  All 
that  is  necessary  is  that  it  should  be  an  observable 
motion.  It  might,  perfectly  well,  be  the  motion  of 
something  quite  "immaterial" — as  a  psychon. 

It  points  out,  also,  that,  since  time  and  space 
should  not  be  considered  as  independent  of  each 
other,  they  are,  empirically  at  any  rate,  not  to  be 


196  APPENDIX 

found  without  that  which  is  essentially  involved 
in  any  time-space  complex — namely,  motion.  Should 
this  be  true,  motion  would  appear  as  fundamental 
in  the  physical  world — a  world  thus  through  and 
through  dynamic,  a  world  of  activity;  and  psycho- 
kinetic  change  there  would  always  involve,  as  its 
correlate  some  form  of  it. 

Yet  while  Relativity  thus  insists  on  the  funda- 
mental role  of  motion  in  the  physical  world,  this 
need  not  imply  that  psychokinetic  change  on  its  own 
plmie  might  not  occur  without  it.  For  it  is  inter- 
esting to  note  here  that  Clerk-Maxwell's  equations 
for  electro-magnetic  change — which  is  not  a  change 
of  motion — have,  unlike  the  Newtonian  formulae, 
remain  unmodified  by  Relativity,  thus  indicating 
that  change  is  logically  prior  to  physical  motion. 

A  further  philosophic  implication  of  Relativity, 
still  straight  in  Hne  with  the  Activist  hypothesis,  is 
that  the  existential  world  of  rnotion,  space,  and 
time,  can  be  perfectly  well  described — in  fact  tmist 
be  described  in  order  fully  to  explain  three-dimen- 
sional phenomena — as  a  four-dimensional  world  of 
fundamental  efficiencies. 

The  reality  of  higher  dimensional  entities  has 
always  been  insisted  upon  by  realistic  philosophies 
which,  like  Activism,  have  frequently  pointed  out 
the  inadequacy  of  the  Aristotelian  "substantive" 
attitude;  and  it  now  appears  as  though  Science,  as 


APPENDIX  197 

well,  was  being  forced  to  break  away  from  the  older 
logical  framework. 

Relativity,  then,  would  presumably  find  no  logical 
objection  to  the  hypothesis  of  Activism,  with  its 
higher  dimensional  entities,  such  as  psychons  and 
relational  complexes ;  since  these  latter,  at  any  rate, 
are  fundamental  to  the  whole  relativist  point  of 
view.  On  the  contrary  the  Principle  of  Relativity 
has  already  been  the  means  of  furnishing  a  striking 
empirical  confirmation  of  at  least  that  portion  of  the 
Activist  hypothesis  which  deals  with  the  relational 
situation. 


J98  APPENDIX 

WHAT  IS  ACTIVISM? 

A   SUMMARY 

Activism  is  a  new  philosophy,  or,  at  the  least,  a 
new  point  of  view  in  philosophy — a  new  way  of 
presenting  certain  old  ideas. 

It  possesses  some  elements  in  common  with 
Realism — especially  Neo-Realism;  some  character- 
istics in  common  with  Pan-psychism ;  and  some  in 
common  with  objective  Idealism;  but  it  differs  in 
many  important  respects  from  them  all. 

It  holds  that  awareness  is  the  fundamental  reality 
of  the  "existential"  world — the  world  of  physical 
objects  and  conscious  experience,  but  not  because 
that  world  owes  its  being  to  some  Thinker,  or 
thinkers  (Idealism),  but  because  the  ultimate  entities 
of  which  it  is  composed  are  minimum  units  of 
awareness — called  "psychons ;"  these  psychons  when 
organized  into  electrons  forming  the  basic  units  of 
the  physical  world,  and  when  organized  into  certain 
other  unitary  complexes  forming  individual  minds. 

It  holds,  however,  as  opposed  to  Idealism  and 
most  forms  of  Pan-psychism,  but  in  common  with 
Neo-Realism,  that  there  are  also  other  realities 
besides  the  psychons — namely  relations,  and  "meta- 
psychic"  entities,  such  as  the  manifolds  of  space, 
time,  and  the  numerical  series — and  that  these  are 
not  essentially  psychic  in  nature. 


APPENDIX  19y 

It  holds  also,  with  Realism,  that  both  the  existen- 
tial world  of  consciousness  and  physical  objects,  and 
the  "subsistential"  world  of  relations  and  meta- 
psychic  entities  are  "objectively"  real,  and  not  de- 
pendent for  their  reality  upon  being  known.  In 
other  words  it  holds  that  knowledge  is  not  essen- 
tially constitutive  of  its  objects. 

It  describes  the  universe,  so  far  as  actually  dis- 
covered, as  consisting  of  certain  well  defined  levels, 
or  "planes,"  with  their  sub-planes;  the  three  prin- 
cipal divisions  being  the  physical,  psychic,  and 
meta-psychic  planes,  each  of  which  possesses  its 
characteristic  basic  units — respectively,  electrons, 
psychons,  and  relations. 

According  to  this  description  it  holds  that,  in  the 
existential  world  at  any  rate,  the  basic  units  of  each 
plane  and  sub-plane  consist  of  unitary  complexes 
of  the  basic  units  of  the  plane  (or  sub-plane)  next 
above  (proceeding  "upwards"  from  the  level  of 
"matter")  ;  these  unitary  complexes  of  higher  plane 
entities  behaving,  upon  their  own  plane,  as  simple 
unit  entities. 

It  holds,  furthermore,  that  this  characteristic 
behavior  of  the  unit  entities  of  each  plane,  or  sub- 
plane,  is  something  sui  generis  and  different  from 
any  possible  behavior  for  the  unit  entities  of  the 
plane  above,  unless  these  higher  plane  units  are 


200  APPENDIX 

organized  into  those  specific  unitary  complexes 
essential  for  the  formation  of  the  lower  plane  units. 

As  for  example,  a  living  cell  behaves  as  no  other 
congeries  of  molecules  can  behave,  a  molecule  of 
protoplasm  as  no  other  congeries  of  atoms,  an  atom 
as  no  other  pattern  of  electrons,  and  an  electron  is 
no  other  aggregate  of  psychons. 

It  holds,  moreover,  that  such  a  progressive 
organization  is  impossible  without  organizing  rela- 
tions— the  efficient  activities  of  the  meta-psychic 
plane.  And  it  holds,  especially,  that  all  these  entities 
and  relations,  both  singly  and  in  their  various  com- 
plexes, make  a  real  difference  somewhere,  and  there- 
fore constitute  real  efficiencies.  Hence  they  are 
called  "activities,"  and  the  philosophy  which  so  con- 
siders them  "Activism." 

It  defines  activity  as  "that  by  reason  of  which 
change  exists" ;  and  it  considers  that  activity,  as  so 
defined,  is  a  conception  universally  valid  for  the 
description  of  all  possible  objects  of  which  we  can 
become  aware,  including  awareness  itself. 

It  holds,  also,  that  activities  of  all  kinds  can  be 
quantitatively  differentiated  by  means  of  a  certain 
characteristic  which  they  possess  in  common  known 
as  "intensity."  And  it  defines  intensity  as  consist- 
ing of  four  elements,  three  of  which  are  primary  and 
one  derivative. 


APPENDIX  201 

These  elements  it  calls,  respectively,  "amount," 
"range,"  "persistence"  and  "exclusion";  amount 
being  the  numerical  quantity  of  activity  units  (upon 
any  plane)  which  compose  a  given  object;  range 
the  numerical  quantity  of  other  objects  to  which 
the  given  object  can  "make  a  difference";  per- 
sistence the  length  of  time  (duration)  through 
which  the  given  object  exists  as  such  an  object; 
and  exclusion  the  inherent  capacity  of  the  given 
object  to  bar  out  any  activities  which  tend  towards 
its  own  disintegration. 

Such  a  principle  of  "intensive"  quantitative  differ- 
entiation, it  holds,  can  be  applied  not  only  to 
material  or  physical  objects,  but  also  to  the  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness.  And  it  further  holds  that 
the  use  of  such  a  quantitative  method  will  be  of  sub- 
stantial assistance  in  the  solution  of  many  problems 
in  psychology  and  psychiatry,  both  experimental  and 
theoretic,  including  the  so-called  mind-body  prob- 
lem ;  especially  since  it  believes  that  it  has  been  able 
to  furnish,  for  the  first  time,  a  logical  explanation 
of  the  interrelations  between  conscious  processes  and 
physical  motion. 

Specifically,  it  maintains  that  the  characteristic 
activities  of  those  unitary  complexes  of  psychons 
which  constitute  individual  human  minds  can  be 
more  accurately  defined;  and  that  mental  processes 
— whether  considered  introspectively  or  in  their  rela- 


202  APPENDIX 

tion  to  the  nervous  system  (whatever  that  relation 
may  be) — can  be  more  fully  described,  than  by  any 
of  the  older  methods. 

In  its  insistence  on  an  essentially  relational  point 
of  view  and  the  efficiency  of  higher  dimensional 
activities,  as  well  as  upon  the  fact  that  change  and 
motion  may  occur  without  being  the  change  or 
motion  of  a  physical  particle,  but  in  order  to  be  real 
need  only  be  an  observable  change  of  motion, 
Activism  is  straight  in  line  with  the  Principle  of 
Relativity  which  has  recently  received  so  brilliant  an 
empirical  confirmation  by  Physics  and  Astronomy. 

And,  finally.  Activism  believes  that  a  further 
development  of  its  fundamental  conceptions — the 
application  of  its  universal  formulae  of  quantitative 
description — together  with  its  attitude  towards  the 
world  order,  the  efficiency  of  organizing  relations, 
and  the  dynamic  reality  of  ideals  and  values,  may 
prove  of  practical  as  well  as  theoretic  importance  in 
solving  many  of  the  scientific  and  social  problems 
which  confront  us  to-day. 


INDEX 

A 

PACE 

Activity,  definition  of   7 

"         various  kinds  of  1 1  flF. 

Activism,  as  a  theoretical  working  hj'pothesis 4 

"          as  a  practical  working  hypothesis   185  ff. 

'*          review  of,  Chapter  10  175  ff. 

"          sumlmary   of    198  ff. 

Amount,  as  an  element  of  intensity  21  ff. 

Atomism 40 

"        psychic    44 

Attention 126 

Awareness,  as  an  activity  35, 5i  ff. 

"  not   constitutive    81, 157  ff. 

"           definition  of    168 

"           nature  of  168  ff. 

B 

Behavior,  consciousness  as 34 

Bcrgson     , 2, 123  note 

Berkeky     153 

Bradley   2,  7, 153 

Buddhism  37  note 

C 

Change,  without  motion 89  note 

Clerk-Maxwell    196 

Color,  as  psychokinetic  periodicity  108  ff. 

Concept   129  ff 

Consciousness,  Chapter  7    92  ff. 

"              as  an  activity   18  ff. 

"             definition  of   92 

Cosmology,   activist    146  ff. 


204  INDEX 

D  PAGE 

Disintegration,  of  unitary  complexes  49  ff. 

Dream  images 165  flf. 

E 

Eastern  philosophy,  and  the  planes  of  activity 36  note 

Einstein    193 

Electrons,  composition  of  45. 89 

"          definition  of  79 

Emerson    2, 25, 167, 17a 

Emotion     132  ff . 

Empiricism,  Radical   4 

Episteitiological  problem   152  ff. 

Error,  problem  of  162  ff. 

Exclusion,  as  an  element  of  intensity 26  ff. 

F 

False  and  True 163  ff. 

Feeling    117  ff. 

Function  and  structure  50  ff- 

Fundmental  conceptions,  Chapter  i  iff. 

G 

Geometrical  figures,  as  activities  24, 27 

Goodness,  as  an  activity 14,  23, 27 

H 

Hallucinations     167 

Herhart    45  note 

Hegel     153 

Hypnotism   188  ff. 

Hume    153 

Huntington     22 note,  i56note 


INDEX  205 

I  PACE 

Ideah,  as  activities  12  ff. 

Idealism    153 

Image    120  ff. 

Immortality,  personal  173 

Intensity,  as  the  measure  of  activity  20  ff. 

"          definition  of   21 

"         as   a   method   of   differentiating   psychic 

processes    104  ff. 

Intcrelations  between  psychons  and  electrons  76  ff. 

J 
James,  William  18  note,  183 

K 

Kant    153 

Knowledge,  not  constitutive I55  ff. 

"           a  priori  160 

L 

Logical  propositions  as  activities 9. 14.  i63ff. 

Lorentz   193 

M 

Mathematical  entities  12  ff. 

Matter,  electrical  character  of  12, 33 

Meaning    132 

Memory   122  ff 

Meta-psychic  entities    53 

Meta-psychic  plane,  Chapter  8 138  ff. 

Minkowski     193 

Mind-body  problem  148  ff. 

Monism   145  ff. 

Motion  and  Relativity  194  ff. 

"        and  Psychokinesis  84  ff. 


206  INDEX 

N  PAGE 

Nerve  impulse,  nature  of » 94  ff. 

Nervous  system,  relation  to  psychokinetic  complex  95  ff. 

New  Realism   154 

O 

One,  and  the  many  3, 144  ff. 

Organizing  relations   32  ff.,  73  ff. 

P 

Pain   117 

Perception    127  ff. 

Periodicities    108  ff. 

Persistence,  as  an  element  of  intensity 24  ff. 

Philosophy,  historic  problems  of.  Chapter  9 144 

Planes,  lower  and  higher 38 

"       interrelation  of.  Chapter  6  58  ff. 

Psychic  Atomism 44 

"       Complex    51  ff. 

Psychokinesis    46, 82 

"             and  motion    84  ff. 

Psychokinetic  intensity    61  ff. 

Psychon    45 

Psycho-physical  correlation  95  ff. 

Q 

Quantitative  method  of  intensity  40, 175  ff. 

"                "        of   Activism   applied   to   Psy- 
chology     104  ff. 

R 

Range,  as  an  element  of  Intensity 23  ff. 

Relations,  types  of 64  ff. 

"          nature  of 67  ff. 

"         between  psychons  68  ff. 

"          theory  of    I53  ff- 


INDEX  207 

PAGE 

Relativity,  principle  of  i93  ff- 

"          and  activism  193  flf. 

Retention — in  memory  122  flf. 

Royce—on  relations   64  ff. 

Russell    2, 9,  22  note,  139  note 

Rhythm,  importance  of  1 19  ff . 

S 

Sensation    107  ff. 

Sensation,  localization  of 1 16  ff. 

Solipsism    71  note 

Space — perception    1 1 1  ff. 

Spencer   119 

Structure  and  process 55  ff- 

Subject — object  relation   170  ff. 

Synapse  98 

T 

Titchencr     1 10  note,  121  note 

Touch    115  ff 

Thought  processes 129 ff. 

Truth   163  ff. 

U 

Universals    14  ff. 

Unitary  Complexes,  Chapter  5  47  ff. 

Units  of  Activity,  Chapter  4  38  ff. 

Unpleasantness    117  ff. 

V 

Values     17  ff. 

"       problem  of    171  ff. 

Visual  sensation  107  ff. 


;J08  INDEX 

W  PAGE 

Warren    107  note,  123  note,  130  note 

Will    134  ff. 

Wundt 127  note 


Zeeman  Effect 101  ff. 


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